custody hearing in Illinois

2025“Other factors that courts have deemed relevant to the custody analysis include ‘whether and to what extent the person has been made aware that he is free to refrain from answering questions’ and ‘the degree of police control over the environment in which the interrogation takes place, and in particular whether the suspect’s freedom of movement is physically restrained or otherwise significantly curtailed.’ ” People v. Logan, 2024 IL 129054 , ¶ 60 (quoting Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 1996)).

2025Other factors courts have deemed relevant to the custody analysis include “ ‘whether and to what extent the person has been made aware that he is free to refrain from answering questions’ ” and “ ‘the degree of police control over the environment in which the interrogation takes place, and in particular whether the suspect’s freedom of movement is physically restrained or otherwise significantly curtailed.’ ” Id. (quoting Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 1996)). ¶ 19 Here, the police controlled the environment.

2024As our supreme court has noted, a “[suspect’s] mental deficits do not inform the custody analysis.” In re D.L.H., Jr., 2015 IL 117341, ¶ 55 (emphasis added) (citing J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 274 , and Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 508 ).

2016Relying on the Ninth Circuit case of Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2002), the Braggs court found that this logic extended to the initial custody analysis: " 'If a juvenile is more susceptible to police coercion during a custodial interrogation, then the same juvenile is also more susceptible to the impression that he is, in fact, in custody in the first instance.' " Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 509 (quoting Alvarado, 316 F.3d at 843 1). ¶ 61 The Braggs court found that the above reasoning extended with equal force to defendants with mental impairments.

2025The Supreme Court found that interviewing officers did not have to subjectively know the defendant’s age for that to inform the custody analysis—it was enough if the defendant’s age “would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer.” Id. at 274 . 30 ¶ 72 Similarly, we find that it is enough to justify application of the modified Braggs reasonable person standard to a custody analysis, if any reasonable officer would have known of the defendant’s intellectual disability.

2024As our supreme court has noted, a “[suspect’s] mental deficits do not inform the custody analysis.” In re D.L.H., Jr., 2015 IL 117341, ¶ 55 (emphasis added) (citing J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 274 , and Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 508 ).

2021People v. Beltran, 2011 IL App (2d) 090856, ¶ 37 (no single factor in the custody analysis is dispositive, and in each case the court considers all of the circumstances).

2021People v. Beltran, 2011 IL App (2d) 090856, ¶ 37 (no single factor in the custody analysis is dispositive, and in each case the court considers all of the circumstances).

2014Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 153 (a police officer’s subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question of whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994). ¶ 37 Conversely, the State’s position that Clayton was considered merely a “witness” by police does not affect the objective circumstances of an interrogation and thus does not affect the custody inquiry.

2014Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 153 (a police officer's subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question of whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994). ¶ 37 Conversely, the State's position that Clayton was considered merely a "witness" by police does not affect the objective circumstances of an interrogation, and thus does not affect the custody inquiry.

1995The majority also misstates the holding of Giacopelli , by characterizing it as a case which "allows the termination of parental rights in adoption proceedings without a finding of unfitness." ( 164 Ill.2d at 484 , 208 Ill.Dec. at 276 , 649 N.E.2d at 332 .) Giacopelli was a custody hearing in which the mother who had voluntarily given up her child for adoption joined in her husband's attempt to reclaim the baby several months later.

1995The majority also misstates the holding of Giacopelli , by characterizing it as a case which "allows the termination of parental rights in adoption proceedings without a finding of unfitness." ( 164 Ill.2d at 484 , 208 Ill.Dec. at 276 , 649 N.E.2d at 332 .) Giacopelli was a custody hearing in which the mother who had voluntarily given up her child for adoption joined in her husband's attempt to reclaim the baby several months later.

2025Other factors courts have deemed relevant to the custody analysis include “ ‘whether and to what extent the person has been made aware that he is free to refrain from answering questions’ ” and “ ‘the degree of police control over the environment in which the interrogation takes place, and in particular whether the suspect’s freedom of movement is physically restrained or otherwise significantly curtailed.’ ” Id. (quoting Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 1996)). ¶ 19 Here, the police controlled the environment.

2014Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 153 (a police officer's subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question of whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994). ¶ 37 Conversely, the State's position that Clayton was considered merely a "witness" by police does not affect the objective circumstances of an interrogation, and thus does not affect the custody inquiry.

2018In People v. Dale , 406 Ill. 238 , 246, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950), overruled in part on other grounds by People v. Warr , 54 Ill. 2d 487 , 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973), the court wrote: "The legislature, by the act in question, no doubt intended to draw a distinction between convictions for minor offenses and those for serious crimes, and to make the remedy available only to persons actually being deprived of their liberty and not to persons who had served their sentences and who might wish to purge their records of past convictions." (Emphasis added.) The court has cited that precise language from Dale n

2018In People v. Dale , 406 Ill. 238 , 246, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950), overruled in part on other grounds by People v. Warr , 54 Ill. 2d 487 , 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973), the court wrote: "The legislature, by the act in question, no doubt intended to draw a distinction between convictions for minor offenses and those for serious crimes, and to make the remedy available only to persons actually being deprived of their liberty and not to persons who had served their sentences and who might wish to purge their records of past convictions." (Emphasis added.) The court has cited that precise language from Dale n

2016Our supreme court has also found the reading of the Miranda warnings to be a factor relevant to a custody analysis, noting that the warnings "might be perceived by a suspect as an indication that he is under arrest." People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 438 (1992).

2016Our supreme court has also found the reading of the Miranda warnings to be a factor relevant to a custody analysis, noting that the warnings “might be perceived by a suspect as an indication that he is under arrest.” People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 438 (1992).

2016E.g., Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d at 417 ; Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 150 ; see also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983) ("It is elementary that States are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires."). 22 juveniles also militates in favor of such a modification where the mentally retarded are concerned." Id.

2016E.g., Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d at 417 ; Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 150 ; see also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983) ("It is elementary that States are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires."). 22 juveniles also militates in favor of such a modification where the mentally retarded are concerned." Id.

2015Id.; see also In re Custody of Kalbes, 2007 WI App 136, ¶ 10 , 302 Wis. 2d 215 , 733 N.W.2d 648 (the husband filed for divorce in Idaho before the child’s birth; the wife, who had moved to Wisconsin, gave birth to their child in Wisconsin and filed for custody afterward; the father then moved for custody in the Idaho action; the reviewing court held that Wisconsin was the child’s home state because the child was born there and lived there from birth; Wisconsin had jurisdiction over the custody proceeding); cf. Berwick v. Wagner, 336 S.W.3d 805, 815-16 (Tex. App. 2011) (limiting Waltenburg to i

2015Id.; see also In re Custody of Kalbes, 2007 WI App 136, ¶ 10 (the husband filed for divorce in Idaho before the child’s birth; the wife, who had moved to Wisconsin, gave birth to their child in Wisconsin and filed for custody afterward; the father then moved for custody in the Idaho action; the reviewing court held that Wisconsin was the child’s home state because the child was born there and lived there from birth; Wisconsin had jurisdiction over the custody proceeding); cf. Berwick v. Wagner, 336 S.W.3d 805, 815-16 (Tex. App. 2011) (limiting Waltenburg to its facts and holding that, where a

2015Id.; see also In re Custody of Kalbes, 2007 WI App 136, ¶ 10 , 302 Wis. 2d 215 , 733 N.W.2d 648 (the husband filed for divorce in Idaho before the child’s birth; the wife, who had moved to Wisconsin, gave birth to their child in Wisconsin and filed for custody afterward; the father then moved for custody in the Idaho action; the reviewing court held that Wisconsin was the child’s home state because the child was born there and lived there from birth; Wisconsin had jurisdiction over the custody proceeding); cf. Berwick v. Wagner, 336 S.W.3d 805, 815-16 (Tex. App. 2011) (limiting Waltenburg to i

2015Id.; see also In re Custody of Kalbes, 2007 WI App 136, ¶ 10 (the husband filed for divorce in Idaho before the child’s birth; the wife, who had moved to Wisconsin, gave birth to their child in Wisconsin and filed for custody afterward; the father then moved for custody in the Idaho action; the reviewing court held that Wisconsin was the child’s home state because the child was born there and lived there from birth; Wisconsin had jurisdiction over the custody proceeding); cf. Berwick v. Wagner, 336 S.W.3d 805, 815-16 (Tex. App. 2011) (limiting Waltenburg to its facts and holding that, where a

2008"Regarding the reasonable-person portion of the custody inquiry, 'the accepted test is what a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he or she been in the defendant's shoes.'" People v. Croom, 379 Ill.

2008“Regarding the reasonable-person portion of the custody inquiry, ‘the accepted test is what a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he or she been in the defendant’s shoes.’ ” People v. Croom, 379 Ill.