13 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Duggan v. Duggan-Schlitzgreen2 sentences2008See Duggan v. Duggan-Schlitz, 246 Ga.App. 127, 128 , 539 S.E.2d 840 (2000) ("We note the general rule that a trial court has discretion in regulating and controlling its business.") (footnote omitted); CRS Sirrine, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 213 Ga. App. 710, 714 , 445 S.E.2d 782 (1994) (noting that "parties are not entitled to present their cases ad infinitum "); Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ga. 115, 116 , 218 S.E.2d 846 (1975) ("A trial judge has discretion to control the conduct of a custody hearing. 2008See Duggan v. Duggan-Schlitz, 246 Ga.App. 127, 128 , 539 S.E.2d 840 (2000) ("We note the general rule that a trial court has discretion in regulating and controlling its business.") (footnote omitted); CRS Sirrine, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 213 Ga. App. 710, 714 , 445 S.E.2d 782 (1994) (noting that "parties are not entitled to present their cases ad infinitum "); Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ga. 115, 116 , 218 S.E.2d 846 (1975) ("A trial judge has discretion to control the conduct of a custody hearing. | 2 | 2 |
Anderson v. Andersongreen2 sentences2008See Duggan v. Duggan-Schlitz, 246 Ga.App. 127, 128 , 539 S.E.2d 840 (2000) ("We note the general rule that a trial court has discretion in regulating and controlling its business.") (footnote omitted); CRS Sirrine, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 213 Ga. App. 710, 714 , 445 S.E.2d 782 (1994) (noting that "parties are not entitled to present their cases ad infinitum "); Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ga. 115, 116 , 218 S.E.2d 846 (1975) ("A trial judge has discretion to control the conduct of a custody hearing. 2008See Duggan v. Duggan-Schlitz, 246 Ga.App. 127, 128 , 539 S.E.2d 840 (2000) ("We note the general rule that a trial court has discretion in regulating and controlling its business.") (footnote omitted); CRS Sirrine, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 213 Ga. App. 710, 714 , 445 S.E.2d 782 (1994) (noting that "parties are not entitled to present their cases ad infinitum "); Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ga. 115, 116 , 218 S.E.2d 846 (1975) ("A trial judge has discretion to control the conduct of a custody hearing. | 2 | 2 |
CRS Sirrine, Inc. v. Dravo Corp.green2 sentences2008See Duggan v. Duggan-Schlitz, 246 Ga.App. 127, 128 , 539 S.E.2d 840 (2000) ("We note the general rule that a trial court has discretion in regulating and controlling its business.") (footnote omitted); CRS Sirrine, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 213 Ga. App. 710, 714 , 445 S.E.2d 782 (1994) (noting that "parties are not entitled to present their cases ad infinitum "); Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ga. 115, 116 , 218 S.E.2d 846 (1975) ("A trial judge has discretion to control the conduct of a custody hearing. 2008See Duggan v. Duggan-Schlitz, 246 Ga.App. 127, 128 , 539 S.E.2d 840 (2000) ("We note the general rule that a trial court has discretion in regulating and controlling its business.") (footnote omitted); CRS Sirrine, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 213 Ga. App. 710, 714 , 445 S.E.2d 782 (1994) (noting that "parties are not entitled to present their cases ad infinitum "); Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ga. 115, 116 , 218 S.E.2d 846 (1975) ("A trial judge has discretion to control the conduct of a custody hearing. | 1 | 2 |
Fedina v. Larichevgreen2 sentences2024See Thrasher-Starobin v. Starobin, 299 Ga. 12, 13 ( 785 SE2d 302 ) (2016) (“if a trial court fails to make findings of fact sufficient to support an award of attorney fees under” OCGA § 9-15-14, “the case must be remanded to the trial court for an explanation of the statutory basis for the award and any findings necessary to support it”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Fedina v. Larichev, 322 Ga. App. 76, 81 (5) ( 744 SE2d 72 ) (2013) (vacating attorney fee award and remanding for entry of a new award where the order did “not indicate how the court [limited] its award to fees generated bas 2024See Thrasher-Starobin v. Starobin, 299 Ga. 12, 13 ( 785 SE2d 302 ) (2016) (“if a trial court fails to make findings of fact sufficient to support an award of attorney fees under” OCGA § 9-15-14, “the case must be remanded to the trial court for an explanation of the statutory basis for the award and any findings necessary to support it”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Fedina v. Larichev, 322 Ga. App. 76, 81 (5) ( 744 SE2d 72 ) (2013) (vacating attorney fee award and remanding for entry of a new award where the order did “not indicate how the court [limited] its award to fees generated bas | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. Leegreen2 sentences2024Thus, while “the trial court’s award of [$9,000] may have been reasonable, [that] order[], on its face fails to show the complex decision-making process necessarily involved in [the trial court] reaching a particular dollar figure and fails to articulate why the amount awarded was [$9,000], as opposed to any other amount.”(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Butler v. Lee, 336 Ga. App. 102, 106 (2) ( 783 SE2d 704 ) (2016). 3 The trial court found that the father was not entitled to recover under OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) any fees associated with litigating the issue of child support. 23 Given the lack 2024Thus, while “the trial court’s award of [$9,000] may have been reasonable, [that] order[], on its face fails to show the complex decision-making process necessarily involved in [the trial court] reaching a particular dollar figure and fails to articulate why the amount awarded was [$9,000], as opposed to any other amount.”(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Butler v. Lee, 336 Ga. App. 102, 106 (2) ( 783 SE2d 704 ) (2016). 3 The trial court found that the father was not entitled to recover under OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) any fees associated with litigating the issue of child support. 23 Given the lack | 1 | 1 |
Thrasher-Starobin v. Starobingreen2 sentences2024See Thrasher-Starobin v. Starobin, 299 Ga. 12, 13 ( 785 SE2d 302 ) (2016) (“if a trial court fails to make findings of fact sufficient to support an award of attorney fees under” OCGA § 9-15-14, “the case must be remanded to the trial court for an explanation of the statutory basis for the award and any findings necessary to support it”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Fedina v. Larichev, 322 Ga. App. 76, 81 (5) ( 744 SE2d 72 ) (2013) (vacating attorney fee award and remanding for entry of a new award where the order did “not indicate how the court [limited] its award to fees generated bas 2024See Thrasher-Starobin v. Starobin, 299 Ga. 12, 13 ( 785 SE2d 302 ) (2016) (“if a trial court fails to make findings of fact sufficient to support an award of attorney fees under” OCGA § 9-15-14, “the case must be remanded to the trial court for an explanation of the statutory basis for the award and any findings necessary to support it”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Fedina v. Larichev, 322 Ga. App. 76, 81 (5) ( 744 SE2d 72 ) (2013) (vacating attorney fee award and remanding for entry of a new award where the order did “not indicate how the court [limited] its award to fees generated bas | 1 | 1 |
Bunnell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 1 | 1 |
J. D. B. v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 1 | 1 |
Tran v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The absence of a parent is just one of nine factors that this Court considers.”). 14 Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions Vol. II: Criminal Cases (2015), § 1.32.22. 15 SuggestedPatternJuryInstructionsVol.il: Criminal Cases (2015), §§ 1.32.21,1.32.40, 1.32.50, 1.32.70. 16 See, e.g., Tran v. State, 246 Ga. App. 153, 160 (7) ( 539 SE2d 862 ) (2000) (a trial court does not err in failing to give a requested charge “when its charge as a whole contains the same principles of law set forth in the request”). 17 See J. 2015The absence of a parent is just one of nine factors that this Court considers.”). 14 Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions Vol. II: Criminal Cases (2015), § 1.32.22. 15 SuggestedPatternJuryInstructionsVol.il: Criminal Cases (2015), §§ 1.32.21,1.32.40, 1.32.50, 1.32.70. 16 See, e.g., Tran v. State, 246 Ga. App. 153, 160 (7) ( 539 SE2d 862 ) (2000) (a trial court does not err in failing to give a requested charge “when its charge as a whole contains the same principles of law set forth in the request”). 17 See J. | 1 | 1 |
Rankin v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 1 | 1 |
SOSNIAK v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 1 | 1 |
McKoon v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 1 | 1 |
Humphreys v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 1 | 1 |
Traylor v. the Stategreen2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 1 | 1 |
Charlot v. Goldwiregreen2 sentences2011“In the absence of a transcript, we must assume the trial court’s findings were supported by evidence presented, and the actions taken by the trial court during the hearing were appropriate.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Baugh v. Robinson, 179 Ga. App. 571, 572 ( 346 SE2d 918 ) (1986) (holding that, without the hearing transcript, this Court assumes that an appellant was not denied due process rights or the opportunity to be heard); see also Chariot v. Goldwire, 310 Ga. App. 463, 464 (1) ( 713 SE2d 667 ) (2011) (holding that in the absence of transcripts from a custody hearing, this Co 2011“In the absence of a transcript, we must assume the trial court’s findings were supported by evidence presented, and the actions taken by the trial court during the hearing were appropriate.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Baugh v. Robinson, 179 Ga. App. 571, 572 ( 346 SE2d 918 ) (1986) (holding that, without the hearing transcript, this Court assumes that an appellant was not denied due process rights or the opportunity to be heard); see also Chariot v. Goldwire, 310 Ga. App. 463, 464 (1) ( 713 SE2d 667 ) (2011) (holding that in the absence of transcripts from a custody hearing, this Co | 1 | 1 |
Baugh v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2011“In the absence of a transcript, we must assume the trial court’s findings were supported by evidence presented, and the actions taken by the trial court during the hearing were appropriate.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Baugh v. Robinson, 179 Ga. App. 571, 572 ( 346 SE2d 918 ) (1986) (holding that, without the hearing transcript, this Court assumes that an appellant was not denied due process rights or the opportunity to be heard); see also Chariot v. Goldwire, 310 Ga. App. 463, 464 (1) ( 713 SE2d 667 ) (2011) (holding that in the absence of transcripts from a custody hearing, this Co 2011“In the absence of a transcript, we must assume the trial court’s findings were supported by evidence presented, and the actions taken by the trial court during the hearing were appropriate.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Baugh v. Robinson, 179 Ga. App. 571, 572 ( 346 SE2d 918 ) (1986) (holding that, without the hearing transcript, this Court assumes that an appellant was not denied due process rights or the opportunity to be heard); see also Chariot v. Goldwire, 310 Ga. App. 463, 464 (1) ( 713 SE2d 667 ) (2011) (holding that in the absence of transcripts from a custody hearing, this Co | 1 | 1 |
Ashburn v. Bakergreen2 sentences1991See also Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507 (2) ( 350 SE2d 437 ) (1986). 1991See also Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507 (2) ( 350 SE2d 437 ) (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 2 | 1993–2015 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 2 | 1993–2015 |
Smith v. Curtis
green
2 sentences2018The trial court noted that Sigafoose's affect was "odd and occasionally inappropriate to the circumstances," that her testimony "lack[ed] factual foundation in many cases," that it was "uncomfortable" to listen to, and that it gave the court "serious concerns about [Sigafoose]'s present mental situation." At the final hearing, the trial court also noted that it regarded the psychological evaluation undergone by Sigafoose to be "superficial and incomplete." As this Court has noted repeatedly in its child custody jurisprudence, "we are mindful that the Solomonic task of making these decisions li 2018The trial court noted that Sigafoose's affect was "odd and occasionally inappropriate to the circumstances," that her testimony "lack[ed] factual foundation in many cases," that it was "uncomfortable" to listen to, and that it gave the court "serious concerns about [Sigafoose]'s present mental situation." At the final hearing, the trial court also noted that it regarded the psychological evaluation undergone by Sigafoose to be "superficial and incomplete." As this Court has noted repeatedly in its child custody jurisprudence, "we are mindful that the Solomonic task of making these decisions li | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In re Stubbs
green
1 sentence2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Stephens v. State
green
2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t 2015Jackson was acquitted of one count of battery. 3 See Stephens v. State, 247 Ga. App. 719 ( 545 SE2d 325 ) (2001). 4 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 773 SE2d 403 ) (2015), quoting Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 6 Ms. Smith died prior to trial. 7 564 U. S. 261 , 277 (II) (B) ( 131 SCt 2394 , 180 LE2d 310) (2011) (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in t | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cormier v. Cormier
green
2 sentences2012“Afundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice that is reasonably calculated to inform interested parties of an impending hearing and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (Punctuation omitted.) Cormier v. Cormier, 280 Ga. 693 (1) ( 631 SE2d 663 ) (2006). 2012“Afundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice that is reasonably calculated to inform interested parties of an impending hearing and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (Punctuation omitted.) Cormier v. Cormier, 280 Ga. 693 (1) ( 631 SE2d 663 ) (2006). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In the Interest of A. D.
neutral
2 sentences1996Whether the case is adjudged under the “clear and convincing evidence of unfitness” standard which has been the law in cases involving a custody challenge by a third party (see In the Interest of A. D., 208 Ga. App. 438 ( 430 SE2d 809 ); In re M. 1996Whether the case is adjudged under the “clear and convincing evidence of unfitness” standard which has been the law in cases involving a custody challenge by a third party (see In the Interest of A. D., 208 Ga. App. 438 ( 430 SE2d 809 ); In re M. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Garner v. United States
green
2 sentences1993Custodial interrogation exists when a law enforcement official questions an individual and that questioning was (1) conducted in custodial settings that have inherently coercive pressures that tend to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. at 1624 (the in custody requirement) and (2) when the inquiry is conducted by officers who are aware of the potentially incriminatory nature of. the disclosures sought, Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 , 96 S.Ct. 1178, 1183 , 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976) (the investigative intent requireme 1993Custodial interrogation exists when a law enforcement official questions an individual and that questioning was (1) conducted in custodial settings that have inherently coercive pressures that tend to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. at 1624 (the in custody requirement) and (2) when the inquiry is conducted by officers who are aware of the potentially incriminatory nature of. the disclosures sought, Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 , 96 S.Ct. 1178, 1183 , 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976) (the investigative intent requireme | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Lee v. Pace
green
2 sentences1991In Lee v. Pace, 252 Ga. 546 (1) ( 315 SE2d 417 ) (1984), this court was careful to distinguish between the bases of a Georgia court’s proper exercise of jurisdiction over a claim involving child support and a claim involving child custody: jurisdiction over the support claim was controlled by OCGA § 9-10-91 (5); jurisdiction over the custody claim was present because of the child’s presence in Georgia. 1991In Lee v. Pace, 252 Ga. 546 (1) ( 315 SE2d 417 ) (1984), this court was careful to distinguish between the bases of a Georgia court’s proper exercise of jurisdiction over a claim involving child support and a claim involving child custody: jurisdiction over the support claim was controlled by OCGA § 9-10-91 (5); jurisdiction over the custody claim was present because of the child’s presence in Georgia. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Camp v. Camp
green
2 sentences1981It is error for a trial court to consider a report from a county Department of Family and Children Services to decide child custody, Camp v. Camp, 213 Ga. 65 (1) ( 97 SE2d 125 ) (1957), in the absence of a stipulation by both parties that the court may do so, Dein v. Mossman, supra, Fn. 1, 244 Ga. at 870 , unless the provisions of Code Ann. § 74-113 apply. 1981It is error for a trial court to consider a report from a county Department of Family and Children Services to decide child custody, Camp v. Camp, 213 Ga. 65 (1) ( 97 SE2d 125 ) (1957), in the absence of a stipulation by both parties that the court may do so, Dein v. Mossman, supra, Fn. 1, 244 Ga. at 870 , unless the provisions of Code Ann. § 74-113 apply. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Mathis v. Nicholson
neutral
1 sentence1981It is error for a trial court to consider a report from a county Department of Family and Children Services to decide child custody, Camp v. Camp, 213 Ga. 65 (1) ( 97 SE2d 125 ) (1957), in the absence of a stipulation by both parties that the court may do so, Dein v. Mossman, supra, Fn. 1, 244 Ga. at 870 , unless the provisions of Code Ann. § 74-113 apply. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Slater v. Slater
green
2 sentences1962Mr. White urges that since this court subsequently held in Slater v. Slater, 216 Ga. 242 ( 115 SE2d 353 ) that the trial court had no jurisdiction to conduct this custody hearing, the judge had no jurisdiction to hold Mr. White in contempt of it. *294 Such a contention is fallacious. 1962Mr. White urges that since this court subsequently held in Slater v. Slater, 216 Ga. 242 ( 115 SE2d 353 ) that the trial court had no jurisdiction to conduct this custody hearing, the judge had no jurisdiction to hold Mr. White in contempt of it. *294 Such a contention is fallacious. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.