custody hearing in Virginia

2009Prizzia v. Prizzia, 45 Va. App. 280, 285 , 610 S.E.2d 326, 329 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2009Prizzia v. Prizzia, 45 Va. App. 280, 285 , 610 S.E.2d 326, 329 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026“Custody and visitation matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Brandon v. Coffey, 77 Va. App. 628 , 635 (2023). “[T]he trial court has broad discretion in conducting a trial, and we will not disturb its rulings on that subject absent an abuse of discretion.” Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 677 (1981).

2023Bay v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 520, 528 (2012).

2019See Wilson, 12 Va. App. at 1256 .

2015Id.; see also Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 F.3d 952 , 956 (9th Cir.2005) (concluding that, while collateral consequences could prevent a timely petition from becoming moot after a petitioner is released from custody, "collateral consequences [do not] satisfy the in custody requirement for a petition filed after the expiration of the state sentence") (citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 , 109 S.Ct. 1923 (holding that a habeas petitioner does not remain " 'in custody' under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior conviction will

2015Id.; see also Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 F.3d 952 , 956 (9th Cir.2005) (concluding that, while collateral consequences could prevent a timely petition from becoming moot after a petitioner is released from custody, "collateral consequences [do not] satisfy the in custody requirement for a petition filed after the expiration of the state sentence") (citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 , 109 S.Ct. 1923 (holding that a habeas petitioner does not remain " 'in custody' under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior conviction will

2015Id.; see also Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 F.3d 952 , 956 (9th Cir.2005) (concluding that, while collateral consequences could prevent a timely petition from becoming moot after a petitioner is released from custody, "collateral consequences [do not] satisfy the in custody requirement for a petition filed after the expiration of the state sentence") (citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 , 109 S.Ct. 1923 (holding that a habeas petitioner does not remain " 'in custody' under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior conviction will

2014Just as an accusation of criminality does not necessarily convert a consensual encounter into an investigatory detention, all the more it does not — by itself — convert an investigatory detention into the functional equivalent of a custodial arrest.3 To be sure, if a custodial situation for 3 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (“Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that no single factor,

2014Just as an accusation of criminality does not necessarily convert a consensual encounter into an investigatory detention, all the more it does not — by itself — convert an investigatory detention into the functional equivalent of a custodial arrest.3 To be sure, if a custodial situation for 3 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (“Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that no single factor,

2014Just as an accusation of criminality does not necessarily convert a consensual encounter into an investigatory detention, all the more it does not — by itself — convert an investigatory detention into the functional equivalent of a custodial arrest.3 To be sure, if a custodial situation for 3 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (“Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that no single factor,

2014Just as an accusation of criminality does not necessarily convert a consensual encounter into an investigatory detention, all the more it does not — by itself — convert an investigatory detention into the functional equivalent of a custodial arrest.3 To be sure, if a custodial situation for 3 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (“Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that no single factor,

2014Just as an accusation of criminality does not necessarily convert a consensual encounter into an investigatory detention, all the more it does not — by itself — convert an investigatory detention into the functional equivalent of a custodial arrest.3 To be sure, if a custodial situation for 3 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (“Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that no single factor,

2013Verrocchio, 16 Va. App. at 320 , 429 S.E.2d at 486 (“Although this provision is not applicable to a custody hearing that is ancillary to a divorce suit in circuit court, the same underlying concerns addressed by the legislature in this provision are present in the circuit court proceeding.”).

2013Verrocchio, 16 Va. App. at 320 , 429 S.E.2d at 486 (“Although this provision is not applicable to a custody hearing that is ancillary to a divorce suit in circuit court, the same underlying concerns addressed by the legislature in this provision are present in the circuit court proceeding.”).

2013When a court modifies a prior custody order, a parent’s “right of due process entitle[s] h[er] to notice and an opportunity to be heard on this issue.” Parish v. Spaulding, 257 Va. 357, 362 , 513 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1999).

2013When a court modifies a prior custody order, a parent’s “right of due process entitle[s] h[er] to notice and an opportunity to be heard on this issue.” Parish v. Spaulding, 257 Va. 357, 362 , 513 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1999).

2008Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 56 , 378 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1989). 2 Wife argues that without the child’s presence at the custody hearing, the trial court could not consider her “reasonable . . . preference” regarding custody, pursuant to Code § 20-124.3.

2008Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 56 , 378 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1989). 2 Wife argues that without the child’s presence at the custody hearing, the trial court could not consider her “reasonable . . . preference” regarding custody, pursuant to Code § 20-124.3.

2008See, e.g., Shortridge, 224 Va. at 594 , 299 S.E.2d at 503 ; Bidwell v. McSorley, 194 Va. 135 , 72 S.E.2d 245 (1952) (applying the principle of voluntary relinquishment in a case where a parent placed a newborn child into the exclusive care of an adopting family for almost one year before seeking rescission of the adoption); see also, e.g., Fleshood v. Fleshood, 144 Va. 767, 769-70 , 130 S.E. 648, 649 (1925) (treating relinquishment of custody and abandonment of a child simultaneously and as essentially indistinct for purposes of a custody analysis).

2008See, e.g., Shortridge, 224 Va. at 594 , 299 S.E.2d at 503 ; Bidwell v. McSorley, 194 Va. 135 , 72 S.E.2d 245 (1952) (applying the principle of voluntary relinquishment in a case where a parent placed a newborn child into the exclusive care of an adopting family for almost one year before seeking rescission of the adoption); see also, e.g., Fleshood v. Fleshood, 144 Va. 767, 769-70 , 130 S.E. 648, 649 (1925) (treating relinquishment of custody and abandonment of a child simultaneously and as essentially indistinct for purposes of a custody analysis).

2008See, e.g., Shortridge, 224 Va. at 594 , 299 S.E.2d at 503 ; Bidwell v. McSorley, 194 Va. 135 , 72 S.E.2d 245 (1952) (applying the principle of voluntary relinquishment in a case where a parent placed a newborn child into the exclusive care of an adopting family for almost one year before seeking rescission of the adoption); see also, e.g., Fleshood v. Fleshood, 144 Va. 767, 769-70 , 130 S.E. 648, 649 (1925) (treating relinquishment of custody and abandonment of a child simultaneously and as essentially indistinct for purposes of a custody analysis).

2008See, e.g., Shortridge, 224 Va. at 594 , 299 S.E.2d at 503 ; Bidwell v. McSorley, 194 Va. 135 , 72 S.E.2d 245 (1952) (applying the principle of voluntary relinquishment in a case where a parent placed a newborn child into the exclusive care of an adopting family for almost one year before seeking rescission of the adoption); see also, e.g., Fleshood v. Fleshood, 144 Va. 767, 769-70 , 130 S.E. 648, 649 (1925) (treating relinquishment of custody and abandonment of a child simultaneously and as essentially indistinct for purposes of a custody analysis).

1998This contention is without merit. "'"[D]ue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.' '[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (citations omitted).

1997Analysis In considering a petition to change child custody, a trial court applies a two-part test to determine "(1) whether there has been a [material] change in circumstances since the most recent custody award; and (2) whether a change in custody would be in the best interests of the child." Visikides v. Derr, 3 Va. App. 69, 70 , 348 S.E.2d 40, 41 (1986).

1997Analysis In considering a petition to change child custody, a trial court applies a two-part test to determine "(1) whether there has been a [material] change in circumstances since the most recent custody award; and (2) whether a change in custody would be in the best interests of the child." Visikides v. Derr, 3 Va. App. 69, 70 , 348 S.E.2d 40, 41 (1986).

1993See also Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 288 , 329 S.E.2d 794, 802 (1985) (absent a valid statute circuit courts may act under their general equity powers); Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 86 , 104 S.E.2d 17, 24 (1958) (chancery courts may exercise their general equity jurisdiction); Buchanan, 174 Va. at 277 , 6 S.E.2d at 621 (“Courts of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, never lose it . . . unless [a] statute . . . use[s] prohibitory or restrictive words” (citation omitted)). 4 Thus, circuit courts conducting a custody hearing ancillary to a divorce proceeding are not *322 constrained by

1993See also Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 288 , 329 S.E.2d 794, 802 (1985) (absent a valid statute circuit courts may act under their general equity powers); Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 86 , 104 S.E.2d 17, 24 (1958) (chancery courts may exercise their general equity jurisdiction); Buchanan, 174 Va. at 277 , 6 S.E.2d at 621 (“Courts of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, never lose it . . . unless [a] statute . . . use[s] prohibitory or restrictive words” (citation omitted)). 4 Thus, circuit courts conducting a custody hearing ancillary to a divorce proceeding are not *322 constrained by

1993See also Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 288 , 329 S.E.2d 794, 802 (1985) (absent a valid statute circuit courts may act under their general equity powers); Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 86 , 104 S.E.2d 17, 24 (1958) (chancery courts may exercise their general equity jurisdiction); Buchanan, 174 Va. at 277 , 6 S.E.2d at 621 (“Courts of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, never lose it . . . unless [a] statute . . . use[s] prohibitory or restrictive words” (citation omitted)). 4 Thus, circuit courts conducting a custody hearing ancillary to a divorce proceeding are not *322 constrained by

1993See also Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 288 , 329 S.E.2d 794, 802 (1985) (absent a valid statute circuit courts may act under their general equity powers); Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 86 , 104 S.E.2d 17, 24 (1958) (chancery courts may exercise their general equity jurisdiction); Buchanan, 174 Va. at 277 , 6 S.E.2d at 621 (“Courts of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, never lose it . . . unless [a] statute . . . use[s] prohibitory or restrictive words” (citation omitted)). 4 Thus, circuit courts conducting a custody hearing ancillary to a divorce proceeding are not *322 constrained by

1993See also Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 288 , 329 S.E.2d 794, 802 (1985) (absent a valid statute circuit courts may act under their general equity powers); Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 86 , 104 S.E.2d 17, 24 (1958) (chancery courts may exercise their general equity jurisdiction); Buchanan, 174 Va. at 277 , 6 S.E.2d at 621 (“Courts of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, never lose it . . . unless [a] statute . . . use[s] prohibitory or restrictive words” (citation omitted)). 4 Thus, circuit courts conducting a custody hearing ancillary to a divorce proceeding are not *322 constrained by

1993See also Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 288 , 329 S.E.2d 794, 802 (1985) (absent a valid statute circuit courts may act under their general equity powers); Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 86 , 104 S.E.2d 17, 24 (1958) (chancery courts may exercise their general equity jurisdiction); Buchanan, 174 Va. at 277 , 6 S.E.2d at 621 (“Courts of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, never lose it . . . unless [a] statute . . . use[s] prohibitory or restrictive words” (citation omitted)). 4 Thus, circuit courts conducting a custody hearing ancillary to a divorce proceeding are not *322 constrained by