30 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kinsella v. Kinsellagreen2 sentences2017See R. 5:8-6 (“As part of the custody hearing, the court may on its own motion or at the request of a litigant conduct an in camera interview with the children).”); Pressler & Verniero, supra, com *336 ment 1.4.5 on R. 5:8-6 (stating that in custody hearings, “[i]t is cleat' that the parties must have an appropriate opportunity for experts’ assistance”); Kinsella v. Kinsella, 160 N.J. 276 , 318, 696 A.2d 556 (1997) (“In implementing the ‘best-interest-of-the child’ standard, courts rely heavily on the expertise of psychologists and other mental health professionals.”). 2017See R. 5:8-6 (“As part of the custody hearing, the court may on its own motion or at the request of a litigant conduct an in camera interview with the child(ren).”); Pressler & Verniero, supra, comment 1.4.5 on R. 5:8-6 (stating that in custody hearings, “[i]t is clear that the 36 parties must have an appropriate opportunity for experts’ assistance”); Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 318 (1997) (“In implementing the ‘best-interest-of-the child’ standard, courts rely heavily on the expertise of psychologists and other mental health professionals.”). | 2 | 2 |
New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Serv. v. Rggreen2 sentences2008See R.G., supra, at 448, 937 A.2d 1013 (holding a permanency hearing is not reqúired because a change in custody between the natural parents of a child is not a “placement”). 2008See R.G., supra, at 448, 937 A. 2d 1013 (holding a permanency hearing is not required because a change in custody between the natural parents of a child is not a "placement"). | 2 | 2 |
Jaime Taormina Bisbing v. Glenn R. Bisbing, III (077533) (Sussex County and Statewide)green2 sentences2020In evaluating the best interests factors, the motion judge may consider the insights of the parents of primary residence and alternate residence, "[t]he views of other adults with close relationships with the child," and "other evidence, including documentary evidence, interviews with the children at the court's discretion, and expert testimony." Bisbing, 230 N.J. at 335 ; see also R. 5:8-6 ("As part of the custody hearing, the court may on its own motion or at the request of a litigant conduct an in camera interview with the child(ren)."). 2019"When a court orders a custody arrangement that is not agreed to by both parents, it must identify on the record the specific factors that justify the arrangement." Bisbing v. Bisbing , 230 N.J. 309 , 322, 166 A.3d 1155 (2017) (citing N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(f) ). | 1 | 3 |
Watkins v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2024Id. at 254 . 2019According to Yolanda, her trial counsel's performance 2 We note that at the May 2, 2018 best interest hearing, defense counsel argued that pursuant to Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 247 (2000), "there need[ed] to be 'proof of parental unfitness,' misconduct, abandonment, or 'exceptional circumstances' … in order for [Wendy] to leave . . . with custody." The court disagreed, concluding that Watkins was factually inapposite to the circumstances that led to Sarah's removal and which prevented reunification. | 1 | 2 |
Almog v. Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc.green1 sentence2026See Almog v. Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 298 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Ponzi v. Fessendengreen1 sentence2020Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 259-61 (1922). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2019That order noted that the court "closed the FN matter after having a custody hearing . . . and determin[ing] that . . . [Sarah] should remain with [Wendy] based upon the [Division] court report along with [Placencia's] notes and summary arguments by the respective attorneys, neither party wanted to continue in therapy and the child remains unwilling to return home due to the history in the FN case."2 On appeal, Yolanda claims she was denied due process because she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel contrary to the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, | 1 | 1 |
Baures v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2018Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91, 116-17 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Guardianship of J.C.green2 sentences2013See In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 , 608 A.2d 1312 (1992). 2013See In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 , 608 A.2d 1312 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Muller v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Defendant points to our decision in State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 195 (1984), in which we credited expert testimony that “battered women, when they want to leave the relationship, are typically unwilling to reach out and confide in their friends, family, or the police, either out of shame and humiliation, fear of reprisal by their husband, or the feeling they will not be believed.” Cf. Muller v. Wisconsin, 94 Wis.2d 450, 461-62 , 289 N.W.2d 570, 576-77 (1980) (declarant’s statement admitting in a custody hearing to having sex with the man that her estranged husband killed was so contrary to dec 1989Defendant points to our decision in State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 195 (1984), in which we credited expert testimony that “battered women, when they want to leave the relationship, are typically unwilling to reach out and confide in their friends, family, or the police, either out of shame and humiliation, fear of reprisal by their husband, or the feeling they will not be believed.” Cf. Muller v. Wisconsin, 94 Wis.2d 450, 461-62 , 289 N.W.2d 570, 576-77 (1980) (declarant’s statement admitting in a custody hearing to having sex with the man that her estranged husband killed was so contrary to dec | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kellygreen2 sentences1989Defendant points to our decision in State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 195 (1984), in which we credited expert testimony that "battered women, when they want to leave the relationship, are typically unwilling to reach out and confide in their friends, family, or the police, either out of shame and humiliation, fear of reprisal by their husband, or the feeling they will not be believed." Cf. Muller v. Wisconsin, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 461-62 , 289 N.W. 2d 570, 576-77 (1980) (declarant's statement admitting in a custody hearing to having sex with the man that her estranged husband killed was so contrary to d 1989Defendant points to our decision in State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 195 (1984), in which we credited expert testimony that “battered women, when they want to leave the relationship, are typically unwilling to reach out and confide in their friends, family, or the police, either out of shame and humiliation, fear of reprisal by their husband, or the feeling they will not be believed.” Cf. Muller v. Wisconsin, 94 Wis.2d 450, 461-62 , 289 N.W.2d 570, 576-77 (1980) (declarant’s statement admitting in a custody hearing to having sex with the man that her estranged husband killed was so contrary to dec | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dyfs v. Gm
green
2 sentences2010Reversing that decision, we stated: *242 In this case, no hearing was held to consider that difficult issue and, in light of conflicting informal accounts of the children's own preferences and [the Division's] own recommendations, it was a mistaken exercise of discretion for the judge to grant [the Division's] request and terminate the proceedings without a full custody hearing. [ Ibid. ] In this matter, on March 7, 2008, the judge reopened the litigation for the purposes of conducting a G.M. "best interest custody hearing." The transcript reveals the action was not reopened at J.D.'s request, 2009The panel remanded for a custody hearing to "determine whether custody should remain as modified, or whether custody should be returned to the initial custodial parent, subject to conditions and [the Division's] continued supervision." Id. at 51-52, 939 A. 2d 239 . | 4 | 2008–2010 |
New Jersey Dyfs v. Gm
green
2 sentences2014The Supreme Court rejected that remedy, however, because the trial court's error "was not in the failure to hold a custody hearing, but in the failure to hold a dispositional hearing." G.M., supra, 198 N.J. at 402 . 18 A-0190-12T3 V. 2010Several months after the judge in this case decided to conduct a custody hearing in accordance with our decision in G.M., the Supreme Court disapproved our opinion and the practice we mandated. 198 N.J. at 401-05 , 968 A. 2d 698 . | 3 | 2010–2014 |
Div. of Youth & Family Serv. v. Vk
green
2 sentences2010Ibid. 2010Ibid. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Dolan v. Sea Transfer Corp.
green
2 sentences2009We granted the Division's petition for certification, 195 N.J. 520 , 950 A. 2d 907 (2008), and granted amicus curiae status to Legal Services of New Jersey. 2009We granted the Division’s petition for certification, 195 N.J. 520 , 950 A.2d 907 (2008), and granted amicus curiae status to Legal Services of New Jersey. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Ramseur
green
2 sentences2008We must conclude that the doctrine of fundamental fairness which “‘serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily,’” Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 , 662 A.2d 367 (1995) (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 377 , 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting)), further supports the requirement that a full custody hearing take place before termination of the Title Nine proceedings. 2008We must conclude that the doctrine of fundamental fairness which “‘serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily,’” Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 , 662 A.2d 367 (1995) (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 377 , 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting)), further supports the requirement that a full custody hearing take place before termination of the Title Nine proceedings. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Doe v. Poritz
green
2 sentences2008We must conclude that the doctrine of fundamental fairness which “‘serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily,’” Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 , 662 A.2d 367 (1995) (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 377 , 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting)), further supports the requirement that a full custody hearing take place before termination of the Title Nine proceedings. 2008We must conclude that the doctrine of fundamental fairness which “‘serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily,’” Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 , 662 A.2d 367 (1995) (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 377 , 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting)), further supports the requirement that a full custody hearing take place before termination of the Title Nine proceedings. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Palacio
green
2 sentences1998Thus, the failure to conduct a plenary hearing and to interview the child was inconsistent with R. 5:8-6 and our decisions in G.C. v. M.Y., 278 N.J.Super. 363, 368 , 651 A.2d 110 (App.Div.1995) (concluding it was improper to make a custody decision on an emergent basis without a plenary hearing and interview with the children in the absence of imminent or threatened harm to the children), and Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J.Super. 267, 273 , 372 A.2d 629 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 28 , 379 A.2d 259 (1977). 1998Thus, the failure to conduct a plenary hearing and to interview the child was inconsistent with R. 5:8-6 and our decisions in G.C. v. M.Y., 278 N.J.Super. 363, 368 , 651 A. 2d 110 (App.Div.1995) (concluding it was improper to make a custody decision on an emergent basis without a plenary hearing and interview with the children in the absence of imminent or threatened harm to the children), and Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J.Super. 267, 273 , 372 A. 2d 629 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 28 , 379 A. 2d 259 (1977). | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Lavene v. Lavene
green
2 sentences1998Thus, the failure to conduct a plenary hearing and to interview the child was inconsistent with R. 5:8-6 and our decisions in G.C. v. M.Y., 278 N.J.Super. 363, 368 , 651 A.2d 110 (App.Div.1995) (concluding it was improper to make a custody decision on an emergent basis without a plenary hearing and interview with the children in the absence of imminent or threatened harm to the children), and Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J.Super. 267, 273 , 372 A.2d 629 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 28 , 379 A.2d 259 (1977). 1998Thus, the failure to conduct a plenary hearing and to interview the child was inconsistent with R. 5:8-6 and our decisions in G.C. v. M.Y., 278 N.J.Super. 363, 368 , 651 A.2d 110 (App.Div.1995) (concluding it was improper to make a custody decision on an emergent basis without a plenary hearing and interview with the children in the absence of imminent or threatened harm to the children), and Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J.Super. 267, 273 , 372 A.2d 629 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 28 , 379 A.2d 259 (1977). | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Gc v. My
green
2 sentences1998Thus, the failure to conduct a plenary hearing and to interview the child was inconsistent with R. 5:8-6 and our decisions in G.C. v. M.Y., 278 N.J.Super. 363, 368 , 651 A.2d 110 (App.Div.1995) (concluding it was improper to make a custody decision on an emergent basis without a plenary hearing and interview with the children in the absence of imminent or threatened harm to the children), and Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J.Super. 267, 273 , 372 A.2d 629 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 28 , 379 A.2d 259 (1977). 1998Thus, the failure to conduct a plenary hearing and to interview the child was inconsistent with R. 5:8-6 and our decisions in G.C. v. M.Y., 278 N.J.Super. 363, 368 , 651 A.2d 110 (App.Div.1995) (concluding it was improper to make a custody decision on an emergent basis without a plenary hearing and interview with the children in the absence of imminent or threatened harm to the children), and Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J.Super. 267, 273 , 372 A.2d 629 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 28 , 379 A.2d 259 (1977). | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Lavene v. Lavene
neutral
2 sentences1998Thus, the failure to conduct a plenary hearing and to interview the child was inconsistent with R. 5:8-6 and our decisions in G.C. v. M.Y., 278 N.J.Super. 363, 368 , 651 A.2d 110 (App.Div.1995) (concluding it was improper to make a custody decision on an emergent basis without a plenary hearing and interview with the children in the absence of imminent or threatened harm to the children), and Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J.Super. 267, 273 , 372 A.2d 629 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 28 , 379 A.2d 259 (1977). 1998Thus, the failure to conduct a plenary hearing and to interview the child was inconsistent with R. 5:8-6 and our decisions in G.C. v. M.Y., 278 N.J.Super. 363, 368 , 651 A. 2d 110 (App.Div.1995) (concluding it was improper to make a custody decision on an emergent basis without a plenary hearing and interview with the children in the absence of imminent or threatened harm to the children), and Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J.Super. 267, 273 , 372 A. 2d 629 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 28 , 379 A. 2d 259 (1977). | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Levine v. Levine
green
1 sentence2022In his detailed statement of reasons, the judge engaged in a fulsome analysis of the fourteen "best interests" factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-44 and 4 N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 enumerates the following custody factors: (1) the parents’ ability to agree, communicate and cooperate in matters relating to the child; (2) the parents’ willingness to accept custody and any history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse; (3) the interaction and relationship of the child with its parents and siblings; (4) the history of domestic violence, if any; (5) the safety of the child a | 1 | 2022–2022 |
New Jersey Department of Children & Families v. I.S.
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 40-41 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Fritz
green
1 sentence2019That order noted that the court "closed the FN matter after having a custody hearing . . . and determin[ing] that . . . [Sarah] should remain with [Wendy] based upon the [Division] court report along with [Placencia's] notes and summary arguments by the respective attorneys, neither party wanted to continue in therapy and the child remains unwilling to return home due to the history in the FN case."2 On appeal, Yolanda claims she was denied due process because she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel contrary to the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Tahan v. Duquette
green
2 sentences2012In Tahan v. Duquette, 259 N.J.Super. 328, 335 , 613 A.2d 486 (App.Div.1992), we distinguished an Article 13(b) grave risk analysis from the type performed in a traditional custody hearing. 2012In Tahan v. Duquette, 259 N.J.Super. 328, 335 , 613 A.2d 486 (App.Div.1992), we distinguished an Article 13(b) grave risk analysis from the type performed in a traditional custody hearing. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Div. of Youth & Fam. Svcs. v. ND
green
1 sentence2011At the custody hearing, “absent a finding of abuse or neglect in the Title 9 action, [defendant] cannot be burdened by assumptions about her parental fitness based on the prior orders entered in this litigation.” Ibid. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. Bresnahan
green
2 sentences1988State v. Taylor, 125 Kan. 594 , 264 P. 1069 (1928); Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 255 Mass. 144 , 150 N.E. 882 (Sup.Jud.Ct. 1926). 1988State v. Taylor, 125 Kan. 594 , 264 P. 1069 (1928); Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 255 Mass. 144 , 150 N.E. 882 (Sup.Jud.Ct. 1926). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Taylor
neutral
2 sentences1988State v. Taylor, 125 Kan. 594 , 264 P. 1069 (1928); Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 255 Mass. 144 , 150 N.E. 882 (Sup.Jud.Ct. 1926). 1988State v. Taylor, 125 Kan. 594 , 264 P. 1069 (1928); Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 255 Mass. 144 , 150 N.E. 882 (Sup.Jud.Ct. 1926). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Jackson v. McDonald
neutral
1 sentence1953Jackson v. McDonald, 70 N.J.L. 594 ( Sup. Ct. 1904); N.J., &c., Ins. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.