precise standard in Kansas

2017This precise claim was considered and rejected by the court in Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 .

2016This precise claim was considered and rejected by the court in Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 .

2015As we proceed on our path for a more precise standard of judicial review, we observe the City contends its decision to annex was an exercise of a quasi-judicial function, citing Reiter v. City of Beloit, 263 Kan. 74, 85 , 947 P.2d 425 (1997).

2015As we proceed on our path for a more precise standard of judicial review, we observe the City contends its decision to annex was an exercise of a quasi-judicial function, citing Reiter v. City of Beloit, 263 Kan. 74, 85 , 947 P.2d 425 (1997).

2021Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 .

1996Within the context of a strikingly similar factual setting, we recently rejected the precise claim that the defendant now makes in our recent case of State v. Knighten, 260 Kan. at 54 .

1987The precise clause at issue in the present case was found to be valid in Gill v. Rollins Protective Services Co., 722 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1983).

1984In State v. Reeves, 233 Kan. 702 , 664 P.2d 862 (1983), the court considered an instruction which amplified the statutory language by requiring the State to prove that the defendant was not only “under the influence of alcohol” but that “the control of his mental or physical function was thereby impaired to the extent that he was incapable of safely driving a vehicle.” The court found that the additional language properly reflected the legislative intent, but disapproved its inclusion as an element of the offense.

1984In State v. Reeves, 233 Kan. 702 , 664 P.2d 862 (1983), the court considered an instruction which amplified the statutory language by requiring the State to prove that the defendant was not only “under the influence of alcohol” but that “the control of his mental or physical function was thereby impaired to the extent that he was incapable of safely driving a vehicle.” The court found that the additional language properly reflected the legislative intent, but disapproved its inclusion as an element of the offense.

1983While we limit our holding to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States.” 420 U.S. at 123 .

1915“The term ‘senile dementia’ means that diminution and weakness of the mental faculties which result from old age, and it does not necessarily exclude the possibility of testamentary capacity in a person whose condition is so described.” (Graham v. Deuterman, 244 Ill. 124 , syl. ¶ 3, 91 N. E. 61 .) “There was senile dementia, not to a degree to invalidate her will.” (Succession of Jones, 120 La. 986, 1010 , 45 South. 965 .) “The theory of the proponents is that the record contains no evidence of general incompetency, the result of senile dementia or general insanity, or of an insane delusion wh

1915“The term ‘senile dementia’ means that diminution and weakness of the mental faculties which result from old age, and it does not necessarily exclude the possibility of testamentary capacity in a person whose condition is so described.” (Graham v. Deuterman, 244 Ill. 124 , syl. ¶ 3, 91 N. E. 61 .) “There was senile dementia, not to a degree to invalidate her will.” (Succession of Jones, 120 La. 986, 1010 , 45 South. 965 .) “The theory of the proponents is that the record contains no evidence of general incompetency, the result of senile dementia or general insanity, or of an insane delusion wh

1915“The term ‘senile dementia’ means that diminution and weakness of the mental faculties which result from old age, and it does not necessarily exclude the possibility of testamentary capacity in a person whose condition is so described.” (Graham v. Deuterman, 244 Ill. 124 , syl. ¶ 3, 91 N. E. 61 .) “There was senile dementia, not to a degree to invalidate her will.” (Succession of Jones, 120 La. 986, 1010 , 45 South. 965 .) “The theory of the proponents is that the record contains no evidence of general incompetency, the result of senile dementia or general insanity, or of an insane delusion wh

1915“The term ‘senile dementia’ means that diminution and weakness of the mental faculties which result from old age, and it does not necessarily exclude the possibility of testamentary capacity in a person whose condition is so described.” (Graham v. Deuterman, 244 Ill. 124 , syl. ¶ 3, 91 N. E. 61 .) “There was senile dementia, not to a degree to invalidate her will.” (Succession of Jones, 120 La. 986, 1010 , 45 South. 965 .) “The theory of the proponents is that the record contains no evidence of general incompetency, the result of senile dementia or general insanity, or of an insane delusion wh

1915Reports, Full Reprint, 287.) In most instances arteriosclerosis takes part in the causation of senile dementia, and the precise principle involved is well stated in the syllabus of the case of Brainard v. Brainard, 259 Ill. 613 , 103 N. E. 45 , decided in October, 1913: “Whether arterio-sclerosis has affected the mind of the testator is not a question which is settled by mere proof that the testator was afflicted with the disease and that the tendency of the disease is to affect the mind, but the question must be determined by the proof in the particular case.” (Syl. ¶ 3.) The following quotat

1915Reports, Full Reprint, 287.) In most instances arteriosclerosis takes part in the causation of senile dementia, and the precise principle involved is well stated in the syllabus of the case of Brainard v. Brainard, 259 Ill. 613 , 103 N. E. 45 , decided in October, 1913: “Whether arterio-sclerosis has affected the mind of the testator is not a question which is settled by mere proof that the testator was afflicted with the disease and that the tendency of the disease is to affect the mind, but the question must be determined by the proof in the particular case.” (Syl. ¶ 3.) The following quotat