custody inquiry in Vermont

2015As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, “so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 , 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011).

2015As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, “so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 , 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011).

2015While DCF custody is a matter of who has control over care for the child, the custody inquiry under Miranda focuses on whether the suspect was “ ‘deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way.’ ” Pontbriand, 2005 VT 20, ¶ 14 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 ).

2015While DCF custody is a matter of who has control over care for the child, the custody inquiry under Miranda focuses on whether the suspect was “deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way.” Pontbriand , 2005 VT 20, ¶ 14 (quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 478 ).

2025See 1 This final grievance demonstrates the purpose of the exhaustion requirement, which "is designed to ensure that a grievance is fully explored and litigated before the administrative body possessing the pertinent experience and expertise in the subject area" in order "to preserve the authority of the administrative body, and to promote judicial efficiency." See Mullinnex, 2020 VT 33 , q 17.

2018See Garbutt , 173 Vt. at 282 , 790 A.2d at 448 . 3 Defendant argues that the location of his confession, "in the guts" of a police station, creates a presumption that he was in custody.

2018See Garbutt , 173 Vt. at 282 , 790 A.2d at 448 . 3 Defendant argues that the location of his confession, "in the guts" of a police station, creates a presumption that he was in custody.

2018See Muntean , 2010 VT 88 , ¶ 19, 189 Vt. 50 , 12 A.3d 518 (explaining that there is no determinative factor to a custody analysis under Miranda ). 5 Defendant also contends that the trial court mischaracterized his expert-witness proffer.

2018See Muntean , 2010 VT 88 , ¶ 19, 189 Vt. 50 , 12 A.3d 518 (explaining that there is no determinative factor to a custody analysis under Miranda ). 5 Defendant also contends that the trial court mischaracterized his expert-witness proffer.

2016When PCR is unavailable either because it is inappropriate or defendant does not meet the custody requirement, there is an alternative: the common-law remedy of coram nobis. 6 See Sinclair, 2012 VT 47, ¶ 1 (acknowledging the continuing life of the common- law coram nobis remedy).

2016When PCR is unavailable either because it is inappropriate or defendant does not meet the custody requirement, there is an alternative: the common-law remedy of coram nobis.6 See Sinclair, 2012 VT 47, ¶ 1 (acknowledging the continuing life of the common-law coram nobis remedy).

2015While DCF custody is a matter of who has control over care for the child, the custody inquiry under Miranda focuses on whether the suspect was “ ‘deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way.’ ” Pontbriand, 2005 VT 20, ¶ 14 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 ).

2015While DCF custody is a matter of who has control over care for the child, the custody inquiry under Miranda focuses on whether the suspect was “deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way.” Pontbriand , 2005 VT 20, ¶ 14 (quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 478 ).

2013It therefore could not have established personal jurisdiction for that order, and the superior court’s reference to that filing in this case does not persuade us that it established personal jurisdiction for the order in issue. 13 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed this question in Child Support Enforcement Div. of Alaska v. Brenckle, 675 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Mass. 1997): “As a remedial statute, and one not affecting substantive rights, it is proper that UIFSA should be applied retroactively.” 14 We recognize that the Oklahoma order purported to find that father was current with hi

2011See In re Smith, 169 Vt. 162, 172 , 730 A.2d 605, 612-13 (1999) (“Where substantial interests exist on both sides, due process demands no more than an equal apportionment of the risk of error, which the preponderance standard accomplishes.”).

2011See In re Smith, 169 Vt. 162, 172 , 730 A.2d 605, 612-13 (1999) (“Where substantial interests exist on both sides, due process demands no more than an equal apportionment of the risk of error, which the preponderance standard accomplishes.”).

2010See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004) (citing fact that defendant was interviewed at police station as a circumstance “weighting] in favor of the view that [defendant] was in custody”); State v. Lacey, 2009 MT 62, ¶ 63 , 204 P.3d 1192 (fact that interview occurred at police station “undoubtedly weighs in favor of a custodial interrogation”); State v. Rogers, 760 N.W.2d 35, 54 (Neb. 2009) (listing location of interrogation among “circumstances . . . most relevant to the custody inquiry”).

2010See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 , 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (citing fact that defendant was interviewed at police station as a circumstance "weigh[ing] in favor of the view that [defendant] was in custody"); State v. Lacey, 2009 MT 62, ¶ 63 , 349 Mont. 371 , 204 P.3d 1192 (fact that interview occurred at police station "undoubtedly weighs in favor of a custodial interrogation"); State v. Rogers, 277 Neb. 37 , 760 N.W.2d 35, 54 (2009) (listing location of interrogation among "circumstances . . . most relevant to the custody inquiry").

2010See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004) (citing fact that defendant was interviewed at police station as a circumstance “weighting] in favor of the view that [defendant] was in custody”); State v. Lacey, 2009 MT 62, ¶ 63 , 204 P.3d 1192 (fact that interview occurred at police station “undoubtedly weighs in favor of a custodial interrogation”); State v. Rogers, 760 N.W.2d 35, 54 (Neb. 2009) (listing location of interrogation among “circumstances . . . most relevant to the custody inquiry”).

2010See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 , 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (citing fact that defendant was interviewed at police station as a circumstance "weigh[ing] in favor of the view that [defendant] was in custody"); State v. Lacey, 2009 MT 62, ¶ 63 , 349 Mont. 371 , 204 P.3d 1192 (fact that interview occurred at police station "undoubtedly weighs in favor of a custodial interrogation"); State v. Rogers, 277 Neb. 37 , 760 N.W.2d 35, 54 (2009) (listing location of interrogation among "circumstances . . . most relevant to the custody inquiry").

2008See Kellner, 2004 VT 1, ¶¶ 12-13 (denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief from a tactical decision that, in retrospect, was ill-advised).

2006See Myott v. Myott, 149 Vt. at 576 , 547 A.2d at 1338 (holding that amendment to child custody statute after divorce action was filed, but effective prior to the final custody hearing, did not fundamentally change the “best interests” standard and therefore could be applied in pending dispute); Murray v. Luzenac Corp., 2003 VT 37, ¶ 7 (holding that where time limitation in repealed statute of repose had not yet run on claim at time of repeal, defendant had no vested right in former limitations law). ¶ 13.

2006See Myott v. Myott, 149 Vt. at 576 , 547 A.2d at 1338 (holding that amendment to child custody statute after divorce action was filed, but effective prior to the final custody hearing, did not fundamentally change the “best interests” standard and therefore could be applied in pending dispute); Murray v. Luzenac Corp., 2003 VT 37, ¶ 7 (holding that where time limitation in repealed statute of repose had not yet run on claim at time of repeal, defendant had no vested right in former limitations law). ¶ 13.

2006See Myott v. Myott, 149 Vt. at 576 , 547 A.2d at 1338 (holding that amendment to child custody statute after divorce action was filed, but effective prior to the final custody hearing, did not fundamentally change the “best interests” standard and therefore could be applied in pending dispute); Murray v. Luzenac Corp., 2003 VT 37, ¶ 7 (holding that where time limitation in repealed statute of repose had not yet run on claim at time of repeal, defendant had no vested right in former limitations law). ¶ 13.

1990State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 475 , 494 A.2d 108, 117 (1985).

1990State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 475 , 494 A.2d 108, 117 (1985).