precise standard in California

2025(In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902 ; In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090 , 1094.) “‘“The precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child.”’” (In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 186-187 .) II.

2024(See N.M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094; In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961 , 973–974.) “In reviewing an order for abuse of discretion, we ‘ “must consider all the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] The precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child.” ’ ” (In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178 , 186–187.) Here, the evidence DCFS presented to the juvenile court— including Mother’s fa

2013(Foster v. Foster (1937) 8 Cal.2d 719, 730 [ 68 P.2d 719 ]; In re Marriage of Carlson (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1330, 1337-1338 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 840 ].) „The reviewing court must consider all the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court‟s ruling. [Citation.] The precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child. [Citation.] We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether it is the ground rel

2013(Foster v. Foster (1937) 8 Cal.2d 719, 730 [ 68 P.2d 719 ]; In re Marriage of Carlson (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1330, 1337-1338 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 840 ].) „The reviewing court must consider all the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court‟s ruling. [Citation.] The precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child. [Citation.] We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether it is the ground rel

2016Plaintiffs insist the correct standard requires them “ ‘to show the statute is unconstitutional in all or most cases.’ ” (City of San Diego v. Boggess (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1504 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 ].) “The precise standard governing facial challenges ‘has been a subject of controversy within [the California Supreme Court].’ ” (Zuckerman v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2002) 29 Cal.4th 32, 39 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 53 P.3d 119 ].) “Under the strictest test, the statute must be upheld unless the party establishes the statute ‘ “inevitably posefs] a present total and fatal conf

2016Plaintiffs insist the correct standard requires them “ ‘to show the statute is unconstitutional in all or most cases.’ ” (City of San Diego v. Boggess (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1504 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 ].) “The precise standard governing facial challenges ‘has been a subject of controversy within [the California Supreme Court].’ ” (Zuckerman v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2002) 29 Cal.4th 32, 39 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 53 P.3d 119 ].) “Under the strictest test, the statute must be upheld unless the party establishes the statute ‘ “inevitably posefs] a present total and fatal conf

2016Improved and Unimproved Public Property “The [Government] [C]laims [A]ct in general, and section 831.2 in particular, fail to either define or establish ‘a precise standard for determining when, as the result of developmental activity, public property in its natural state ceases to be “unimproved.” ’ ” (Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882 , 887-888 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 586 ] (Keyes).) Courts, however, have required “at least ‘some form of [artificial] physical change in the condition of the property at the location of the injury.’ ” (Id. at p. 888, quoting Van Alstyne,

2016Improved and Unimproved Public Property “The [Government] [C]laims [A]ct in general, and section 831.2 in particular, fail to either define or establish ‘a precise standard for determining when, as the result of developmental activity, public property in its natural state ceases to be “unimproved.” ’ ” (Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882 , 887-888 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 586 ] (Keyes).) Courts, however, have required “at least ‘some form of [artificial] physical change in the condition of the property at the location of the injury.’ ” (Id. at p. 888, quoting Van Alstyne,

2016Improved and Unimproved Public Property “The [Government] [C]laims [A]ct in general, and section 831.2 in particular, fail to either define or establish ‘a precise standard for determining when, as the result of developmental activity, public property in its natural state ceases to be “unimproved.” ’ ” (Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882 , 887-888 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 586 ] (Keyes).) Courts, however, have required “at least ‘some form of [artificial] physical change in the condition of the property at the location of the injury.’ ” (Id. at p. 888, quoting Van Alstyne,

2016Improved and Unimproved Public Property “The [Government] Claims Act in general, and section 831.2 in particular, fail to either define or establish ‘a precise standard for determining when, as the result of developmental activity, public property in its natural state ceases to be ‘unimproved.’ ” (Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882 , 887–888 (Keyes).) Courts, however, have required “at least ‘some form of [artificial] physical change in the condition of the property at the location of the injury.” (Id. at p. 888, quoting Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liabilit

2024(Ibid.) We “‘consider all the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] The precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child. [Citation.] We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether it is the ground relied upon by the trial judge. [Citation.]’” (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 .) B.

2024On appeal, this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474 .) In reviewing an order for abuse of discretion, we “ ‘must consider all the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] The precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 .) “The trial court is accorded wide discretio

2024On appeal, this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474 .) In reviewing an order for abuse of discretion, we “ ‘must consider all the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] The precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 .) “The trial court is accorded wide discretio

2020(In re Gabriel L. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644, 652 .) “In reviewing an order for abuse of discretion, we ‘“must consider all the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] The precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child.”’ [Citation.] ‘The trial court is accorded wide discretion and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent “a manifest showing of abuse.”’” (In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal

2022In Cel-Tech, the Supreme Court determined that the definitions the Courts of Appeal had developed for the term “unfair” business practices, as used in the unfair competition law, were “too amorphous and provide too little guidance to courts and businesses.” ( Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 184–185.) It devised a more precise test: “[T]o guide courts and the business community adequately and to promote consumer protection, we must require that any finding of unfairness to competitors under section 17200 be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened

2020In Cel-Tech, we noted that our court had not yet defined the term “unfair” as used in the UCL and determined that although two Court of Appeal decisions had attempted such a definition,9 the suggested definitions in those appellate decisions were “too amorphous and provide too little guidance to courts and businesses.” (Cel-Tech, at p. 185.) Thereafter, in devising “a more precise test for determining what is unfair under the unfair competition law”, the court in Cel-Tech “turn[ed] for guidance to the jurisprudence arising under the ‘parallel’ section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ( 15

2013The Pereira approach is to allocate a fair return to the separate property investment and allocate the balance of the increased value to community property as arising from community efforts. [Citations.] The Van Camp approach is to determine the reasonable value of the community’s services, allocate that amount to community property and the balance to separate property.’ ( Dekker, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at pp. 852–853, fns. omitted.) “ ‘[C]ourts have not developed a precise standard in choosing between Pereira or Van Camp, but have endeavored to adopt that formula which is most appropriate and

2013If the court chooses the Pereira approach, it “would allocate a fair return of the increase to the community property and the excess would be the husband‟s separate property.” [Citation.] If the court chooses the Van Camp approach, it “would determine the reasonable value of husband‟s services (less the draws or salary taken) and allocate this additional sum, if any, to husband as his separate property and the balance of the increase to community property.” [Citation.]‟ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Hargrave, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 356 .) “[C]ourts have not developed a precise standard

2019(See People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666 , 672, 238 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 738 P.2d 752 .) In Guiton , we did not establish the precise standard of review for cases governed by Green . ( Guiton , 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1130-1131, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Although we observed that in cases like Green "the general rule has been to reverse the conviction because the appellate court is ' "unable to determine which of the prosecution's theories served as the basis for the jury's verdict" ' " ( Guiton , at p. 1130, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 ), we also noted that "even this rule has not been not

2019(See People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666 , 672, 238 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 738 P.2d 752 .) In Guiton , we did not establish the precise standard of review for cases governed by Green . ( Guiton , 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1130-1131, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Although we observed that in cases like Green "the general rule has been to reverse the conviction because the appellate court is ' "unable to determine which of the prosecution's theories served as the basis for the jury's verdict" ' " ( Guiton , at p. 1130, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 ), we also noted that "even this rule has not been not

2023Whether the particular misconduct is a bar to the alleged claim for relief depends on (1) analogous case law, (2) the nature of the misconduct, and (3) the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries.” (Kendall-Jackson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 979 .) We need not decide the precise standard of review that governs the defense of unclean hands. ( Brown, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at pp. 274–275 [noting differences among various appellate courts].) Regardless of which standard applies (see ibid.), we conclude the trial court did not err in rejecting the defense.

2011(See Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 274-275 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 893 ] (Brown) [noting differences among various appellate courts].) Regardless of whether we apply an abuse of discretion, substantial evidence, or “question of fact” standard of review (see ibid, [identifying three different standards which have been used by appellate courts]), the trial court was correct not to give preclusive effect to the defense.

2019The California Supreme Court has not articulated a precise standard to judge whether private property constitutes a public forum for free speech purposes under California's constitution, but it has said, at the highest level of generality, private property constitutes a public forum if the property is open to the public "in the same manner as public streets or parks." ( Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850 , 859, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288 , 172 P.3d 742 ( Fashion Valley Mall ).) So, for example, our Supreme Court in its seminal Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ce

2019The California Supreme Court has not articulated a precise standard to judge whether private property constitutes a public forum for free speech purposes under California's constitution, but it has said, at the highest level of generality, private property constitutes a public forum if the property is open to the public "in the same manner as public streets or parks." ( Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850 , 859, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288 , 172 P.3d 742 ( Fashion Valley Mall ).) So, for example, our Supreme Court in its seminal Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ce

2016Plaintiffs insist the correct standard requires them “ ‘to show the statute is unconstitutional in all or most cases.’ ” (City of San Diego v. Boggess (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1504 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 ].) “The precise standard governing facial challenges ‘has been a subject of controversy within [the California Supreme Court].’ ” (Zuckerman v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2002) 29 Cal.4th 32, 39 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 53 P.3d 119 ].) “Under the strictest test, the statute must be upheld unless the party establishes the statute ‘ “inevitably posefs] a present total and fatal conf

2016Plaintiffs insist the correct standard requires them “ ‘to show the statute is unconstitutional in all or most cases.’ ” (City of San Diego v. Boggess (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1504 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 ].) “The precise standard governing facial challenges ‘has been a subject of controversy within [the California Supreme Court].’ ” (Zuckerman v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2002) 29 Cal.4th 32, 39 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 53 P.3d 119 ].) “Under the strictest test, the statute must be upheld unless the party establishes the statute ‘ “inevitably posefs] a present total and fatal conf

2016Improved and Unimproved Public Property “The [Government] [C]laims [A]ct in general, and section 831.2 in particular, fail to either define or establish ‘a precise standard for determining when, as the result of developmental activity, public property in its natural state ceases to be “unimproved.” ’ ” (Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882 , 887-888 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 586 ] (Keyes).) Courts, however, have required “at least ‘some form of [artificial] physical change in the condition of the property at the location of the injury.’ ” (Id. at p. 888, quoting Van Alstyne,

2016Improved and Unimproved Public Property “The [Government] [C]laims [A]ct in general, and section 831.2 in particular, fail to either define or establish ‘a precise standard for determining when, as the result of developmental activity, public property in its natural state ceases to be “unimproved.” ’ ” (Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882 , 887-888 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 586 ] (Keyes).) Courts, however, have required “at least ‘some form of [artificial] physical change in the condition of the property at the location of the injury.’ ” (Id. at p. 888, quoting Van Alstyne,

2016We acknowledge that “[t]here is some dispute about the precise standard of review that applies to an appellate challenge to a juvenile court ruling rejecting a claim that one of the adoption exceptions applies.” (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) Assuming the substantial evidence test applies, “we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 .) Mo

2014The transcript clearly indicates that counsel for DCFS, the child, and Mother all addressed the question, and that the juvenile court decided the question. 14 emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.’ [Citations.]” (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528-529 (J.C.).) “There is some dispute about the precise standard of review that applies to an appellate challenge to a juvenile court ruling rejecting a claim that one of the adoption exceptions applies.” (In re Bailey J. (201

2016Plaintiffs insist the correct standard requires them “ ‘to show the statute is unconstitutional in all or most cases.’ ” (City of San Diego v. Boggess (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1504 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 ].) “The precise standard governing facial challenges ‘has been a subject of controversy within [the California Supreme Court].’ ” (Zuckerman v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2002) 29 Cal.4th 32, 39 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 53 P.3d 119 ].) “Under the strictest test, the statute must be upheld unless the party establishes the statute ‘ “inevitably posefs] a present total and fatal conf

2016Plaintiffs insist the correct standard requires them “ ‘to show the statute is unconstitutional in all or most cases.’ ” (City of San Diego v. Boggess (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1504 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 ].) “The precise standard governing facial challenges ‘has been a subject of controversy within [the California Supreme Court].’ ” (Zuckerman v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2002) 29 Cal.4th 32, 39 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 53 P.3d 119 ].) “Under the strictest test, the statute must be upheld unless the party establishes the statute ‘ “inevitably posefs] a present total and fatal conf

2002We evaluate the merits of a facial challenge by considering “only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual.” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 ].) A plaintiff challenging the facial validity of a statute “cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular application of the statute.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 180 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 487 , 624 P.2d 1215 ].) The precise

2002We evaluate the merits of a facial challenge by considering “only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual.” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 ].) A plaintiff challenging the facial validity of a statute “cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular application of the statute.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 180 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 487 , 624 P.2d 1215 ].) The precise