53 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2026 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vodvarka v. Grasmeyergreen2 sentences2022This understanding is consistent with the fact that the law places the ultimate burden of convincing the fact-finder on the party requesting the change in custody, see Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003) (stating that the party requesting a change in custody has the burden to establish proper cause or a change of circumstances before the trial court may hold a custody hearing), in the same way that it places the burden on a plaintiff asserting a typical civil claim, see, e.g., Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp, 432 Mich 527, 550 ; 443 NW2d 354 (1989) (stating that the ulti 2022This understanding is consistent with the fact that the law places the ultimate burden of convincing the fact-finder on the party requesting the change in custody, see Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003) (stating that the party requesting a change in custody has the burden to establish proper cause or a change of circumstances before the trial court may hold a custody hearing), in the same way that it places the burden on a plaintiff asserting a typical civil claim, see, e.g., Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp, 432 Mich 527, 550 ; 443 NW2d 354 (1989) (stating that the ulti | 2 | 8 |
J. D. B. v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences2013However, as Innis, 446 US at 301 n 7, explained, such intent is not “irrelevant” either, and it is especially not “irrelevant” when a In the case relied on heavily by Justice Mary Beth Kelly — JDB v North Carolina, 564 US_; 131 S Ct 2394 , 2398, 2406; 180 L Ed 2d 310 (2011), which, unlike the instant case, involved a 13-year-old boy — the United States Supreme Court held that although “the age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda,” “[tjhis is not to say that a child’s age will be a determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case.” 2013However, as Innis, 446 US at 301 n 7, explained, such intent is not “irrelevant” either, and it is especially not “irrelevant” when a In the case relied on heavily by Justice Mary Beth Kelly — JDB v North Carolina, 564 US_; 131 S Ct 2394 , 2398, 2406; 180 L Ed 2d 310 (2011), which, unlike the instant case, involved a 13-year-old boy — the United States Supreme Court held that although “the age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda,” “[tjhis is not to say that a child’s age will be a determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case.” | 2 | 5 |
Kubicki v. Sharpegreen2 sentences2024This too will be a determination made on the basis of the facts of each case, with the relevance of the facts presented being gauged by the statutory best interest factors. [Id. at 513-514.] After finding proper cause or a change in circumstances, “[t]he next step in a court’s custody analysis requires a determination of the appropriate burden of proof.” Kubicki v Sharpe, 306 Mich App 525, 540 ; 858 NW2d 57 (2014). 2024This too will be a determination made on the basis of the facts of each case, with the relevance of the facts presented being gauged by the statutory best interest factors. [Id. at 513-514.] After finding proper cause or a change in circumstances, “[t]he next step in a court’s custody analysis requires a determination of the appropriate burden of proof.” Kubicki v Sharpe, 306 Mich App 525, 540 ; 858 NW2d 57 (2014). | 2 | 3 |
Rittershaus v. Rittershausgreen2 sentences2026When a trial court fails to make sufficient findings for each of the best-interests factors, “the proper remedy” is to remand for a new custody hearing or for the trial court “to make a determination whether the current record is sufficient to make the proper evidentiary findings.” Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 475-476 ; 730 NW2d 262 (2007). 2026When a trial court fails to make sufficient findings for each of the best-interests factors, “the proper remedy” is to remand for a new custody hearing or for the trial court “to make a determination whether the current record is sufficient to make the proper evidentiary findings.” Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 475-476 ; 730 NW2d 262 (2007). | 2 | 3 |
Foskett v. Foskettgreen2 sentences2017Foskett, 247 Mich App at 12 (citation and quotation marks omitted). -7- 2017Foskett, 247 Mich App at 12 (citation and quotation marks omitted). -7- | 2 | 3 |
Kimberly Marie Marik v. Peter Brian Marikgreen2 sentences2022See Marik, 325 Mich App at 361 ; Pierron, 486 Mich at 92 - -3- 93. 2022See Marik, 325 Mich App at 361 ; Pierron, 486 Mich at 92 - -3- 93. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Zahngreen2 sentences2018JDB, 564 US at 270- 271; Stansbury, 511 US at 324 ; see also Zahn, 234 Mich App at 450 (“Because [the officer’s] intention to prevent defendant from leaving the apartment was not conveyed to defendant, it could not have had any bearing on a defendant’s understanding of the situation.”). 2018JDB, 564 US at 270- 271; Stansbury, 511 US at 324 ; see also Zahn, 234 Mich App at 450 (“Because [the officer’s] intention to prevent defendant from leaving the apartment was not conveyed to defendant, it could not have had any bearing on a defendant’s understanding of the situation.”). | 2 | 2 |
Treutle v. Treutlegreen2 sentences2018See Maier v Maier, 311 Mich App 218, 226-227 ; 874 NW2d 725 (2015) (explaining that the trial court “may consider the relative weight of the factors [stated in MCL 722.23] and is not required to give them equal weight”); MacIntyre, 267 Mich App at 458 (“The trial court need not violate the child’s confidence by revealing that preference on the record.”); Treutle v Treutle, 197 Mich App 690, 694-695 ; 495 NW2d 836 (1992) (“The child’s preference does not automatically outweigh the other factors, but is only one element evaluated to determine the best interests of the child.”). -8- Defendant als 2018See Maier v Maier, 311 Mich App 218, 226-227 ; 874 NW2d 725 (2015) (explaining that the trial court “may consider the relative weight of the factors [stated in MCL 722.23] and is not required to give them equal weight”); MacIntyre, 267 Mich App at 458 (“The trial court need not violate the child’s confidence by revealing that preference on the record.”); Treutle v Treutle, 197 Mich App 690, 694-695 ; 495 NW2d 836 (1992) (“The child’s preference does not automatically outweigh the other factors, but is only one element evaluated to determine the best interests of the child.”). -8- Defendant als | 2 | 2 |
Maier v. Maiergreen2 sentences2018See Maier v Maier, 311 Mich App 218, 226-227 ; 874 NW2d 725 (2015) (explaining that the trial court “may consider the relative weight of the factors [stated in MCL 722.23] and is not required to give them equal weight”); MacIntyre, 267 Mich App at 458 (“The trial court need not violate the child’s confidence by revealing that preference on the record.”); Treutle v Treutle, 197 Mich App 690, 694-695 ; 495 NW2d 836 (1992) (“The child’s preference does not automatically outweigh the other factors, but is only one element evaluated to determine the best interests of the child.”). -8- Defendant als 2018See Maier v Maier, 311 Mich App 218, 226-227 ; 874 NW2d 725 (2015) (explaining that the trial court “may consider the relative weight of the factors [stated in MCL 722.23] and is not required to give them equal weight”); MacIntyre, 267 Mich App at 458 (“The trial court need not violate the child’s confidence by revealing that preference on the record.”); Treutle v Treutle, 197 Mich App 690, 694-695 ; 495 NW2d 836 (1992) (“The child’s preference does not automatically outweigh the other factors, but is only one element evaluated to determine the best interests of the child.”). -8- Defendant als | 2 | 2 |
Dailey v. Kloenhamergreen2 sentences2022“Once a party has met the initial burden of showing a change in circumstances or proper cause to revisit the custody order, the next step is for the circuit court to determine the applicable burden of proof for the custody hearing.” Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 666-667 ; 811 NW2d 501 (2011), citing MCL 722.27(1)(c). 2022“Once a party has met the initial burden of showing a change in circumstances or proper cause to revisit the custody order, the next step is for the circuit court to determine the applicable burden of proof for the custody hearing.” Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 666-667 ; 811 NW2d 501 (2011), citing MCL 722.27(1)(c). | 1 | 5 |
Howes v. Fieldsgreen2 sentences2017In Howes, 565 US at 509 , the United States Supreme Court identified a handful of “[r]elevant factors” that should guide a court’s custody inquiry: “the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints . . ., and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” (Citations omitted.) The Supreme Court assigned no particular weight to any of the factors; the factual considerations are guides rather than rigid or immutable requirements. 2017In Howes, 565 US at 509 , the United States Supreme Court identified a handful of “[r]elevant factors” that should guide a court’s custody inquiry: “the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints . . ., and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” (Citations omitted.) The Supreme Court assigned no particular weight to any of the factors; the factual considerations are guides rather than rigid or immutable requirements. | 1 | 4 |
Berkemer v. McCartygreen2 sentences1987See Coleman v State, 668 P2d 1126 (Okla Crim App, 1983) (applying a focus test); contra Little v State, 627 P2d 445 (Okla Crim App, 1981) (applying a custody test). [13] See, e.g., 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 6.6(d)-(f), pp 494-499. [1] "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 442 ; 104 S Ct 3138 ; 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984). 1987See Coleman v State, 668 P2d 1126 (Okla Crim App, 1983) (applying a focus test); contra Little v State, 627 P2d 445 (Okla Crim App, 1981) (applying a custody test). [13] See, e.g., 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 6.6(d)-(f), pp 494-499. [1] "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 442 ; 104 S Ct 3138 ; 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
K & K Const. Inc. v. Deqgreen2 sentences2022It is the duty of the lower court or tribunal, on remand, to comply strictly with the mandate of the appellate court. [K & K Constr, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 267 Mich App 523, 544-545 ; 705 NW2d 365 (2005) (citations omitted)] In Argel’s last appeal, a panel of this Court addressed whether the trial court properly denied Argel’s motion for a custody hearing on the ground that Argel failed to establish proper cause or a change in circumstances on the face of his motion. 2022It is the duty of the lower court or tribunal, on remand, to comply strictly with the mandate of the appellate court. [K & K Constr, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 267 Mich App 523, 544-545 ; 705 NW2d 365 (2005) (citations omitted)] In Argel’s last appeal, a panel of this Court addressed whether the trial court properly denied Argel’s motion for a custody hearing on the ground that Argel failed to establish proper cause or a change in circumstances on the face of his motion. | 1 | 1 |
Mann v. Manngreen2 sentences2015See Mann v Mann, 190 Mich App 526, 531-532 ; 476 NW2d 439 (1991) (“Permitting a court to even temporarily change custody solely on the basis of a Friend of the Court referee’s recommendation and without holding a hearing would circumvent and frustrate one of the purposes of the Child Custody Act — to minimize the prospect of unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody.”), and Pluta v Pluta, 165 Mich App 55, 60 ; 418 NW2d 400 (1987) (“We do not believe that the trial court should be allowed to circumvent and frustrate the purpose of the law by issuing an ex parte order changing custody withou 2015See Mann v Mann, 190 Mich App 526, 531-532 ; 476 NW2d 439 (1991) (“Permitting a court to even temporarily change custody solely on the basis of a Friend of the Court referee’s recommendation and without holding a hearing would circumvent and frustrate one of the purposes of the Child Custody Act — to minimize the prospect of unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody.”), and Pluta v Pluta, 165 Mich App 55, 60 ; 418 NW2d 400 (1987) (“We do not believe that the trial court should be allowed to circumvent and frustrate the purpose of the law by issuing an ex parte order changing custody withou | 1 | 1 |
| Yarborough v. Alvaradogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Evans v. McTaggartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Weldongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Guardianship of Doegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bahr v. Bahrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Deel v. Deelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henrikson v. Gablegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Santosky v. Kramergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wallachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coleman v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Berger v. Berger
green
2 sentences2024The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be considered. [MCL 722.27(1)(c).] -16- “An established custodial environment may exist with both parents where a child looks to both the mother and the father for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 706 ; 747 NW2d 336 (2008), The custody hearing began in December 2022, when AK was 17 months old, and concluded approximately three months later. 2024The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be considered. [MCL 722.27(1)(c).] -16- “An established custodial environment may exist with both parents where a child looks to both the mother and the father for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 706 ; 747 NW2d 336 (2008), The custody hearing began in December 2022, when AK was 17 months old, and concluded approximately three months later. | 4 | 2011–2024 |
Stansbury v. California
green
2 sentences2017While the officers’ personal opinions about the guilt of their subject are irrelevant to a custody analysis, those beliefs “may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned.” Stansbury, 511 US at 325 . 2017While the officers’ personal opinions about the guilt of their subject are irrelevant to a custody analysis, those beliefs “may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned.” Stansbury, 511 US at 325 . | 4 | 2017–2018 |
Corporan v. Henton
green
2 sentences2020Because defendant failed to demonstrate any proper cause or change in circumstances, the trial court was precluded from holding a custody hearing to consider the children’s best interests, id. at 508-509 ; Corporan, 282 Mich App at 603-604 . 2018That is, given that Vodvarka applies and that defendant has not alleged proper cause or a change in circumstances, there was no need for an evidentiary hearing under Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512 , and the trial court was precluded from holding a custody hearing to consider the children’s best interests, id. at 508-509 ; Corporan, 282 Mich App at 603 - 604 & n 2. | 3 | 2018–2020 |
Fletcher v. Fletcher
green
2 sentences2024Plaintiff further opines that imposing a temporal limitation on the evidence in these circumstances would be contrary to the rationale for remanding articulated in Fletcher, 447 Mich at 889 -890: Our disposition of this case recognizes that trial courts are in a superior position to make accurate decisions concerning the custody arrangement that will be in a child’s best interests. 2011In Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 882 ; 526 NW2d 889 (1994), our Supreme Court expressly stated that “review of custody orders is not de novo.” The trial court’s failure to apply the law by not first determining whether there was an established custodial environment is clear legal error, and, according to Fletcher , we must remand unless the error is harmless. | 2 | 2011–2024 |
Sinicropi v. Mazurek
green
2 sentences2022Sinicropi, 273 Mich App at 155 . 2022Sinicropi, 273 Mich App at 155 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Pierron v. Pierron
green
2 sentences2022See Marik, 325 Mich App at 361 ; Pierron, 486 Mich at 92 - -3- 93. 2022See Marik, 325 Mich App at 361 ; Pierron, 486 Mich at 92 - -3- 93. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Storms v. Storms
neutral
2 sentences2018With regard to the trial court’s credibility determinations, it has long been 2 On that note, it is somewhat telling that despite being adamant that the hearing could not continue until he was represented by counsel, defendant did not retain counsel to represent him during the nearly two-month long period that transpired between the first and second days of the custody hearing. -4- recognized that when a trial court is tasked with making factual determinations, “[g]reat weight is given to the determination of the trial judge, who is able to view the demeanor of the witness.” Storms v Storms, 1 2018With regard to the trial court’s credibility determinations, it has long been 2 On that note, it is somewhat telling that despite being adamant that the hearing could not continue until he was represented by counsel, defendant did not retain counsel to represent him during the nearly two-month long period that transpired between the first and second days of the custody hearing. -4- recognized that when a trial court is tasked with making factual determinations, “[g]reat weight is given to the determination of the trial judge, who is able to view the demeanor of the witness.” Storms v Storms, 1 | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Hartland Township v. Kucykowicz
green
2 sentences2025But, “MRE 611 grants a trial court broad power to control the manner in which a trial is conducted, including the examination of witnesses.” Hartland Twp v Kucykowicz, 189 Mich App 591, 595 ; 474 NW2d 306 (1991). 2025But, “MRE 611 grants a trial court broad power to control the manner in which a trial is conducted, including the examination of witnesses.” Hartland Twp v Kucykowicz, 189 Mich App 591, 595 ; 474 NW2d 306 (1991). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Howard v. Howard
green
1 sentence2025See Kubicki v Sharpe, 306 Mich App 525, 545 ; 858 NW2d 57 (2014). -6- A. BURDEN OF PROOF “[O]nce a natural parent initiates a custody dispute with a third-party custodian, the third party . . . must . . . present evidence in support of that party’s claim that the child’s best interests are served by the continued placement of the child with that third party instead of the natural parent.” Howard, 310 Mich App at 496-497 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Jenson v. Puste
green
2 sentences2022Although our Supreme Court continued to refer to the trial court’s ability to render judgment against “the plaintiff” in MCR 2.504(B)(2), when the court rules are read together and with the goal of creating a harmonious whole, as this Court must do, see Jenson v Puste, 290 Mich App 338, 341-342 ; 801 NW2d 639 (2010), the most natural understanding is that the term “plaintiff” refers to the party who moved for a change of custody in cases involving the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction over a child’s custody. 2022Although our Supreme Court continued to refer to the trial court’s ability to render judgment against “the plaintiff” in MCR 2.504(B)(2), when the court rules are read together and with the goal of creating a harmonious whole, as this Court must do, see Jenson v Puste, 290 Mich App 338, 341-342 ; 801 NW2d 639 (2010), the most natural understanding is that the term “plaintiff” refers to the party who moved for a change of custody in cases involving the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction over a child’s custody. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kessler v. Kessler
green
2 sentences2022In Kessler v Kessler, 295 Mich App 54, 59 ; 811 NW2d 39 (2011), the Court stated: In effect, the trial court operated on the premise that because the parties were living together with the children in the marital home up to the time of the custody hearing and no custody order had been entered by the court, it was not required to address whether an established custodial environment existed. 2022In Kessler v Kessler, 295 Mich App 54, 59 ; 811 NW2d 39 (2011), the Court stated: In effect, the trial court operated on the premise that because the parties were living together with the children in the marital home up to the time of the custody hearing and no custody order had been entered by the court, it was not required to address whether an established custodial environment existed. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Palenkas v. Beaumont Hospital
green
2 sentences2022This understanding is consistent with the fact that the law places the ultimate burden of convincing the fact-finder on the party requesting the change in custody, see Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003) (stating that the party requesting a change in custody has the burden to establish proper cause or a change of circumstances before the trial court may hold a custody hearing), in the same way that it places the burden on a plaintiff asserting a typical civil claim, see, e.g., Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp, 432 Mich 527, 550 ; 443 NW2d 354 (1989) (stating that the ulti 2022This understanding is consistent with the fact that the law places the ultimate burden of convincing the fact-finder on the party requesting the change in custody, see Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003) (stating that the party requesting a change in custody has the burden to establish proper cause or a change of circumstances before the trial court may hold a custody hearing), in the same way that it places the burden on a plaintiff asserting a typical civil claim, see, e.g., Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp, 432 Mich 527, 550 ; 443 NW2d 354 (1989) (stating that the ulti | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Brown v. Loveman
green
2 sentences2022When, as in this case, “a modification of custody (either by changing custody or parenting time) would change the established custodial environment of a child, the moving party must show by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child’s best interest.” Brown v Loveman, 260 Mich App 576, 585 ; 680 NW2d 432 (2004). 2022When, as in this case, “a modification of custody (either by changing custody or parenting time) would change the established custodial environment of a child, the moving party must show by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child’s best interest.” Brown v Loveman, 260 Mich App 576, 585 ; 680 NW2d 432 (2004). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Gerstenschlager v. Gerstenschlager
green
2 sentences2019MCR 7.203(B)(1). -3- Where a current order governs the custody of a minor child, the party moving to modify that order must prove “either proper cause or a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant reconsideration of the custody decision.” Gerstenschalger v Gerstenschalger, 292 Mich App 654, 657 ; 808 NW2d 811 (2011). [T]o establish “proper cause” necessary to revisit a custody order, a movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an appropriate ground for legal action to be taken by the trial court. 2019MCR 7.203(B)(1). -3- Where a current order governs the custody of a minor child, the party moving to modify that order must prove “either proper cause or a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant reconsideration of the custody decision.” Gerstenschalger v Gerstenschalger, 292 Mich App 654, 657 ; 808 NW2d 811 (2011). [T]o establish “proper cause” necessary to revisit a custody order, a movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an appropriate ground for legal action to be taken by the trial court. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Spires v. Bergman
green
1 sentence2015Spires v Bergman, 276 Mich App 432, 443 ; 741 NW2d 523 (2007), citing Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 12 ; 634 NW2d 363 (2001). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Pluta v. Pluta
green
2 sentences2015See Mann v Mann, 190 Mich App 526, 531-532 ; 476 NW2d 439 (1991) (“Permitting a court to even temporarily change custody solely on the basis of a Friend of the Court referee’s recommendation and without holding a hearing would circumvent and frustrate one of the purposes of the Child Custody Act — to minimize the prospect of unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody.”), and Pluta v Pluta, 165 Mich App 55, 60 ; 418 NW2d 400 (1987) (“We do not believe that the trial court should be allowed to circumvent and frustrate the purpose of the law by issuing an ex parte order changing custody withou 2015See Mann v Mann, 190 Mich App 526, 531-532 ; 476 NW2d 439 (1991) (“Permitting a court to even temporarily change custody solely on the basis of a Friend of the Court referee’s recommendation and without holding a hearing would circumvent and frustrate one of the purposes of the Child Custody Act — to minimize the prospect of unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody.”), and Pluta v Pluta, 165 Mich App 55, 60 ; 418 NW2d 400 (1987) (“We do not believe that the trial court should be allowed to circumvent and frustrate the purpose of the law by issuing an ex parte order changing custody withou | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Braverman v. GARDEN CITY HOSPITAL green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Glover v. McRipley green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Stevens v. Stevens green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Quilloin v. Walcott green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Mason v. Simmons green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In the Matter of Kozak green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Phillips v. Jordan green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Sparks v. Sparks green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Hill green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Martin green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Belanger green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Little v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Nichols v. Nichols green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Sweet v. Sweet green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Winsett v. Donaldson neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| In Re Myrtle Davis green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| In Re Fuller green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.