custody hearing in Ohio

2000Justice Resnick's dissent in Pater v. Pater (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 393 , 403 , ably sums up the scenario in this case: It is the role of a trial judge at a custody hearing to consider all relevant factors, and then reach a decision.

1999In her opinion in Davis v. Flickinger, supra, Justice Lundberg Stratton cited with approval these observations of Justice Resnick's dissent in Pater v. Pater (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 393 , 403 , 588 N.E.2d 794 , 802 : It is the role of a trial judge at a custody hearing to consider all relevant factors, and then reach a decision.

2023Thus, “so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.” Id. at 277 . {¶15} If a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation, “[p]rior to questioning, the police must warn the suspect that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” (Internal quotations omit

2016The United States Supreme Court in remanding the case for a determination of custody, developed a reasonable juvenile standard holding: This case presents the question whether the age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2009"While a new marriage, alone usually does not constitute a sufficient change in circumstances, a new marriage that creates hostility by the residential parent and spouse toward the nonresidential parent, frustrating attempts at visitation, may be an unforeseen change in circumstances warranting further inquiry into the best interest of the child." In concluding their analysis, the court stated, "[i]n addition, the court could consider the change in circumstances created by the maturing of the child." Id. 3 {¶ 66} Most notably, however, the court emphasized, "[i]t is the role of a trial judge a

2001In Davis v. Flickinger (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 415 , 420 , the court stated: "`It is the role of a trial judge at a custody hearing to consider all relevant factors, and then reach a decision.

2023Accordingly, a police officer's “unarticulated plan [to arrest a suspect] has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984).

2023Accordingly, a police officer's “unarticulated plan [to arrest a suspect] has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984).

2023Montgomery No. 28089, 2019-Ohio-889, ¶ 25 , as follows: The custody test is objective. “[T]he initial determination of custody depends upon the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994).

2023Montgomery No. 28089, 2019-Ohio-889, ¶ 25 , as follows: The custody test is objective. “[T]he initial determination of custody depends upon the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994).

2019Summit No. 26506, 2012-Ohio-5999, ¶ 19 , citing In re J.S., 9th Dist.

2015Summit No. 26506, 2012-Ohio-5999, ¶ 19 , citing In re J.S., 9th Dist.

2018“Grandparents may also acquire legal rights through other means, such as filing a motion for temporary or permanent custody, which would then give them standing to intervene in a custody hearing.” Id., citing In re Schmidt, 25 Ohio St.3d 331, 336 (1986).

2016“Grandparents may also acquire legal rights through other means, such as filing a motion for temporary or permanent custody, which would then give them standing to intervene in a custody hearing.” Id., citing In re Schmidt, 25 Ohio St.3d 331, 336 (1986).

2013Although appellant requested a transcript of the proceedings, the court reporter filed an affidavit in which he alleged that he could not transcribe the proceedings due to a malfunction in the recording. {¶ 10} App.R. 9(C) specifies the procedure an appellant may follow when a transcript is unavailable: “If no recording of the proceedings was made, if a transcript is unavailable, or if a recording was made but is no longer available for transcription, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available Washington App. No. 13CA3 7 means, including the ap

2013Although appellant requested a transcript of the proceedings, the court reporter filed an affidavit in which he alleged that he could not transcribe the proceedings due to a malfunction in the recording. {¶ 10} App.R. 9(C) specifies the procedure an appellant may follow when a transcript is unavailable: “If no recording of the proceedings was made, if a transcript is unavailable, or if a recording was made but is no longer available for transcription, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available Washington App. No. 13CA3 7 means, including the ap

2024McKenzie at 4.” In re Calvert Children, 2005-Ohio-5653, ¶ 74 . {¶21} Mother did obtain employment and stable housing, though only months before the custody hearing.

2023Brown No. CA2016-11-021, 2017-Ohio-5776, ¶ 25-26 ; In re Bouska, 5th Dist.

2023Montgomery No. 28089, 2019-Ohio-889, ¶ 25 , as follows: The custody test is objective. “[T]he initial determination of custody depends upon the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994).

2023Thus, “so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.” Id. at 277 . {¶15} If a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation, “[p]rior to questioning, the police must warn the suspect that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” (Internal quotations omit

2023Thus, “so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.” Id. at 277 . {¶15} If a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation, “[p]rior to questioning, the police must warn the suspect that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” (Internal quotations omit

2021Hamilton No. C- 180056, 2019-Ohio-2359, ¶ 20 . {¶40} The trial court did not violate Whitesed’s constitutional rights when it determined that the magistrate properly proceeded ex parte with the custody hearing.

2021No. 2011 CA 13, 2012-Ohio-2231, ¶ 34 . {¶ 56} Moreover, even if we were to conclude that counsel's performance was deficient in failing to object to Schilling's testimony about the positive drug screens, S.E. has not satisfied her burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for her counsel's errors, the result of the custody hearing would have been different.

2020Holman v. Keegan, 139 Ohio App.3d 911, 918 , 746 N.E.2d 209 (6th Dist.2000). {¶ 27} We previously found the denial of a continuance proper in a custody hearing where “the reason for the request” was “in the hands of the party requesting a continuance.” T.M. v. J.H., 6th Dist.

2020Holman v. Keegan, 139 Ohio App.3d 911, 918 , 746 N.E.2d 209 (6th Dist.2000). {¶ 27} We previously found the denial of a continuance proper in a custody hearing where “the reason for the request” was “in the hands of the party requesting a continuance.” T.M. v. J.H., 6th Dist.

2020Fayette No. CA2012-06-019, 2013-Ohio-453, ¶ 26 . {¶ 16} At the custody hearing, the juvenile court first heard testimony from Mother, who testified that she could adequately provide for the Children if she was awarded legal custody.

2019Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 (1965).

2019Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 (1965).

2019In determining whether an individual was in custody, “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or a restraint on movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 , -14- 495, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 , 97 S.Ct. 711 (1977). {¶ 25} The custody test is objective. “[T]he initial determination of custody depends upon the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the pe

2019In determining whether an individual was in custody, “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or a restraint on movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 , -14- 495, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 , 97 S.Ct. 711 (1977). {¶ 25} The custody test is objective. “[T]he initial determination of custody depends upon the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the pe

2019In determining whether an individual was in custody, “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or a restraint on movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 , -14- 495, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 , 97 S.Ct. 711 (1977). {¶ 25} The custody test is objective. “[T]he initial determination of custody depends upon the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the pe

2019In determining whether an individual was in custody, “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or a restraint on movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 , -14- 495, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 , 97 S.Ct. 711 (1977). {¶ 25} The custody test is objective. “[T]he initial determination of custody depends upon the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the pe