precise rule in Texas

2025But the Court of Criminal Appeals has cautioned that “[a]lthough it is impossible to articulate a precise rule regarding these kinds of argument, it is fair to say that a prosecutor runs a risk of improperly striking at a defendant over the shoulder of counsel when the argument is made in terms of defense counsel personally and when the argument explicitly impugns defense 1 In Coble, the prosecutor had referred to “the saying among lawyers” that if you don’t have the facts or law on your side, you argue “something ridiculous.” 871 S.W.2d at 203 . 11 counsel’s character.” Mosley v. State, 983 S

2019“Although it is impossible to articulate a precise rule regarding these kinds of argument[s], it is fair to say that a prosecutor runs a risk of improperly striking at a defendant over the shoulder of counsel when the argument is made in terms of defense counsel personally and when the argument explicitly impugns defense counsel’s character.” Brown, 270 S.W.3d at 572 (alteration in original) (quoting Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim.

2008Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 356 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet ref'd) (op. on reh’g); Tyler, 2006 WL 1452536 , at*2.

2008Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 356 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet ref’d) (op. on reh’g); Tyler, 2006 WL 1452536 , at*2.

2021“Although it is impossible to articulate a precise rule regarding these kinds of argument[s], it is fair to say that a prosecutor runs a risk of improperly striking at a defendant over the shoulder of counsel when the argument is made in terms of defense counsel personally and when the argument explicitly impugns defense counsel’s character.” Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 572 (Tex. Crim.

2019“Although it is impossible to articulate a precise rule regarding these kinds of argument[s], it is fair to say that a prosecutor runs a risk of improperly striking at a defendant over the shoulder of counsel when the argument is made in terms of defense counsel personally and when the argument explicitly impugns defense counsel’s character.” Brown, 270 S.W.3d at 572 (alteration in original) (quoting Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim.

2015Likewise, “[t]he vagueness of the court’s order indicates that the substantial relationship test was not used; had it been, the court should have been able to state without difficulty the precise factors establishing a substantial relationship between the two representations.” Id.

2009In Coker , the court held that A [t]he vagueness of the court = s order indicates that the substantial relation test was not used; had it been, the court should have been able to state without difficulty the precise factors establishing a substantial relationship between the two representations. @ Coker , 765 S.W.2d at 400 .

2015Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex. Crim.

2014Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex. Crim.

2015Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 (explaining that prohibition on executing intellectually disabled individuals extends to those “mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus,” but leaving to the states “ ‘the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction’ ”) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)).

2015Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 (explaining that prohibition on executing intellectually disabled individuals extends to those “mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus,” but leaving to the states “ ‘the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction’ ”) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)).

2008See Nucor Steel, 168 S.W.3d at 267-68 .

2008See Nucor Steel , 168 S.W.3d at 267-68 .

2015Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 (explaining that prohibition on executing intellectually disabled individuals extends to those “mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus,” but leaving to the states “ ‘the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction’ ”) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)).

2015Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (explaining that prohibition on executing intellectually disabled individuals extends to those “mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus,” but leaving to the states “‘the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction’”) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416 (1986)).

1992Although the United States Supreme Court has not formulated a precise test for identifying what degree of state involvement is sufficient to convert a private person’s conduct into state action, three lines of state-action doctrine emerge from the Supreme Court cases: the “symbiotic relationship” doctrine, the “public function” doctrine, and the “nexus theory.” The Supreme Court has applied the “symbiotic relationship” doctrine to cases in which the government has “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence [with the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint partic

1992Although the United States Supreme Court has not formulated a precise test for identifying what degree of state involvement is sufficient to convert a private person’s conduct into state action, three lines of state-action doctrine emerge from the Supreme Court cases: the “symbiotic relationship” doctrine, the “public function” doctrine, and the “nexus theory.” The Supreme Court has applied the “symbiotic relationship” doctrine to cases in which the government has “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence [with the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint partic

1982State v. Jackson, 370 S.W.2d 797 , 800 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1963), aff'd 376 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1964).

1982State v. Jackson, 370 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. Civ.

2021Cf., e.g., Baty v. Futrell, 543 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tex. 2018) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (concluding that expert report essentially “just say[ing] ‘do no harm’” was insufficiently specific to identify the precise standard of care in medical malpractice case); Acharya v. Gomez, No. 05-18-00833-CV, 2019 WL 1923213 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 30, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that expert report adequately specified professional standard of care in medical malpractice case because the report “provided more detail than ‘do no harm’ as the applicable standard of care”); Celebrity Healthcare

2020Appellant argues that his defense mirrors that which was discussed in Pavlacka v. State, 892 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tex. Crim.

2020Even if we were to assume that Appellant’s opening statement alone did not raise a fabrication theory, nonetheless, his opening salvo of questions during cross-examination reflected his intention to develop a precise defense of fabrication when he asked N.L. if she “said that [she] [was] raped as an excuse,” and if she “[made] up this story to cover up for [her] own action that night[.]” See Dennis, 178 S.W.3d at 178 (holding that the defendant raised a fabrication defense where defense counsel stated during opening statement that the victim fabricated the sexual assault allegations against he

2020See Todd, 911 S.W.2d at 819 ; Borrego, 1997 WL 33804169 , at *1; accord Thompson, 2011 WL 2176507 , at *3-4; Halk, 1999 WL 504187 , at *5.

2018See generally McGinn v. State, 961 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (if a trial court sustains an objection to improper jury argument, the complaining party must request an instruction to disregard the argument in order to preserve error on appeal if an instruction to disregard could have cured the prejudice resulting from the argument).

2016See id. at 122–23.

2015Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 691 (Tex. 2012); In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex.2003).

2015Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 691 (Tex. 2012); In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex.2003).

2014See id. at 263 (op. on State’s second motion for reh’g); see also, e.g., Matheson, 694 S.W.2d at 662 (quoting the specific language at issue from Rogers); Kopeski, 2011 WL 3505272 , at *4 (same).

2014See id. at 263 (op. on State’s second motion for reh’g); see also, e.g., Matheson, 694 S.W.2d at 662 (quoting the specific language at issue from Rogers); Kopeski, 2011 WL 3505272 , at *4 (same).

2013See, e.g., Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim.