custody requirement in Florida

2017Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574 .

2017Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574 .

2014“The whole point of the custody analysis is to determine whether, given the circumstances, ‘a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was ... at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2407 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)).

2014“The whole point of the custody analysis is to determine whether, given the circumstances, ‘a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was ... at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2407 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)).

2013Nov. 21, 2001); People v. Hubbart, 88 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 (2001); People v. Wakefield, 81 Cal.App.4th 893 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 (2000); People v. Hedge, 72 Cal.App.4th 1466 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 (1999); People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1383 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (1999); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 (1998)).

2002The courts also noted that the California Legislature amended the custody requirement statute to provide that a petition "shall not be dismissed on the basis of a later judicial or administrative determination that the individual's custody was unlawful, if the unlawful custody was the result of a good faith mistake of fact or law" with an explanation that the amendment was "declaratory of existing law." Superior Court, 2001 WL 1299443 at *7; see also Jones, 2001 WL 1480301 at *2; Wakefield, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d at 223-24 ; Garcetti, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d at 732 n. 7.

2013As Justice Harding pointed out, the majority’s pronouncement was at odds with the interpretation of a California statute with a similar “in custody” provision adopted by “five California appellate courts[, which] concluded that the custody requirement in California’s Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act requires only actual custody, not lawful custody.” Id. (citing People v. Jones, No. C034587, 2001 WL 1480301 (Cal. 3rd Ct.App.

2003Atkinson v. State, 791 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), aff'd, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla.2002). [4] In State v. Atkinson, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2002), our supreme court held that the custody requirement imposed by section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2001), must be read to require that the custody was lawful.

2001This court reversed after determining that the time *462 had not expired based on the application of Wood v. State, 750 So.2d 592 (Fla.1999)(providing that all defendants previously adjudicated would have two years from issuance date of May 27, 1999, in which to file rule 3.850 motions raising claims traditionally cognizable under coram nobis). [1] Appellant was never in custody on the challenged convictions because he was sentenced only to four days time served; therefore, he could not file a rule 3.850 motion as to those convictions until the supreme court removed the custody requirement fro

2001Wood amended the rule, deleted the requirement and provided. “[a]ll defendants adjudicated prior to this opinion shall have two years from the filing date within which to file claims traditionally cognizable under coram nobis.” Id. at 595 .

2014“The whole point of the custody analysis is to determine whether, given the circumstances, ‘a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was ... at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2407 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)).

2014“The whole point of the custody analysis is to determine whether, given the circumstances, ‘a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was ... at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2407 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)).

2013Nov. 21, 2001); People v. Hubbart, 88 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 (2001); People v. Wakefield, 81 Cal.App.4th 893 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 (2000); People v. Hedge, 72 Cal.App.4th 1466 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 (1999); People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1383 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (1999); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 (1998)).

2013Nov. 21, 2001); People v. Hubbart, 88 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 (2001); People v. Wakefield, 81 Cal.App.4th 893 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 (2000); People v. Hedge, 72 Cal.App.4th 1466 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 (1999); People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1383 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (1999); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 (1998)).

2013Nov. 21, 2001); People v. Hubbart, 88 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 (2001); People v. Wakefield, 81 Cal.App.4th 893 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 (2000); People v. Hedge, 72 Cal.App.4th 1466 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 (1999); People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1383 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (1999); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 (1998)).

2013Nov. 21, 2001); People v. Hubbart, 88 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 (2001); People v. Wakefield, 81 Cal.App.4th 893 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 (2000); People v. Hedge, 72 Cal.App.4th 1466 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 (1999); People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1383 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (1999); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 (1998)).

2013Nov. 21, 2001); People v. Hubbart, 88 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 (2001); People v. Wakefield, 81 Cal.App.4th 893 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 (2000); People v. Hedge, 72 Cal.App.4th 1466 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 (1999); People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1383 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (1999); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 (1998)).

2013Nov. 21, 2001); People v. Hubbart, 88 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 (2001); People v. Wakefield, 81 Cal.App.4th 893 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 (2000); People v. Hedge, 72 Cal.App.4th 1466 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 (1999); People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1383 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (1999); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 (1998)).

2013Nov. 21, 2001); People v. Hubbart, 88 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 (2001); People v. Wakefield, 81 Cal.App.4th 893 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 (2000); People v. Hedge, 72 Cal.App.4th 1466 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 (1999); People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1383 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (1999); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 (1998)).

2013Nov. 21, 2001); People v. Hubbart, 88 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 (2001); People v. Wakefield, 81 Cal.App.4th 893 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 (2000); People v. Hedge, 72 Cal.App.4th 1466 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 (1999); People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1383 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (1999); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 (1998)).

2012Id.

2012Id.

2009Given these factual circumstances, the second step of the custody analysis is to determine whether “a reasonable person [would] have felt [that] he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 663 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 (quoting Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 ).

2009Given these factual circumstances, the second step of the custody analysis is to determine whether “a reasonable person [would] have felt [that] he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 663 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 (quoting Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 ).

2009As stated above, Ramirez provides the following question-based channeling mechanism to answer this question: (1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; [and] (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave the place of questioning. 739 So.2d at 574 (citing Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 558 ) (formatting altered).

2009As stated above, Ramirez provides the following question-based channeling mechanism to answer this question: (1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; [and] (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave the place of questioning. 739 So.2d at 574 (citing Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 558 ) (formatting altered).

2008The court placed great reliance on the accomplishment of certain procedural prerequisites under the Act "while the person [is] still in prison." Gordon, 839 So.2d at 718 . [10] In other words, the procedural review process must be accomplished prior to the completion of *1176 a person's sentence and while the individual is still incarcerated. [11] Gordon found that since these prerequisites could only be accomplished in a total confinement setting, i.e., prison, "in custody," as used in Clause One, must necessarily equate to "total confinement." The court noted approvingly Siddal's reliance on

2008The court placed great reliance on the accomplishment of certain procedural prerequisites under the Act "while the person [is] still in prison." Gordon, 839 So.2d at 718 . [10] In other words, the procedural review process must be accomplished prior to the completion of *1176 a person's sentence and while the individual is still incarcerated. [11] Gordon found that since these prerequisites could only be accomplished in a total confinement setting, i.e., prison, "in custody," as used in Clause One, must necessarily equate to "total confinement." The court noted approvingly Siddal's reliance on

2004Similar holdings by the district courts are in Howarth v. State, 673 So.2d 580 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); McArthur v. State, 597 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); and Lawrence v. State, 404 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

2004Similar holdings by the district courts are in Howarth v. State, 673 So.2d 580 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); McArthur v. State, 597 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); and Lawrence v. State, 404 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

2004Similar holdings by the district courts are in Howarth v. State, 673 So.2d 580 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); McArthur v. State, 597 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); and Lawrence v. State, 404 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

2003Atkinson v. State, 791 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), aff'd, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla.2002). [4] In State v. Atkinson, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2002), our supreme court held that the custody requirement imposed by section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2001), must be read to require that the custody was lawful.

1992See, e.g., Wall v. State, 525 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Shell v. State, 501 So.2d 1332 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).

1989It was error for the judge to not allow the husband to offer evidence at the child custody hearing concerning these best interests of the child, a matter decided by this court in the earlier case of Doane v. Doane, 279 So.2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).

1987A panel of this court held that the Wisharts, as grandparents, "should have been afforded an opportunity to be heard and present evidence at the custody hearing." Wishart v. Bates, 487 So.2d 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).

1985However, we further find that the order indicates an incomplete consideration of the custody standard announced in Pape v. Pape, 444 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

1981The court again granted temporary custody to the father. [4] In point of fact it gave the Brevard decree far more effect than a Florida court would have, since it was clearly improper on its face. [5] Cf. Robinson v. Robinson, 333 So.2d 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (grandparents living nearby not controlling). [6] During the custody hearing, the judge stated several times that the mother and father were equally fit persons to have custody.

1975State v. Reynolds, Fla. 1970, 238 So.2d 598 ; Wilcox v. State, Fla.App. 1st, 1972, 267 So.2d 15 .

1975State v. Reynolds, Fla. 1970, 238 So.2d 598 ; Wilcox v. State, Fla.App. 1st, 1972, 267 So.2d 15 .