precise standard in Illinois

1995(Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 150 , 506 N.E.2d 1269 .) The precise standard lies between mere denials and proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

1995(Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 150 , 506 N.E.2d 1269 .) The precise standard lies between mere denials and proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

2014Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 152 . ¶ 15 As an initial matter, the State contends that this case falls outside the scope of Franks, because where, as here, an informant appears before an issuing judge to testify, “the informant is under oath *** [and] the judge has the opportunity to personally observe the demeanor of the informant and to assess the informant’s credibility.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gorosteata, 374 Ill.

2014Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 152 . ¶ 15 As an initial matter, the State contends that this case falls outside the scope of Franks, because where, as here, an informant appears before an issuing judge to testify, “the informant is under oath *** [and] the judge has the opportunity to personally observe the demeanor of the informant and to assess the informant’s credibility.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gorosteata, 374 Ill.

2005Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 , 151 L.

2005Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 , 151 L.

2017App. 3d 22, 29 (2005) (“A prior prosecution can easily be proven by reference to the record, thereby protecting a defendant from being placed in double jeopardy.”). ¶ 242 Ultimately, we are left guessing as to the basis of defendant’s precise challenge to her money laundering conviction. “[A] reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and cohesive arguments presented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barlow v. Costigan, 2014 IL 115152 , ¶ 52.

2016App. 3d 22, 29 (2005) (“A prior prosecution can easily be proven by reference to the record, thereby protecting a defendant from being placed in double jeopardy.”). - 62 - No. 1-14-1477 ¶ 242 Ultimately, we are left guessing as to the basis of defendant’s precise challenge to her money laundering conviction. “[A] reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and cohesive arguments presented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barlow v. Costigan, 2014 IL 115152 , ¶ 52.

2015The current trend being employed to accomplish this goal is to allow an award of interest on funds owing so that justice might be accomplished in each particular case. [Citation.] In Illinois, prejudgment interest may be recovered when warranted by -33- 1-12-2725 equitable considerations, and disallowed if such an award would not comport with justice and equity." In re Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d at 86-87 . ¶ 86 Although courts in many cases awarding prejudgment interest did find bad conduct and were affirmed, under Illinois Supreme Court precedent bad conduct is not a precise requirement.

2015The current trend being employed to accomplish this goal is to allow an award of interest on funds owing so that justice might be accomplished in each particular case. [Citation.] In Illinois, prejudgment interest may be recovered when warranted by equitable considerations, and disallowed if such an award would not comport with justice and equity.” In re Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d at 86-87 . ¶ 86 Although courts in many cases awarding prejudgment interest did find bad conduct and were affirmed, under Illinois Supreme Court precedent bad conduct is not a precise requirement.

2011Even if not forfeited, the State asserts the claim has no merit because the precise claim was rejected in People v. Smith, 383 Ill.

2011Even if not forfeited, the State asserts the claim has no merit because the precise claim was rejected in People v. Smith, 383 Ill.

2000Thus, while it appears Apprendi extends greater constitutional protections to noncapital, rather than capital, defendants, the Court has endorsed this precise principle, and we are in no position to second-guess that decision here. 6 In a final attempt to show that the statutory maximum was not exceeded in this case, the State relies on the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that the theoretical possibility of a certain statutory penalty of a given offense represents that offense’s maximum punishment.

2000Thus, while it appears Apprendi extends greater constitutional protections to noncapital, rather than capital, defendants, the Court has endorsed this precise principle, and we are in no position to secondguess that decision here. (footnote: 6) In a final attempt to show that the statutory maximum was not exceeded in this case, the State relies on the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Smith , 223 F.3d 554 (7 th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that the theoretical possibility of a certain statutory penalty of a given offense represents that offense's maximum punishment.

2024People v. Zavala, 2024 IL App (1st) 232355-U, ¶24 (citing People v. Castillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶ 16-18 ).

2023In determining the issue before it, the Reed court “consider[ed] the motives behind and consequences of a plea in light of the precise challenge asserted by an actual innocence claim.” Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 24 .

2023Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21 .

2022At the outset, I recognize that “trial courts cannot realistically expect defendants to articulate the precise nature of the confidential records without having prior access to them.” See Gagne, 612 A.2d at 901 ; see also Stampe, 994 F.3d at 771 (“[B]efore disclosure a defendant likely will not know the content of an undisclosed item.”).

2020Elsewhere, in People v. Cook, 2018 IL App (1st) 142134, ¶ 63 , this court found that “no such conflict exists” but that “supreme court decisions have applied the two standards of review separately to the appropriate issue addressed on appeal.” Our court in Cook reasoned: “Whereas a reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion analysis to determinations about the propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks during argument [citations] a court reviews de novo the legal issue of whether a prosecutor’s misconduct, like improper remarks during argument, was so egregious that it warrants a new trial.” Cook

2020Elsewhere, in People v. Cook, 2018 IL App (1st) 142134, ¶ 63 , this court found that “no such conflict exists” but that “supreme court decisions have applied the two standards of review separately to the appropriate issue addressed on appeal.” Our court in Cook reasoned: “Whereas a reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion analysis to determinations about the propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks during argument [citations] a court reviews de novo the legal issue of whether a prosecutor’s misconduct, like improper remarks during argument, was so egregious that it warrants a new trial.” Cook

2020Here, we do not conclude the petition filed in this case is based on indisputably meritless legal theory or fanciful allegations. ¶ 40 The State argues this court “already rejected the precise claim [defendant] is making here in the case of People v. Handy, 2019 IL App (1st) 170213 , and should now follow its prior - 13 - 1-18-0190 ruling.” However, we find Handy distinguishable because Handy involved a successive postconviction petition filed by a young adult where the petitioner was required to meet the higher standard of the cause and prejudice test.

2020This court previously considered this precise claim and rejected it in People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 130097, ¶ 36 .

2019In support, the plaintiff cites three appellate court decisions, Clark v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 297 Ill.

2011App.3d 726, 731-32 , 342 Ill.Dec. 66 , 931 N.E.2d 1249, 1254 (2010) (citing this court's holding in People v. Montgomery, 373 Ill.App.3d 1104 , 313 Ill.Dec. 420 , 872 N.E.2d 403 (2007), and People v. Rathbone, 345 Ill.App.3d 305, 310-11 , 280 Ill.Dec. 408 , 802 N.E.2d 333, 337 (2003) (strict enforcement of section 5-8-1(c) is necessary to allow the trial court to review the precise claim of error so that it can either (1) correct its mistake or (2) explain its reasons for imposing the sentence it did)). ¶ 86 We note that defendant, apparently in an effort to overcome the above-cited body of la

2011App.3d 726, 731-32 , 342 Ill.Dec. 66 , 931 N.E.2d 1249, 1254 (2010) (citing this court's holding in People v. Montgomery, 373 Ill.App.3d 1104 , 313 Ill.Dec. 420 , 872 N.E.2d 403 (2007), and People v. Rathbone, 345 Ill.App.3d 305, 310-11 , 280 Ill.Dec. 408 , 802 N.E.2d 333, 337 (2003) (strict enforcement of section 5-8-1(c) is necessary to allow the trial court to review the precise claim of error so that it can either (1) correct its mistake or (2) explain its reasons for imposing the sentence it did)). ¶ 86 We note that defendant, apparently in an effort to overcome the above-cited body of la

2011The DNA fee was properly assessed against the defendant, even if his assertion is correct that this is the second time he has been charged this fee.” Adair, 406 Ill.