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7 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1999–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. James L. Conleygreen2 sentences2001“When a defendant is already incarcerated at the time of interrogation, the traditional custody analysis is inappropriate because, by its very nature, a prison setting restrains the freedom of movement of its inmates.” Ford, 144 N.H. at 63 (citing United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986)). 1999See United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Thompson v. Keohanegreen2 sentences2019In a custody analysis, " 'the crucial question entails an evaluation made after determination of the historical facts: if encountered by a "reasonable person," would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda ?' " State v. Ford , 144 N.H. 57 , 63, 738 A.2d 937 (1999) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99 , 113, 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) ) (brackets omitted). "[A]lthough we will not overturn the factual findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the ultimate determination of custody de novo ." McKenna , 166 N.H 2019In a custody analysis, " 'the crucial question entails an evaluation made after determination of the historical facts: if encountered by a "reasonable person," would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda ?' " State v. Ford , 144 N.H. 57 , 63, 738 A.2d 937 (1999) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99 , 113, 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) ) (brackets omitted). "[A]lthough we will not overturn the factual findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the ultimate determination of custody de novo ." McKenna , 166 N.H | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Colleygreen2 sentences2001“When a defendant is already incarcerated at the time of interrogation, the traditional custody analysis is inappropriate because, by its very nature, a prison setting restrains the freedom of movement of its inmates.” Ford, 144 N.H. at 63 (citing United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986)). 1999See United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986). | 1 | 2 |
J. D. B. v. North Carolinagreen1 sentence2023State v. Steimel, 155 N.H. 141, 146 (2007); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (“[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”); J.D.B. v. 10 North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011) (“[T]he objective test avoids burdening police with the task of anticipating the idiosyncrasies of every individual suspect and divining how those particular traits affect each person’s subjective state of mind.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Steimelgreen1 sentence2023State v. Steimel, 155 N.H. 141, 146 (2007); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (“[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”); J.D.B. v. 10 North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011) (“[T]he objective test avoids burdening police with the task of anticipating the idiosyncrasies of every individual suspect and divining how those particular traits affect each person’s subjective state of mind.”). | 1 | 1 |
Stansbury v. Californiagreen1 sentence2023State v. Steimel, 155 N.H. 141, 146 (2007); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (“[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”); J.D.B. v. 10 North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011) (“[T]he objective test avoids burdening police with the task of anticipating the idiosyncrasies of every individual suspect and divining how those particular traits affect each person’s subjective state of mind.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Teresa Mechell Griffingreen2 sentences2014See United States v. Colonna, 511 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that although the defendant was told that he “was not under arrest,” which weighed in favor of a conclusion of no custody, the defendant was in custody, in part because he “was never told that he was free to leave or that he did not have to respond to questions”); see also United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the interview at will often defines the custodial setting. . . . 2014See United States v. Colonna, 511 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that although the defendant was told that he “was not under arrest,” which weighed in favor of a conclusion of no custody, the defendant was in custody, in part because he “was never told that he was free to leave or that he did not have to respond to questions”); see also United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the interview at will often defines the custodial setting.... | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Colonnagreen2 sentences2014See United States v. Colonna, 511 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that although the defendant was told that he “was not under arrest,” which weighed in favor of a conclusion of no custody, the defendant was in custody, in part because he “was never told that he was free to leave or that he did not have to respond to questions”); see also United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the interview at will often defines the custodial setting. . . . 2014See United States v. Colonna, 511 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that although the defendant was told that he “was not under arrest,” which weighed in favor of a conclusion of no custody, the defendant was in custody, in part because he “was never told that he was free to leave or that he did not have to respond to questions”); see also United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the interview at will often defines the custodial setting.... | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Aaron L. Salvogreen2 sentences2014Although such a statement generally weighs in favor of a finding of non-custody, see, e.g., United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 951 (6th Cir. 1998), it is not dispositive; rather it is but one factor to be weighed in the custody analysis. 2014Although such a statement generally weighs in favor of a finding of non-custody, see, e.g., United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 951 (6th Cir. 1998), it is not dispositive; rather it is but one factor to be weighed in the custody analysis. | 1 | 1 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2002See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ford
green
2 sentences2019In a custody analysis, " 'the crucial question entails an evaluation made after determination of the historical facts: if encountered by a "reasonable person," would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda ?' " State v. Ford , 144 N.H. 57 , 63, 738 A.2d 937 (1999) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99 , 113, 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) ) (brackets omitted). "[A]lthough we will not overturn the factual findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the ultimate determination of custody de novo ." McKenna , 166 N.H 2019In a custody analysis, " 'the crucial question entails an evaluation made after determination of the historical facts: if encountered by a "reasonable person," would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda ?' " State v. Ford , 144 N.H. 57 , 63, 738 A.2d 937 (1999) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99 , 113, 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) ) (brackets omitted). "[A]lthough we will not overturn the factual findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the ultimate determination of custody de novo ." McKenna , 166 N.H | 4 | 2001–2019 |
State of New Hampshire v. Timothy McKenna
green
1 sentence2019In a custody analysis, " 'the crucial question entails an evaluation made after determination of the historical facts: if encountered by a "reasonable person," would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda ?' " State v. Ford , 144 N.H. 57 , 63, 738 A.2d 937 (1999) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99 , 113, 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) ) (brackets omitted). "[A]lthough we will not overturn the factual findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the ultimate determination of custody de novo ." McKenna , 166 N.H | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Hughes
green
2 sentences2014The court found that “[w]hile escorting a suspect throughout his home may have some bearing on the custody inquiry, there is no evidence that the troopers followed the defendant so closely as to intrude upon any intimate moment or private activity.” Id. (citation omitted). 2014The court found that “[w]hile escorting a suspect throughout his home may have some bearing on the custody inquiry, there is no evidence that the troopers followed the defendant so closely as to intrude upon any intimate moment or private activity.” Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.