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23 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1865–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hallakgreen2 sentences2017As acknowledged by defendant, this Court has already rendered a binding and determinative decision regarding the precise challenge raised by defendant in People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555 ; 873 NW2d 811 (2015), rev’d in part on other grounds by 499 Mich 879 (2016). 2017As acknowledged by defendant, this Court has already rendered a binding and determinative decision regarding the precise challenge raised by defendant in People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555 ; 873 NW2d 811 (2015), rev’d in part on other grounds by 499 Mich 879 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc v. Sinacola Companies—midwest, Incgreen1 sentence2002MCL 570.1111(1); MSA 26.316(111)(1) states without qualification that a subcontractor's right to a lien ceases to exist if not recorded in the county office of the register of deeds within ninety days after the last furnishing of labor or material. [Id. at 323-324, 603 N.W.2d 257 (emphasis added).] In my view, interpreting the term "recorded" to mean entry in the book of levies not only is consistent with the plain meaning of the statute but is consistent with the Legislature's intent to require strict compliance with this particular notice provision of the act. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fredericksgreen2 sentences1973The precise instruction given was considered by a panel of this Court in People v Fredericks, 36 Mich App 632, 636 ; 194 NW2d 42, 44 (1971). 1973The precise instruction given was considered by a panel of this Court in People v Fredericks, 36 Mich App 632, 636 ; 194 NW2d 42, 44 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
Albert A. Albrecht Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Iron Worksgreen1 sentence1973See Albert A. Albrecht Co v Whitehead & Kales Iron Works, 200 Mich 109 (1918); Smith v Port Huron Gas & Electric Co, 217 Mich 519, 522 (1922). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Port Huron Gas & Electric Co.green1 sentence1973See Albert A. Albrecht Co v Whitehead & Kales Iron Works, 200 Mich 109 (1918); Smith v Port Huron Gas & Electric Co, 217 Mich 519, 522 (1922). | 1 | 1 |
Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Rileygreen2 sentences1932But as indicative of the growth and development of the law in this and other States in the direction of rendering it effective extraterritorially, see Bradbury, Workmen’s Compensation (3d Ed.), p. 92, quoted by the late Justice Fellows in Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, supra, 221; also 1 Honnold on Workmen’s Compensation, § 8, where it is said: “In view of the conflict of authority and differences between the various acts, it is difficult to formulate a precise rule relative to the extraterritorial operation of these laws; but it may be stated on the weight of authority that acts not con 1932But as indicative of the growth and development of the law in this and other States in the direction of rendering it effective extraterritorially, see Bradbury, Workmen’s Compensation (3d Ed.), p. 92, quoted by the late Justice Fellows in Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, supra, 221; also 1 Honnold on Workmen’s Compensation, § 8, where it is said: “In view of the conflict of authority and differences between the various acts, it is difficult to formulate a precise rule relative to the extraterritorial operation of these laws; but it may be stated on the weight of authority that acts not con | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lockridge
green
2 sentences2018Id. 2018Id. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Buell v. Irwin
green
2 sentences1921To support this proposition counsel cites Buell v. Irwin, 24 Mich. 145 ; Gamble v. Ross, 88 Mich. 315 , and several other authorities. 1899To support this proposition counsel cites Buell v. Irwin, 24 Mich. 145 , Gamble v. Ross, 88 Mich. 315 , and several other authorities. | 2 | 1899–1921 |
Gamble v. Ross
green
2 sentences1921To support this proposition counsel cites Buell v. Irwin, 24 Mich. 145 ; Gamble v. Ross, 88 Mich. 315 , and several other authorities. 1899To support this proposition counsel cites Buell v. Irwin, 24 Mich. 145 , Gamble v. Ross, 88 Mich. 315 , and several other authorities. | 2 | 1899–1921 |
People v. Garland
green
1 sentence2026Garland, 286 Mich App at 7 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
green
2 sentences2018Gilbert , 470 Mich. at 782 , 685 N.W.2d 391 . 2018Gilbert , 470 Mich. at 782 , 685 N.W.2d 391 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Robinson
green
1 sentence2017As acknowledged by defendant, this Court has already rendered a binding and determinative decision regarding the precise challenge raised by defendant in People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555 ; 873 NW2d 811 (2015), rev’d in part on other grounds by 499 Mich 879 (2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Industries
green
2 sentences2005That is, "an obvious danger is no danger to a `reasonably' careful person." Id. at 396 , 491 N.W.2d 208 . "[I]f the risk is obvious from the characteristics of the product, the product itself telegraphs the precise warning that plaintiffs [would claim] is lacking." Id. at 394 , 491 N.W.2d 208 . 2005That is, "an obvious danger is no danger to a `reasonably' careful person." Id. at 396 , 491 N.W.2d 208 . "[I]f the risk is obvious from the characteristics of the product, the product itself telegraphs the precise warning that plaintiffs [would claim] is lacking." Id. at 394 , 491 N.W.2d 208 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Meeboer
yellow
1 sentence1992The Supreme Court’s remand order directs us to address "whether the totality of circumstances test, discussed in Meeboer, supra, should apply in this case where the complainant is thirteen years of age and a presumption might arise that the complainant understood the need to be truthful to examining medical personnel.” 440 Mich 856 . *662 Neither counsel nor the Supreme Court has directed our attention to the precise presumption to which the Supreme Court refers. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Miller v. Grand Haven Board of Education
neutral
2 sentences1987Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 24.306(l)(d); MSA 3.560(206)(l)(d); Comstock Public Schools v Wildfong, 92 Mich App 279, 284-285 ; 284 NW2d 527 (1979); Miller v Grand Haven Bd of Ed, 151 Mich App 412, 422 ; 390 NW2d 255 (1986), lv den 426 Mich 881 (1986). 1987Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 24.306(l)(d); MSA 3.560(206)(l)(d); Comstock Public Schools v Wildfong, 92 Mich App 279, 284-285 ; 284 NW2d 527 (1979); Miller v Grand Haven Bd of Ed, 151 Mich App 412, 422 ; 390 NW2d 255 (1986), lv den 426 Mich 881 (1986). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Comstock Public Schools v. Wildfong
green
2 sentences1987Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 24.306(l)(d); MSA 3.560(206)(l)(d); Comstock Public Schools v Wildfong, 92 Mich App 279, 284-285 ; 284 NW2d 527 (1979); Miller v Grand Haven Bd of Ed, 151 Mich App 412, 422 ; 390 NW2d 255 (1986), lv den 426 Mich 881 (1986). 1987Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 24.306(l)(d); MSA 3.560(206)(l)(d); Comstock Public Schools v Wildfong, 92 Mich App 279, 284-285 ; 284 NW2d 527 (1979); Miller v Grand Haven Bd of Ed, 151 Mich App 412, 422 ; 390 NW2d 255 (1986), lv den 426 Mich 881 (1986). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences1983This Court rejected this precise claim in People v Davis, 101 Mich App 198, 201-203 ; 300 NW2d 497 (1980). 1983This Court rejected this precise claim in People v Davis, 101 Mich App 198, 201-203 ; 300 NW2d 497 (1980). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
In Re Woods Estate
green
2 sentences1977Hobbs v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 90 ; 247 NW2d 754 (1976), Kerkstra v State Highway Department, 60 Mich App 761 ; 231 NW2d 521 (1975), Detroit Bank & Trust Co v Department of State Highways, 55 Mich App 131 ; 222 NW2d 59 (1974), In re Woods Estate, 49 Mich App 412 ; 212 NW2d 240 (1973). 4 MCLA 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922. 5 (1) The governmental immunity statute, MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), is unconstitutional; (2) The trial court erred in considering. the motion for summary judgment since that defense was not raised in a motion for accelerated judgment nor in the first responsive p 1977Hobbs v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 90 ; 247 NW2d 754 (1976), Kerkstra v State Highway Department, 60 Mich App 761 ; 231 NW2d 521 (1975), Detroit Bank & Trust Co v Department of State Highways, 55 Mich App 131 ; 222 NW2d 59 (1974), In re Woods Estate, 49 Mich App 412 ; 212 NW2d 240 (1973). 4 MCLA 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922. 5 (1) The governmental immunity statute, MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), is unconstitutional; (2) The trial court erred in considering. the motion for summary judgment since that defense was not raised in a motion for accelerated judgment nor in the first responsive p | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Hobbs v. Department of State Highways
red
2 sentences1977Hobbs v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 90 ; 247 NW2d 754 (1976), Kerkstra v State Highway Department, 60 Mich App 761 ; 231 NW2d 521 (1975), Detroit Bank & Trust Co v Department of State Highways, 55 Mich App 131 ; 222 NW2d 59 (1974), In re Woods Estate, 49 Mich App 412 ; 212 NW2d 240 (1973). 4 MCLA 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922. 5 (1) The governmental immunity statute, MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), is unconstitutional; (2) The trial court erred in considering. the motion for summary judgment since that defense was not raised in a motion for accelerated judgment nor in the first responsive p 1977Hobbs v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 90 ; 247 NW2d 754 (1976), Kerkstra v State Highway Department, 60 Mich App 761 ; 231 NW2d 521 (1975), Detroit Bank & Trust Co v Department of State Highways, 55 Mich App 131 ; 222 NW2d 59 (1974), In re Woods Estate, 49 Mich App 412 ; 212 NW2d 240 (1973). 4 MCLA 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922. 5 (1) The governmental immunity statute, MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), is unconstitutional; (2) The trial court erred in considering. the motion for summary judgment since that defense was not raised in a motion for accelerated judgment nor in the first responsive p | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. Department of State Highways
green
2 sentences1977Hobbs v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 90 ; 247 NW2d 754 (1976), Kerkstra v State Highway Department, 60 Mich App 761 ; 231 NW2d 521 (1975), Detroit Bank & Trust Co v Department of State Highways, 55 Mich App 131 ; 222 NW2d 59 (1974), In re Woods Estate, 49 Mich App 412 ; 212 NW2d 240 (1973). 4 MCLA 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922. 5 (1) The governmental immunity statute, MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), is unconstitutional; (2) The trial court erred in considering. the motion for summary judgment since that defense was not raised in a motion for accelerated judgment nor in the first responsive p 1977Hobbs v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 90 ; 247 NW2d 754 (1976), Kerkstra v State Highway Department, 60 Mich App 761 ; 231 NW2d 521 (1975), Detroit Bank & Trust Co v Department of State Highways, 55 Mich App 131 ; 222 NW2d 59 (1974), In re Woods Estate, 49 Mich App 412 ; 212 NW2d 240 (1973). 4 MCLA 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922. 5 (1) The governmental immunity statute, MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), is unconstitutional; (2) The trial court erred in considering. the motion for summary judgment since that defense was not raised in a motion for accelerated judgment nor in the first responsive p | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Kerkstra v. State Highway Department
green
2 sentences1977Hobbs v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 90 ; 247 NW2d 754 (1976), Kerkstra v State Highway Department, 60 Mich App 761 ; 231 NW2d 521 (1975), Detroit Bank & Trust Co v Department of State Highways, 55 Mich App 131 ; 222 NW2d 59 (1974), In re Woods Estate, 49 Mich App 412 ; 212 NW2d 240 (1973). 4 MCLA 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922. 5 (1) The governmental immunity statute, MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), is unconstitutional; (2) The trial court erred in considering. the motion for summary judgment since that defense was not raised in a motion for accelerated judgment nor in the first responsive p 1977Hobbs v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 90 ; 247 NW2d 754 (1976), Kerkstra v State Highway Department, 60 Mich App 761 ; 231 NW2d 521 (1975), Detroit Bank & Trust Co v Department of State Highways, 55 Mich App 131 ; 222 NW2d 59 (1974), In re Woods Estate, 49 Mich App 412 ; 212 NW2d 240 (1973). 4 MCLA 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922. 5 (1) The governmental immunity statute, MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), is unconstitutional; (2) The trial court erred in considering. the motion for summary judgment since that defense was not raised in a motion for accelerated judgment nor in the first responsive p | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Fleish
green
1 sentence1954Notwithstanding the length of this opinion, in the light of appellants’ insistence, we add the following: The rule relating to admission of testimony in conspiracy cases was stated in People v. Fleish, 321 Mich 443, 459 , where it is said: “In conspiracy cases it is quite impossible to formulate a precise rule of evidence as to what testimony is and what is not admissible as being competent and relevant. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Consumers Power Co. v. City of Allegan
neutral
1 sentence1931Consumers Power Co. v. City of Allegan, supra. Furthermore, the structure of section 4-f(3) as a whole quite conclusively demonstrates that the legislature did not have in mind the precise rule of “antecedent subjects” in drafting the statute. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Industrial Commission v. Aetna Life Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1921The gist of the later decisions is quite well stated by the supreme court of Colorado in Industrial Commission v. Insurance Co., 64 Colo. 480 ( 174 Pac. 589 ), where this question was before that court. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Steele v. German Insurance
green
1 sentence1901In Steele v. Insurance Co., 93 Mich. 84, 85 ( 53 N. W. 514 ), Grant, J., said: “The precise claim is that the local agents cannot re-delegate their authority to clerks, unless such authority to redelegate is conveyed in express terms. | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Daggett v. Davis
green
1 sentence1895It is urged that the court erred in instructing the jury as follows: “ If you find a conversion of this stock by McKinnon,— and by 'conversion’ I mean, if you find that the plaintiff was entitled to it, and demanded it, and that the defendant declined and refused to deliver it, that would make it a conversion, — if you find an unlawful conversion of this stock by McKinnon, and that the plaintiff never got possession of it, never received possession of it down to this time, then you should give the plaintiff, as damages, the value of the stock at the time of such conversion, with interest to da | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Michigan State Insurance v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1888Co. v. Lewis, 30 Mich. 41 ; McIntyre v. Ins. | 1 | 1888–1888 |
People v. Gallagher
green
1 sentence1865It is conceded to be the settled doctrine of this State, that every enactment of the State Legislature is presumed to be constitutional and valid; that before we can pronounce it otherwise we must be able to point out the precise clause in the constitution which it violates, and that the conflict between the two must be clear or free from reasonable doubt; since it is only from constitutional provisions limiting the legislative power and controlling the legislative will, that we derive authority to declare void any legislative enactment. — People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich., 244 ; Sears v. Cottrell, | 1 | 1865–1865 |
Sears v. Cottrell
green
1 sentence1865It is conceded to be the settled doctrine of this State, that every enactment of the State Legislature is presumed to be constitutional and valid; that before we can pronounce it otherwise we must be able to point out the precise clause in the constitution which it violates, and that the conflict between the two must be clear or free from reasonable doubt; since it is only from constitutional provisions limiting the legislative power and controlling the legislative will, that we derive authority to declare void any legislative enactment. — People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich., 244 ; Sears v. Cottrell, | 1 | 1865–1865 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.