custody hearing in Indiana

2015In Brown v. Brown, 463 N.E.2d 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), this court held that a delay of two months between the granting of a temporary ex parte order immediately transferring custody of children from father to mother and a full custody hearing was one of several procedural irregularities that combined to constitute an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

2015Id. at 313 (“Because a delay in custody hearing may increase the chances of a custodial parent eventually being deprived of custody, it is not reasonable for a custody hearing to follow an ex parte transfer of custody by two months.”) (emphasis added).

2020State v. Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d 675, 679 (Ind. 2019), Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-951 | April 3, 2020 Page 9 of 20 petition for cert. docketed.

2020Accordingly, we will consider whether Crabtree was in custody at the time of the interrogation. [22] “The custody inquiry is a mixed question of fact and law: the circumstances surrounding [Crabtree’s] interrogation are matters of fact, and whether those facts add up to Miranda custody is a question of law.” Id. at 679 .

2018See Howes , 565 U.S. at 509 , 132 S.Ct. 1181 (noting that whether the interviewee is released after questioning matters in the custody analysis).

2018See Howes , 565 U.S. at 509 , 132 S.Ct. 1181 (noting that whether the interviewee is released after questioning matters in the custody analysis).

2020The United States Supreme Court has identified only one subjective characteristic relevant to the custody analysis: whether the suspect is a child if the child’s age “was known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer, . . . .” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 , 131 S. Ct. 1 2394, 2404 , 180 L.

2020The United States Supreme Court has identified only one subjective characteristic relevant to the custody analysis: whether the suspect is a child if the child’s age “was known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer, . . . .” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 , 131 S. Ct. 1 2394, 2404 , 180 L.

2024K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 459 . 7 This provision was codified at subsection (d) at the time of the custody hearing here.

2010As a result, "the focus is significantly different because the parties are not on par." In re Custody of McGuire, 487 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ind.Ct.App.1985); see In re Paternity of K.I., 903 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ind.2009) (in custody dispute between parent and third party, burden is always on third party). *462 Where the dispute involves a parent and a third party, we cannot ignore the constitutional implications; the relationship of a parent and a child is of a constitutional dimension.

2015And in Wilcox v. Wilcox, 635 N.E.2d 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), this court held that a delay of fifteen months between the granting of an emergency ex parte order immediately transferring custody of children was a significant enough delay to alone be a denial of due process.

2005See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 635 N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

2024Cf. In re Adoption of T.W., 859 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming finding that parent was unfit based, in part, on parent’s “drug use and criminal convictions” and affirming children’s adoption by relatives). [29] As for Father’s physical abuse of the Children, Father admitted at the CHINS fact-finding hearing that he regularly physically disciplined the Children.

2021F.M. v. N.B., 979 N.E.2d 1036, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2020See Hecht v. Hecht, 142 N.E.3d 1022 , 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Although it did not make specific findings regarding each factor, we note that the trial court was not required to enter a finding as to each factor it considered.”); see also Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Ind. 1997) (“Although a court is required to consider all relevant factors in making its determination, it is not required to make specific findings [when ruling on a motion to modify custody].” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DR-850 | December 17, 2020 Page 9 of 23 [19] Our Supreme Court has h

2020See Hecht v. Hecht, 142 N.E.3d 1022 , 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Although it did not make specific findings regarding each factor, we note that the trial court was not required to enter a finding as to each factor it considered.”); see also Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Ind. 1997) (“Although a court is required to consider all relevant factors in making its determination, it is not required to make specific findings [when ruling on a motion to modify custody].” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DR-850 | December 17, 2020 Page 9 of 23 [19] Our Supreme Court has h

2020The United States Supreme Court has identified only one subjective characteristic relevant to the custody analysis: whether the suspect is a child if the child’s age “was known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer, . . . .” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 , 131 S. Ct. 1 2394, 2404 , 180 L.

2019See Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99 , 112-13, 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995).

2019See Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99 , 112-13, 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995).

2011See Trout v. Trout, 638 N.E.2d 1306, 1307-08 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) ("A timely objection is a prerequisite to appellate review.

2010As a result, "the focus is significantly different because the parties are not on par." In re Custody of McGuire, 487 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ind.Ct.App.1985); see In re Paternity of K.I., 903 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ind.2009) (in custody dispute between parent and third party, burden is always on third party). *462 Where the dispute involves a parent and a third party, we cannot ignore the constitutional implications; the relationship of a parent and a child is of a constitutional dimension.

2004See Clark v. Madden, 725 N.E.2d 100, 105 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding father could not challenge trial court order that he hire a nanny when father had offered to do so at the custody hearing).

2002"Although a move out of state is not per se a [substantial change] such as to make that parent's continued custody unreasonable, that does not mean that the circumstances inherent in such a move are always insufficient as a matter of law to warrant modifying custody." In re Paternity of Winkler, 725 N.E.2d 124, 128 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (quoting Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96, 98-99 (Ind.1992)).

2002"Although a move out of state is not per se a [substantial change] such as to make that parent's continued custody unreasonable, that does not mean that the circumstances inherent in such a move are always insufficient as a matter of law to warrant modifying custody." In re Paternity of Winkler, 725 N.E.2d 124, 128 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (quoting Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96, 98-99 (Ind.1992)).

1990See Matter of B. (1972), 30 N.Y.2d 352 , 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 , 285 N.E.2d 288 ; Adoption of R.I, supra. Unlike the evidence presented in Lassi-ter, which demonstrated that the respondent-mother expressly declined to appear at a custody hearing and did not take the trouble to consult with her retained attorney after being notified of the proceedings, Forest took all possible necessary steps to prevent the termination of his parental rights of Benjamin.

1990See Matter of B. (1972), 30 N.Y.2d 352 , 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 , 285 N.E.2d 288 ; Adoption of R.I, supra. Unlike the evidence presented in Lassi-ter, which demonstrated that the respondent-mother expressly declined to appear at a custody hearing and did not take the trouble to consult with her retained attorney after being notified of the proceedings, Forest took all possible necessary steps to prevent the termination of his parental rights of Benjamin.