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9 Delaware opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shaffer v. Heitnergreen2 sentences1987Notwithstanding the obvious emphasis on consent in this statute, the Delaware Supreme Court stated: In the context of the case sub judice, the precise inquiry is whether the defendants’ acceptance of Delaware corporate directorships is a sufficient contact with this State, such that requiring them to come into the State to defend suits alleging breach of their fiduciary duties to the company does not offend tradition notions of fair play and substantial justice. [Citations omitted.] “[T]he inquiry must focus on ‘the relationship among the de-; fendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ Shaffer v 1987Notwithstanding the obvious emphasis on consent in this statute, the Delaware Supreme Court stated: In the context of the case sub judice, the precise inquiry is whether the defendants’ acceptance of Delaware corporate directorships is a sufficient contact with this State, such that requiring them to come into the State to defend suits alleging breach of their fiduciary duties to the company does not offend tradition notions of fair play and substantial justice. [Citations omitted.] “[T]he inquiry must focus on ‘the relationship among the de-; fendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ Shaffer v | 1 | 2 |
Beard Research, Inc. v. Katesgreen1 sentence2025“The doctrine of collateral estoppel ‘precludes a party to a second suit involving a different claim or cause of action from the first from relitigating an issue 62 Beard Rsch., Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
County of Riverside v. McLaughlingreen1 sentence2024Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy any reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment”); cf. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) (“At the core of the standing doctrine is the requirement that a plaintiff ‘allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief’ . . . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pennellgreen1 sentence2000In Nelson, 628 A.2d at 74 , our Supreme Court adopted for the admission of expert testimony an application of the Delaware Rules of Evidence expert witness approach first articulated by Judge Gebelein in State v. Pennell, Del.Super., 584 A.2d 513, 515 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Pressgreen2 sentences1990But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 , 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2827 , 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (“It is not crucial whether we describe this right ... as a ‘right of access’ or a ‘right to gather information’....”) (citations omitted); In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1337 (D.C.Cir.1985) (“The more precise inquiry, however, is a functional rather than classificational one: whether information of the sort at issue here — regardless of its prior or current classification as court records — was traditionally open to public scrutiny.”). 1990But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 , 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2827 , 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) ("It is not crucial whether we describe this right ... as a `right of access' or a `right to gather information'....") (citations omitted); In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1337 (D.C.Cir. 1985) ("The more precise inquiry, however, is a functional rather than classificational one: whether information of the sort at issue here โ regardless of its prior or current classification as court records โ was traditionally open to public scrutiny."). | 1 | 1 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1980See id., 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. at 158 ; see also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 , 100 S.Ct. 571 , 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980). “[T]he inquiry must focus on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, 433 U.S., at 204 , 97 S.Ct., at 2580 .” Rush v. Savchuk, supra, 444 U.S. at 327 , 100 S.Ct. at 577 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 524 . 1980See id., 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. at 158 ; see also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 , 100 S.Ct. 571 , 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980). “[T]he inquiry must focus on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, 433 U.S., at 204 , 97 S.Ct., at 2580 .” Rush v. Savchuk, supra, 444 U.S. at 327 , 100 S.Ct. at 577 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 524 . | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.green1 sentence1980Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., Del.Supr., 319 A.2d 107, 108 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Rush v. Savchukgreen2 sentences1980See id., 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. at 158 ; see also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 , 100 S.Ct. 571 , 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980). “[T]he inquiry must focus on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, 433 U.S., at 204 , 97 S.Ct., at 2580 .” Rush v. Savchuk, supra, 444 U.S. at 327 , 100 S.Ct. at 577 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 524 . 1980See id., 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. at 158 ; see also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 , 100 S.Ct. 571 , 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980). “[T]he inquiry must focus on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, 433 U.S., at 204 , 97 S.Ct., at 2580 .” Rush v. Savchuk, supra, 444 U.S. at 327 , 100 S.Ct. at 577 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 524 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginiagreen2 sentences1990But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 , 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2827 , 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (“It is not crucial whether we describe this right ... as a ‘right of access’ or a ‘right to gather information’....”) (citations omitted); In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1337 (D.C.Cir.1985) (“The more precise inquiry, however, is a functional rather than classificational one: whether information of the sort at issue here — regardless of its prior or current classification as court records — was traditionally open to public scrutiny.”). 1990But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 , 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2827 , 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (“It is not crucial whether we describe this right ... as a ‘right of access’ or a ‘right to gather information’....”) (citations omitted); In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1337 (D.C.Cir.1985) (“The more precise inquiry, however, is a functional rather than classificational one: whether information of the sort at issue here — regardless of its prior or current classification as court records — was traditionally open to public scrutiny.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hughes v. Abell
green
1 sentence2021J., at 46–47 (citing Hughes, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 91 ). 99 Hughes, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 91. -19- rejected the precise waiver argument H&M makes here, finding that the “[defendant]’s later filing did not abandon the counterclaims.”100 H&M offers little—and certainly, no good—authority for shying from this view.101 Savant’s counterclaims are still part of the immediate case. 2. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Paolino v. MacE Security International, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015I hold, therefore, that Echo is not required to advance the fees and expenses incurred in Mooney II. 71 Paolino, 985 A.2d at 401 . 72 Notably, regardless of the precise standard under Roven for the advanceability of counterclaims, Mooney II fails to satisfy any of the three possible requirements, because it: (1) is not compulsory; (2) does not defeat the Original Counterclaims; and (3) does not offset the Original Counterclaims. 27 E. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Nelson v. State
green
1 sentence2000In Nelson, 628 A.2d at 74 , our Supreme Court adopted for the admission of expert testimony an application of the Delaware Rules of Evidence expert witness approach first articulated by Judge Gebelein in State v. Pennell, Del.Super., 584 A.2d 513, 515 (1989). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Armstrong v. Pomerance
green
1 sentence1987Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d at 176 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.