custody inquiry in Massachusetts

2020In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 , 271- 276 (2011), the United States Supreme Court addressed whether age is relevant to the custody inquiry under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring warnings prior to custodial interrogation).

2020See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011) ("so long as the child's age 11In fact, approximately twenty-four minutes into the interview, the defendant asked the officers why he was being questioned and if he was a suspect. 17 was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test").

2023See Groome, 435 Mass. at 212 n.13 ("an officer's subjective suspicions are relevant to the custody inquiry only if those suspicions have been communicated to the defendant").

2014An officer’s belief that the defendant was a suspect does not control; rather, what matters for purposes of a custody inquiry is whether that belief was conveyed to the defendant. 10 See, e.g., Groome, 435 Mass. at 214 ; Bryant, 390 Mass. at 738 .

2020In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 , 271- 276 (2011), the United States Supreme Court addressed whether age is relevant to the custody inquiry under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring warnings prior to custodial interrogation).

1998Relying on United States v. Carollo, 507 F.2d 50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 444 n.4 (1966), we first articulated this factor as pertinent to the custody analysis in Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 553 (1977), S.C., 398 Mass. 806 (1986).

2023While the Matta decision did not alter the custody analysis, see Evelyn, supra at 698-699; Commonwealth v. Lugo, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 170 , 179 n.10 (2023), both tests focus on "the objective circumstances of the encounter" and "attempt to ascertain whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, an individual has been compelled to interact with the police." Evelyn, supra. In this case, the defendant has never claimed that the initial seizure was unjustified. 12 restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" Medina, supra, quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 5

1998As the court further emphasized, and as we have stated above, “the ultimate inquiry is whether there was ‘a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ Thompson v. Keohane, [ 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)] (quotation marks and citations omitted); Stansbury v. California, [supra at 323] (per curiam) (same).” United States v. Ventura, supra at 710 .

2015For example, “the fact that the focus of the investigation was on the defendant,” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 752 (1985), and “[t]he fact that the defendant’s interview occurred at the police station [are] not, by [themselves], dispositive.” Hilton, 443 Mass. at 609-610 .

2014See id. at 609-610 .

2025J.D.B., supra at 271. 11 Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 37, 41 (2015). "[T]he term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response f

2025J.D.B., supra at 271. 11 Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 37, 41 (2015). "[T]he term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response f

2023Cf. Damiano, 422 Mass. at 13 ("The question whether the defendant was in protective custody is not controlling.

2020Custody exists when "a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes would experience the environment in which the interrogation took place as coercive." Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 432 (1999).

2020See Commonwealth v. Martin, 444 Mass. 213, 214-215 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 413 Mass. 521, 531 (1992).

2020See Commonwealth v. Martin, 444 Mass. 213, 214-215 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 413 Mass. 521, 531 (1992).

2015Whether an investigation has begun to focus on a suspect is “material to the custody inquiry only to the extent that an officer’s suspicions influence the objective conditions of an interrogation, such that a reasonable person in the position of the person being questioned would not feel free to leave the place of questioning.” Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 124-125 (1998).

2015For example, “the fact that the focus of the investigation was on the defendant,” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 752 (1985), and “[t]he fact that the defendant’s interview occurred at the police station [are] not, by [themselves], dispositive.” Hilton, 443 Mass. at 609-610 .

2001See, e.g., Hersey v. Hersey, supra at 554 ; Grandell v. Short, 317 Mass. 605, 607 (1945); Yannas, supra at 711-712 ; Haas v. Puchalski, supra at 557 ; Delmolino v. Nance, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 209, 211 (1982).

2001See, e.g., Hersey v. Hersey, supra at 554 ; Grandell v. Short, 317 Mass. 605, 607 (1945); Yannas, supra at 711-712 ; Haas v. Puchalski, supra at 557 ; Delmolino v. Nance, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 209, 211 (1982).

2001Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323-324 (1994).

2001See, e.g., Hersey v. Hersey, supra at 554 ; Grandell v. Short, 317 Mass. 605, 607 (1945); Yannas, supra at 711-712 ; Haas v. Puchalski, supra at 557 ; Delmolino v. Nance, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 209, 211 (1982).

1998At one time, certain courts found these factors relevant, see, e.g., United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1979) (articulating a four fac tor test for custody that included these factors)[ 7 ], but subsequent Supreme Court decisions rejected this approach.

1998Indeed, in light of these cases, the Fifth Circuit repudiated its four-factor test, announcing that ‘[pjrobable cause and focus become material to the custody inquiry only when they influence a reasonable person’s perception of the situation.’ United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596-97 [(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988)] (footnote omitted).” 8 United States v. Ventura, supra at 712 .