custody analysis in South Carolina

2011We also noted in Kisling that this parity exists "as the custody analysis begins." Id.

2011We also noted in Kisling that this parity exists “as the custody analysis begins.” Id.

2021The Court further noted that an individual's freedom of movement is but one part of the custody analysis and past decisions did not "'accord talismanic power' to the freedom-of-movement inquiry, and . . . instead asked the additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)).

2018See Stansbury , 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 (officer's view of an interviewee's culpability may bear on the custody analysis if manifested by word or deed to interviewee "and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave").

2007Another legal principle in line with our holding today is the established rule in South Carolina that “in custody matters, the father and mother are in parity as to entitlement to the custody of a child.” Brown v. Brown, 362 S.C. 85, 91 , 606 S.E.2d 785, 788 (Ct.App.2004). “[T]here is no preference given to the father or mother in regard to the custody of the child[;][t]he parents stand in perfect equipoise as the custody analysis begins.” Id.

2007Another legal principle in line with our holding today is the established rule in South Carolina that “in custody matters, the father and mother are in parity as to entitlement to the custody of a child.” Brown v. Brown, 362 S.C. 85, 91 , 606 S.E.2d 785, 788 (Ct.App.2004). “[T]here is no preference given to the father or mother in regard to the custody of the child[;][t]he parents stand in perfect equipoise as the custody analysis begins.” Id.

2021The Court concluded its jurisprudence established "that the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody." Id. (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)).

2021The Court further noted that an individual's freedom of movement is but one part of the custody analysis and past decisions did not "'accord talismanic power' to the freedom-of-movement inquiry, and . . . instead asked the additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)).

2021The Court concluded its jurisprudence established "that the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody." Id. (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)).

2011Addressing the first reason from Altman , which we described as "the general legal principle that the imposition of a change of circumstances burden applies when a parent seeks to alter a prior custody order," 372 S.C. at 397 , 642 S.E.2d at 624 (emphasis added), this general principle does not require the existence of a prior custody order in every instance before a parent seeking custody must show a change of circumstances. *544 Purser's request for custody was, in reality, a request to change an established custodial arrangement.

2011Addressing the first reason from Altman , which we described as "the general legal principle that the imposition of a change of circumstances burden applies when a parent seeks to alter a prior custody order," 372 S.C. at 397 , 642 S.E.2d at 624 (emphasis added), this general principle does not require the existence of a prior custody order in every instance before a parent seeking custody must show a change of circumstances. *544 Purser's request for custody was, in reality, a request to change an established custodial arrangement.

2010However, “[ajlthough there is no rule of law requiring custody be awarded to the primary caretaker, there is an assumption that custody will be awarded to the primary caretaker.” Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 527 , 599 S.E.2d 114, 120 (2004).

2010However, “[ajlthough there is no rule of law requiring custody be awarded to the primary caretaker, there is an assumption that custody will be awarded to the primary caretaker.” Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 527 , 599 S.E.2d 114, 120 (2004).

2009See In re Brandon A., 50 A.D.3d 395, 395-96 , 855 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2008) (holding former foster mother lacked standing to intervene in custody hearing because she did not have any protected liberty interest in the foster-parent-and-child relationship); Valentine v. Lutz, 512 N.W.2d 868, 870-71 (Minn.1994) (holding former foster parents did not have the right to intervene in a custody hearing involving a child who lived with them for four years because they were not currently providing care nor under a duty to provide care to the child).

2009See In re Brandon A., 50 A.D.3d 395, 395-96 , 855 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2008) (holding former foster mother lacked standing to intervene in custody hearing because she did not have any protected liberty interest in the foster-parent-and-child relationship); Valentine v. Lutz, 512 N.W.2d 868, 870-71 (Minn.1994) (holding former foster parents did not have the right to intervene in a custody hearing involving a child who lived with them for four years because they were not currently providing care nor under a duty to provide care to the child).

2009See In re Brandon A., 50 A.D.3d 395, 395-96 , 855 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2008) (holding former foster mother lacked standing to intervene in custody hearing because she did not have any protected liberty interest in the foster-parent-and-child relationship); Valentine v. Lutz, 512 N.W.2d 868, 870-71 (Minn.1994) (holding former foster parents did not have the right to intervene in a custody hearing involving a child who lived with them for four years because they were not currently providing care nor under a duty to provide care to the child).

2009See In re Brandon A., 50 A.D.3d 395, 395-96 , 855 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2008) (holding former foster mother lacked standing to intervene in custody hearing because she did not have any protected liberty interest in the foster-parent-and-child relationship); Valentine v. Lutz, 512 N.W.2d 868, 870-71 (Minn.1994) (holding former foster parents did not have the right to intervene in a custody hearing involving a child who lived with them for four years because they were not currently providing care nor under a duty to provide care to the child).