custody test in Colorado

2011"In particular, the court may not consider the `unarticulated thoughts or views of the officers and suspects' because the custody test is objective in nature." Id. (quoting People v. Hankins, 201 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Colo.2009)); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) ("Our decisions make *1122 clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."); Matheny, 46 P.3d at 468 .

2011"In particular, the court may not consider the `unarticulated thoughts or views of the officers and suspects' because the custody test is objective in nature." Id. (quoting People v. Hankins, 201 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Colo.2009)); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) ("Our decisions make *1122 clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."); Matheny, 46 P.3d at 468 .

2011Moreover, by establishing a presumption in favor of parental custody, the judiciary's ability to engage in social engineering is dramatically restricted." Id. at 247 (citations omitted).

2011Moreover, by establishing a presumption in favor of parental custody, the judiciary's ability to engage in social engineering is dramatically restricted." Id. at 247 (citations omitted).

2022See J.D.B. v. North Carolina , 564 U.S. 261, 278 (2011) (noting the state’s concession that a suspect’s personal characteristics — for example, blindness — may be relevant to the custody analysis and finding age to be a relevant factor in some circumstances).

2014Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that courts must consider a juvenile's age when determining custody, as age is "a reality that courts cannot simply ignore." J.D.B. v. North Carolina, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2406 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) ("[Slo long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.").

2011In the custody inquiry we analyze the totality of the cireumstances, including (1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (8) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer's response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during the interrogation; a

2011"In particular, the court may not consider the `unarticulated thoughts or views of the officers and suspects' because the custody test is objective in nature." Id. (quoting People v. Hankins, 201 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Colo.2009)); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) ("Our decisions make *1122 clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."); Matheny, 46 P.3d at 468 .

2011"In particular, the court may not consider the `unarticulated thoughts or views of the officers and suspects' because the custody test is objective in nature." Id. (quoting People v. Hankins, 201 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Colo.2009)); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) ("Our decisions make *1122 clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."); Matheny, 46 P.3d at 468 .

2010In particular, the court may not consider the " 'unarticulated thoughts or views of the officers and suspects' because the custody test is objective in nature." Hankins, 201 P.3d at 1219 (quoting People v. Elmarr, 181 P.3d 1157, 1162 (Colo.2008)); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994).

2011It is only when an officer's knowledge or beliefs are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned that such knowledge or belief may bear upon the custody issue, and even then are "relevant only to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her `freedom of action.'" Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)).

2011It is only when an officer's knowledge or beliefs are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned that such knowledge or belief may bear upon the custody issue, and even then are "relevant only to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her `freedom of action.'" Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)).

2010In particular, the court may not consider the " 'unarticulated thoughts or views of the officers and suspects' because the custody test is objective in nature." Hankins, 201 P.3d at 1219 (quoting People v. Elmarr, 181 P.3d 1157, 1162 (Colo.2008)); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994).

2009Elmarr, 181 P.3d at 1162 ; see Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 328 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ("Our decisions make clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective cireumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.").

2026See Niemeyer, ¶ 39, 555 P.3d at 617; Effland, 240 P.3d at 874 . ¶ 35 Nevertheless, Torres contends that he was in custody before Detective Wonderly handcuffed him for four reasons. ¶ 36 First, Torres argues that Sergeant Mazone placed him in custody when Sergeant Mazone “ordered him to remain positioned at the back of [the car].” But we are unaware of a Colorado case supporting a determination that the officers’ safety-related restrictions on Torres’s movements would have caused “a reasonable person in [Torres]’s position [to] believe himself to be deprived of his freedom of action to the degr

2026See Niemeyer, ¶ 39, 555 P.3d at 617; Effland, 240 P.3d at 874 . ¶ 35 Nevertheless, Torres contends that he was in custody before Detective Wonderly handcuffed him for four reasons. ¶ 36 First, Torres argues that Sergeant Mazone placed him in custody when Sergeant Mazone “ordered him to remain positioned at the back of [the car].” But we are unaware of a Colorado case supporting a determination that the officers’ safety-related restrictions on Torres’s movements would have caused “a reasonable person in [Torres]’s position [to] believe himself to be deprived of his freedom of action to the degr

2022For example, in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984), the Court “recognize[d] . . . the importance of . . . workable rule[s].” And, in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004), the Court noted that “the custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police.” Colorado’s supreme court quoted this language approvingly in Cowart, 244 P.3d at 1204 .

2022People v. Sampson , 2017 CO 100, ¶ 29 (concluding the defendant was not in custody during question ing because an officer informed the defendant that he would be a rrested at a later time); see also Clark , ¶ 32. ¶ 25 Finally, while acknowledging that the custody test is an objective one, our review of the t otality of the circumstances requires that we consider Peterson’s deafness and the limitations his disability might have presente d.

2022For example, in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984), the Court “recognize[d] . . . the importance of . . . workable rule[s].” And, in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004), the Court noted that “the custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police.” Colorado’s supreme court quoted this language approvingly in Cowart, 244 P.3d at 1204 .

2022People v. Sampson , 2017 CO 100, ¶ 29 (concluding the defendant was not in custody during question ing because an officer informed the defendant that he would be a rrested at a later time); see also Clark , ¶ 32. ¶ 25 Finally, while acknowledging that the custody test is an objective one, our review of the t otality of the circumstances requires that we consider Peterson’s deafness and the limitations his disability might have presente d.

2017Pleshakov, ¶30, 298 P.3d at 235 (finding the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when there were four officers present at the scene, but only one officer spoke with the defendant and the other officers were engaged in other tasks). ¶32 Here, there were many officers present, but not all of the officers focused on Garcia.

2014See Howard, 92 P.3d at 451 (section 19-2-511(1) protects only those juveniles that are in Miranda custody). {48 The majority rightly notes that the trial court blurred the custody standard when it focused on whether N.A.S. felt "free to leave," an error we have corrected many times.

2014See, eg., People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 15 , 325 P.3d 1026 (discussing the distinction between custody under the Fifth Amendment and seizure under the Fourth Amendment). 49 That said, the trial court did start by framing the issue as whether N.A.S. "would have considered himself deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way ... such as to make it a custodial interrogation." (Emphasis added.) This echoes the Supreme Court's original words in Miranda: "To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any sign

2014See, eg., People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 15 , 325 P.3d 1026 (discussing the distinction between custody under the Fifth Amendment and seizure under the Fourth Amendment). 49 That said, the trial court did start by framing the issue as whether N.A.S. "would have considered himself deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way ... such as to make it a custodial interrogation." (Emphasis added.) This echoes the Supreme Court's original words in Miranda: "To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any sign

2013Thus, facts of which a defendant is unaware-including an officer's subjective thoughts and beliefs, "hafve] no bearing on the question of whether a suspect was in 'eustody' at a particular time." Klinck, 259 P.3d at 493 (concluding that trial court erred in basing custody determination on police officer's un-articulated intent to arrest defendant after interview); see also People v. Hughes, 252 P.3d 1118, 1120, 1121-22 (Colo.2011) (concluding that trial court erred in basing custody determination on officer's subjective intent that he would have detained defendant if he had tried to leave); Ma

1993See, e.g., Black, 698 P.2d at 768 ; People v. Corley, 698 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo.1985) (finding no custodial interrogation despite the fact that the investigating officer "focused" on the defendant as a suspect).

1993See, e.g., Black, 698 P.2d at 768 ; People v. Corley, 698 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo.1985) (finding no custodial interrogation despite the fact that the investigating officer “focused” on the defendant as a suspect).

1993See, e.g., Black, 698 P.2d at 768 ; People v. Corley, 698 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo.1985) (finding no custodial interrogation despite the fact that the investigating officer "focused" on the defendant as a suspect).

1993See, e.g., Black, 698 P.2d at 768 ; People v. Corley, 698 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo.1985) (finding no custodial interrogation despite the fact that the investigating officer “focused” on the defendant as a suspect).

1973See the discussion in Rea v. Rea, 195 Or. 252 , 245 P.2d 884 .

1973See the discussion in Rea v. Rea, 195 Or. 252 , 245 P.2d 884 .