precise claim in Pennsylvania

2018Although courts are not bound to utilize this precise instruction, see Commonwealth v. Ragan, 560 Pa. 106 , 743 A.2d 390, 399 (1999) (declining to require use if the “even if not wholly believed” language used in Pounds); cf. Commonwealth v. Blount, 538 Pa. 156 , 647 A.2d 199, 209 (1994) (“The trial court has discretion in phrasing its instructions to the jury ....”), an alibi instruction should simply “indicate that the failure of the evidence to prove alibi is not evidence of guilt, that the defendant bears no burden to disprove any element of the offense, and alibi evidence may negate proof

2018Although courts are not bound to utilize this precise instruction, see Commonwealth v. Ragan, 560 Pa. 106 , 743 A.2d 390, 399 (1999) (declining to require use if the “even if not wholly believed” language used in Pounds); cf. Commonwealth v. Blount, 538 Pa. 156 , 647 A.2d 199, 209 (1994) (“The trial court has discretion in phrasing its instructions to the jury ....”), an alibi instruction should simply “indicate that the failure of the evidence to prove alibi is not evidence of guilt, that the defendant bears no burden to disprove any element of the offense, and alibi evidence may negate proof

2018Although courts are not bound to utilize this precise instruction, see Commonwealth v. Ragan, 560 Pa. 106 , 743 A.2d 390, 399 (1999) (declining to require use if the “even if not wholly believed” language used in Pounds); cf. Commonwealth v. Blount, 538 Pa. 156 , 647 A.2d 199, 209 (1994) (“The trial court has discretion in phrasing its instructions to the jury ....”), an alibi instruction should simply “indicate that the failure of the evidence to prove alibi is not evidence of guilt, that the defendant bears no burden to disprove any element of the offense, and alibi evidence may negate proof

2018Although courts are not bound to utilize this precise instruction, see Commonwealth v. Ragan, 560 Pa. 106 , 743 A.2d 390, 399 (1999) (declining to require use if the “even if not wholly believed” language used in Pounds); cf. Commonwealth v. Blount, 538 Pa. 156 , 647 A.2d 199, 209 (1994) (“The trial court has discretion in phrasing its instructions to the jury ....”), an alibi instruction should simply “indicate that the failure of the evidence to prove alibi is not evidence of guilt, that the defendant bears no burden to disprove any element of the offense, and alibi evidence may negate proof

2018See Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 721 , 69 A.3d 601 (2013) (reiterating failure to cite to legal authority to support argument results in waiver of claim on appeal).

2018See Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 721 , 69 A.3d 601 (2013) (reiterating failure to cite to legal authority to support argument results in waiver of claim on appeal).

2018Id. at 1238-40 (citing Moltz, 176 A. at 843 (holding that an insurance carrier could not file an action directly against the tortfeasor to enforce its subrogation rights; only one action could be brought and the employer's right of subrogation "must be worked out through an action brought in the name of the injured employee, either by joining the employer as a party plaintiff or as a use plaintiff") (internal citations omitted); 12 Reliance Ins.

2018Id. at 1238-40 (citing *851 Moltz , 176 A. at 843 (holding that an insurance carrier could not file an action directly against the tortfeasor to enforce its subrogation rights; only one action could be brought and the employer's right of subrogation "must be worked out through an action brought in the name of the injured employee, either by joining the employer as a party plaintiff or as a use plaintiff") (internal citations omitted); 12 Reliance Ins.

2018However, this Court has previously rejected this precise claim in Furgess, supra, and Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa.Super. 2013).

2018We have previously rejected this precise claim in our decision in Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016): The Miller decision applies to only those defendants who were under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes. *** [Furgess] argues that he nevertheless may invoke Miller because he was a “technical juvenile,” and he relies on neuroscientific theories regarding immature brain development to support his claim that he is eligible for relief.

2025See McMullen, 985 A.2d at 777 (holding only that the trial court had the authority to consider the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees claimed under a separation and property settlement agreement but declining to consider whether the fees claimed were reasonable); id. at 779 (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 783 (Castille, C.J., dissenting).

2025See McMullen, 985 A.2d at 777 (holding only that the trial court had the authority to consider the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees claimed under a separation and property settlement agreement but declining to consider whether the fees claimed were reasonable); id. at 779 (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 783 (Castille, C.J., dissenting).

2024In that regard, he must first invoke our jurisdiction by (1) timely filing a notice of appeal, (2) preserving the precise challenge in the trial court, (3) including a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief, and (4) raising “a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Salter, 290 A.3d 741, 748 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up).

2024See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9543(a)(3), 9544(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986 (Pa. 2011) (stating that previously litigated claims are not cognizable under the PCRA).

2022It maintains that only Hawaii has addressed the precise claim and rejected it in Commonwealth v. Daniels, 122 P.3d 796, 802 (Haw. 2005). [J-53-2021] - 16 prosecutor overreached at the expense of justice; society’s strong interest in bringing the guilty to justice; and the economic and psychological effect of retrial on a citizen, as measured with the possibility that retrial may result in the conviction of an innocent person.

2022Appellant acknowledges that, in Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1074 (Pa.Super. 2022), we recently rejected the precise claim he advances by holding that Alexander did not supplant the plain view exception for automobiles.

2020Although not adjudicated under the precise framework of Brady, this Court has previously held that even the outright destruction of handwritten notes by police is not “material” to the underlying prosecution where the content of the notes have been “substantively incorporated” into the official report and is merely “cumulative evidence.” Commonwealth v. Pickering, 533 A.2d 735, 736-37 (Pa.Super. 1987).

2018“When [a] plea agreement contains a negotiated sentence which is accepted and imposed by the sentencing court, there is no authority to permit a challenge to the discretionary aspects of that sentence.” Commonwealth v. Morrison, 173 A.3d 286, 290 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted). -2- J-S83024-17 Because Appellant entered a guilty plea that included a negotiated term of incarceration, he cannot challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence on appeal.

2018Given the precise claim raised by Appellant and our disposition of his contention, we shall dispense with the recitation of our standard and scope of review, as well as the four-step procedure for raising and preserving a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence. “[W]hen a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she waives all defects and defenses except those concerning the validity of the plea, the jurisdiction of the trial court, and the legality of the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Stradley, 50 A.3d 769, 771 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing Commonwealth v. Boyd, 835 A.2d 812, 819 (

2018Given the precise claim raised by Appellant and our disposition of his contention, we shall dispense with the recitation of our standard and scope of review, as well as the four-step procedure for raising and preserving a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence. “[W]hen a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she waives all defects and defenses except those concerning the validity of the plea, the jurisdiction of the trial court, and the legality of the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Stradley, 50 A.3d 769, 771 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing Commonwealth v. Boyd, 835 A.2d 812, 819 (

2018Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 607 (Pa. 2014) (jury charge substantially identical to the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions "thoroughly and accurately represented the law on first degree murder").

2015See, e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Because revocation of supervised release amounts only to a modification of the terms of the defendant's original sentence, and does not constitute punishment for the revocation-triggering offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated by a subsequent prosecution for that offense.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1149 , 117 S.Ct. 1325 , 137 L.Ed.2d 486 (1997); United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir.) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the government from criminally prosecuting and punishing an offens

2015See, e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Because revocation of supervised release amounts only to a modification of the terms of the defendant's original sentence, and does not constitute punishment for the revocation-triggering offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated by a subsequent prosecution for that offense.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1149 , 117 S.Ct. 1325 , 137 L.Ed.2d 486 (1997); United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir.) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the government from criminally prosecuting and punishing an offens

2015See Northeast Women’s Center v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466 , 476 (3rd Cir. 1989) (“In cases in which the plaintiff’s successful and unsuccessful claims involve a common core of facts or related legal theories, or where much of counsel’s time is dedicated to the litigation as a whole, it is often impossible to divide counsel’s time on a precise claim-by- claim basis.” (citations omitted)).

2015See Northeast Women’s Center v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466 , 476 (3rd Cir. 1989) (“In cases in which the plaintiffs successful and unsuccessful claims involve a common core of facts or related legal theories, or where much of counsel’s time is dedicated to the litigation as a whole, it is often impossible to divide counsel’s time on a precise claim-by-claim basis.” (citations omitted)).

2015See, e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Because revocation of supervised release amounts only to a modification of the terms of the defendant's original sentence, and does not constitute punishment for the revocation-triggering offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated by a subsequent prosecution for that offense.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1149 , 117 S.Ct. 1325 , 137 L.Ed.2d 486 (1997); United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir.) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the government from criminally prosecuting and punishing an offens

2015See, e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Because revocation of supervised release amounts only to a modification of the terms of the defendant's original sentence, and does not constitute punishment for the revocation-triggering offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated by a subsequent prosecution for that offense.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1149 , 117 S.Ct. 1325 , 137 L.Ed.2d 486 (1997); United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir.) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the government from criminally prosecuting and punishing an offens