precise principle in Wyoming

2003Stephens, 774 P.2d at 71-72 ; Dike, 990 P.2d at 1024 .

2003Stephens, 774 P.2d at 71-72 ; Dike, 990 P.2d at 1024 .

2003Stephens, 774 P.2d at 71-72 ; Dike, 990 P.2d at 1024 .

2003Stephens, 774 P.2d at 71-72 ; Dike, 990 P.2d at 1024 .

2002In O'Brien, the more precise instruction was not given; however, the failure to do so was determined not to be error because the evidence supported the jury verdict under any of the three elements, "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Id. [T19] O'Brien clarified that the statutory intent behind the language "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under cireumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life" was to reach extremely reckless conduct that resulted in serious physical injury in

1991The precise principle is also to be *839 found in Mullins, 375 S.W.2d 832 and Shepherd, 101 S.W.2d 918 .

1991The precise principle is also to be found in Mullins, 375 S.W.2d 832 and Shepherd, 101 S.W.2d 918 .

1991The precise principle is also to be *839 found in Mullins, 375 S.W.2d 832 and Shepherd, 101 S.W.2d 918 .

1991The precise principle is also to be found in Mullins, 375 S.W.2d 832 and Shepherd, 101 S.W.2d 918 .

1991Actually what is sometimes called the York rule in Washington state law should more properly be designated the Powell principle derived from State v. Powell, 51 Wash. 372 , 98 P. 741, 742 (1909), where it was stated: "Outside of the evidence of this girl there is no evidence of the offense to submit to the jury." The court then said: The jury at the trial did not have the fact before it that the witness had made sworn statements contrary to her testimony.

1991Actually what is sometimes called the York rule in Washington state law should more properly be designated the Powell principle derived from State v. Powell, 51 Wash. 372 , 98 P. 741, 742 (1909), where it was stated: “Outside of the evidence of this girl there is no evidence of the offense to submit to the jury.” The court then said: The jury at the trial did not have the fact before it that the witness had made sworn statements contrary to her testimony.

1976To the same effect, but not stated so concisely, is Brantley v. State, 1900, 9 Wyo. 102, 108 , 61 P. 139, 140 .

1976To the same effect, but not stated so concisely, is Brantley v. State, 1900, 9 Wyo. 102, 108 , 61 P. 139, 140 .

1976It rather reflects the very ‘inclusion’ that defines the lesser offense as one ‘included’ in the greater. * * *” It should be marked that the rule uses the expression “an offense necessarily included in the offense charged.” In Fuller, the court set out in footnote 28, p. 1228 of its opinion, what it considered to be a precise analysis of what constitutes a necessarily included offense, found in Model Penal Code § 1.07(4), which defines an offense as included when: *416 “(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense ch

1976It rather reflects the very ‘inclusion’ that defines the lesser offense as one ‘included’ in the greater. * * *” It should be marked that the rule uses the expression “an offense necessarily included in the offense charged.” In Fuller, the court set out in footnote 28, p. 1228 of its opinion, what it considered to be a precise analysis of what constitutes a necessarily included offense, found in Model Penal Code § 1.07(4), which defines an offense as included when: *416 “(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense ch

1900Referring to the general rule, that a trustee is to observe how men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital 'to be invested, Chief Justice Gray in a Massachusetts case said, “If a more strict or precise rule should be deemed expedient, it must be enacted by the Legislature.” Brown v. French, 125 Mass., 410 .