fixed rule in Pennsylvania

1981It is the fixed rule in Pennsylvania that counsel fees are not recoverable from the opponent in litigation unless there is a clear agreement, or an authorizing statute, or other established exception to the general rule: Mitchell v. McKinnis, 284 Pa. Superior Ct. 469 , 426 A. 2d 142 , (1981); Gary v. Masterson et al, 38 Somerset 347, 376-7(1979), and cases therein cited; Judicial Code §2503.

1981It is the fixed rule in Pennsylvania that counsel fees are not recoverable from the opponent in litigation unless there is a clear agreement, or an authorizing statute, or other established exception to the general rule: Mitchell v. McKinnis, 284 Pa. Superior Ct. 469 , 426 A. 2d 142 , (1981); Gary v. Masterson et al, 38 Somerset 347, 376-7(1979), and cases therein cited; Judicial Code §2503.

1963Only on such a basis can those who devote their lives to ministering to human suffering in some degree be fairly paid: Succession of Levitan, 143 La. 1025 , 79 So. 829 ; Young Bros. v. Succession of Von Schoeler, 151 La. 73 , 91 So. 551 .

1963Only on such a basis can those who devote their lives to ministering to human suffering in some degree be fairly paid: Succession of Levitan, 143 La. 1025 , 79 So. 829 ; Young Bros. v. Succession of Von Schoeler, 151 La. 73 , 91 So. 551 .

1963Only on such a basis can those who devote their lives to ministering to human suffering in some degree be fairly paid: Succession of Levitan, 143 La. 1025 , 79 So. 829 ; Young Bros. v. Succession of Von Schoeler, 151 La. 73 , 91 So. 551 .

1963Only on such a basis can those who devote their lives to ministering to human suffering in some degree be fairly paid: Succession of Levitan, 143 La. 1025 , 79 So. 829 ; Young Bros. v. Succession of Von Schoeler, 151 La. 73 , 91 So. 551 .

1942In Harkins v. Somerset Bus Co., 308 Pa. 109 , 162 A. 163 , the court, in recognizing that collisions between automobiles parked on the highway and other cars are always attended with circumstances peculiar to the individual accident, said that a fixed rule cannot be laid down which will infallibly determine in every case who is responsible for a rear end collision on a highway at night between a parked vehicle and one that was moving.

1942In Harkins v. Somerset Bus Co., 308 Pa. 109 , 162 A. 163 , the court, in recognizing that collisions between automobiles parked on the highway and other cars are always attended with circumstances peculiar to the individual accident, said that a fixed rule cannot be laid down which will infallibly determine in every case who is responsible for a rear end collision on a highway at night between a parked vehicle and one that was moving.

1936It is earnestly argued that a distinction should be made between funds on deposit at the time of the service of the attachment and the funds which were realized from the sale of HOLC bonds, relying upon Frazier v. Berg, 306 Pa. 317 , 159 A. 541 , which held that “in attachment execution proceedings, the process binds all property belonging to the defendant or money due him in the hands of the garnishee which the latter receives up to the time of the trial.” In the opinion by Justice Schaffer, sustaining this rule, we find no language which modifies the fixed rule that the plaintiff’s rights sh

1936It is earnestly argued that a distinction should be made between funds on deposit at the time of the service of the attachment and the funds which were realized from the sale of HOLC bonds, relying upon Frazier v. Berg, 306 Pa. 317 , 159 A. 541 , which held that “in attachment execution proceedings, the process binds all property belonging to the defendant or money due him in the hands of the garnishee which the latter receives up to the time of the trial.” In the opinion by Justice Schaffer, sustaining this rule, we find no language which modifies the fixed rule that the plaintiff’s rights sh

2017The people have directed that the cause of public education ... must evolute or retrograde with succeeding generations as the times prescribe.” Id.

2017The people have directed that the cause of public education . . . must evolute or retrograde with succeeding generations as the times prescribe.” Id.

1980It is our conclusion that a change in the rule would lead only to confusion and chaos and add greater difficulty in the trial of such cases.” The origin of this principle is Chesapeake & Ohio RW Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 [ 36 S.Ct. 630 , 60 L.Ed. 1117 ] (1916), in which the Supreme Court announced that awards for future damages had to be discounted to present value at some appropriate discount rate.

1980It is our conclusion that a change in the rule would lead only to confusion and chaos and add greater difficulty in the trial of such cases.” The origin of this principle is Chesapeake & Ohio RW Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 [ 36 S.Ct. 630 , 60 L.Ed. 1117 ] (1916), in which the Supreme Court announced that awards for future damages had to be discounted to present value at some appropriate discount rate.

1977In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), the Court summarized the factors that should be considered: The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by the law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. 388 U.S. at 297 , 87 S.Ct. at 1970.

1977In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), the Court summarized the factors that should be considered: The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by the law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. 388 U.S. at 297 , 87 S.Ct. at 1970.

1976Conti did not announce a fixed rule for determining when a trial judge “will be regarded as having been able to maintain his impartiality after hearing incompetent evidence,” 236 Pa. Superior Ct. at 501 , 345 A.2d at 245 , but noted that two factors are of “critical import” in a case-by-case determination: the inherently prejudicial nature of the evidence involved, and the importance of the evidence to the particular case, i.e., the extent of other evidence of guilt.

1976Conti did not announce a fixed rule for determining when a trial judge "will be regarded as having been able to maintain his impartiality after hearing incompetent evidence," 236 Pa. Superior *292 Ct. at 501, 345 A.2d at 245 , but noted that two factors are of "critical import" in a case-by-case determination: the inherently prejudicial nature of the evidence involved, and the importance of the evidence to the particular case, i.e., the extent of other evidence of guilt.

1973Indeed, immediately following the above quotation, the Court in Martin embraced the selected language of several earlier cases: “ [I] n Eastley v. Glenn, 313 Pa. 130, 132 , 169 A. 433 , it was said that ‘Reading the verdict slip with the prefix, “. . . hearken to your *502 verdict as the court has recorded it,” followed by an oral dissent, with or without poll, by a member of the jury before dismissal, is not returning or recording a verdict as is required by law.’ ...

1973Indeed, immediately following the above quotation, the Court in Martin embraced the selected language of several earlier cases: “ [I] n Eastley v. Glenn, 313 Pa. 130, 132 , 169 A. 433 , it was said that ‘Reading the verdict slip with the prefix, “. . . hearken to your *502 verdict as the court has recorded it,” followed by an oral dissent, with or without poll, by a member of the jury before dismissal, is not returning or recording a verdict as is required by law.’ ...

1961By virtue of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “counsel must be furnished to an indigent defendant ■prosecuted in a federal court in every case, whatever the circumstances.” (Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134 .) However, the Supreme Court of the United States held in that case, that “Prosecutions in State courts are not subject to this fixed requirement.” But there is this modification, “process of law in order to be ‘due’ does require that a State give a defendant ample opportunity to meet an accusation.” What is the criterion for determination of “dueness” in process of

1961By virtue of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, "counsel must be furnished to an indigent defendant prosecuted in a federal court in every case, whatever the circumstances." ( Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 .) However, the Supreme Court of the United States held in that case, that "Prosecutions in State courts are not subject to this fixed requirement." But there is this modification. "process of law in order to be `due' does require that a State give a defendant ample opportunity to meet an accusation." What is the criterion for determination of "dueness" in process of l

1949“We have consistently held that a fixed rule cannot be laid down which will determine in every instance the person legally responsible for a rear-end collision on a highway at night between a parked vehicle and one that is moving”: Buohl v. Lockport Brewing Co., supra, 349 Pa. 377, 379 , 37 A. 2d 524 .

1949“We have consistently held that a fixed rule cannot be laid down which will determine in every instance the person legally responsible for a rear-end collision on a highway at night between a parked vehicle and one that is moving”: Buohl v. Lockport Brewing Co., supra, 349 Pa. 377, 379 , 37 A. 2d 524 .

1948Martocello v. Martocello, 148 Pa. Superior Ct. 562 , 25 A. 2d 855 at page 563: “In cases of this kind, what is in the best interest of the child and his permanent welfare is to be decided, not in relation to a fixed standard, but by determining what is best for the child under all of the circumstances.” The relatrix, who lives with her present husband and their infant son in a two bedroom house on Birch Avenue, Wilmington, Delaware, testified that her husband, who is regularly employed by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company at an average weekly wage of “$80 to $90”, is “willing” to have Jerie li

1948Martocello v. Martocello, 148 Pa. Superior Ct. 562 , 25 A. 2d 855 at page 563: “In cases of this kind, what is in the best interest of the child and his permanent welfare is to be decided, not in relation to a fixed standard, but by determining what is best for the child under all of the circumstances.” The relatrix, who lives with her present husband and their infant son in a two bedroom house on Birch Avenue, Wilmington, Delaware, testified that her husband, who is regularly employed by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company at an average weekly wage of “$80 to $90”, is “willing” to have Jerie li

1947L, 415, sec. 57: “ ‘In the absence of an express *553 agreement as to amount, the law implies a promise to pay for a physician’s services as much as they are reasonably worth.’ ” In this connection, we said, in Pfeiffer v. Dyer, 295 Pa. 306, 311 , 145 A. 284 : . . physicians should not have their services valued as you would commodities in trade by a fixed standard; what would be a proper charge for the same service to a man fully able to pay would be excessive to a man of limited means, and what would be willingly done for the indigent without thought of financial reward should be compensated

1947L, 415, sec. 57: “ ‘In the absence of an express *553 agreement as to amount, the law implies a promise to pay for a physician’s services as much as they are reasonably worth.’ ” In this connection, we said, in Pfeiffer v. Dyer, 295 Pa. 306, 311 , 145 A. 284 : . . physicians should not have their services valued as you would commodities in trade by a fixed standard; what would be a proper charge for the same service to a man fully able to pay would be excessive to a man of limited means, and what would be willingly done for the indigent without thought of financial reward should be compensated

1944In our State there is no deviation from the fixed principle that there can be no reservation of title in a purported conditional vendor superior to the right of an innocent purchaser for value when the would-be vendor never had possession of the chattel: Root v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 279 Pa. 55 (1924); Ambler National Bank v. Maryland Credit Finance Co., supra; Equitable Credit Co. v. Stephany et al., 155 Pa. Superior Ct. 261 (1944).

1944Co., Inc., supra: Harkins v. Somerset Bus Co., 308 Pa. 109 ; Farley v. Ventresco, 307 Pa. 441 ; Kazan v. Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp., 347 Pa. 232 , affirming, per curiam, 151 Pa. Superior Ct. 38 .

1944Co., Inc., supra: Harkins v. Somerset Bus Co., 308 Pa. 109 ; Farley v. Ventresco, 307 Pa. 441 ; Kazan v. Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp., 347 Pa. 232 , affirming, per curiam, 151 Pa. Superior Ct. 38 .

1944Co., Inc., supra: Harkins v. Somerset Bus Co., 308 Pa. 109 ; Farley v. Ventresco, 307 Pa. 441 ; Kazan v. Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp., 347 Pa. 232 , affirming, per curiam, 151 Pa. Superior Ct. 38 .

1944Co., Inc., supra: Harkins v. Somerset Bus Co., 308 Pa. 109 ; Farley v. Ventresco, 307 Pa. 441 ; Kazan v. Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp., 347 Pa. 232 , affirming, per curiam, 151 Pa. Superior Ct. 38 .

1944In our State there is no deviation from the fixed principle that there can be no reservation of title in a purported conditional vendor superior to the right of an innocent purchaser for value when the would-be vendor never had possession of the chattel: Root v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 279 Pa. 55 (1924); Ambler National Bank v. Maryland Credit Finance Co., supra; Equitable Credit Co. v. Stephany et al., 155 Pa. Superior Ct. 261 (1944).

1942True, the Supreme Court in Hutchinson v. Follmer Trucking Company, 333 Pa. 424, 427 , 5 A. 2d 182 , held that the legislative mandate, which states that it is the duty of an operator of a motor vehicle to maintain such control oyer it as to enable him to bring it to a stop within the range of his headlights, must be obeyed.

1942True, the Supreme Court in Hutchinson v. Follmer Trucking Company, 333 Pa. 424, 427 , 5 A. 2d 182 , held that the legislative mandate, which states that it is the duty of an operator of a motor vehicle to maintain such control oyer it as to enable him to bring it to a stop within the range of his headlights, must be obeyed.

1926It is said that: “No one is entitled to absolute quiet in the enjoyment of his property; he may only insist upon a degree of quietness consistent with the standard of comfort prevailing in the locality in which he dwells:” Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 331 .

1924When, from a view of the whole instrument, it is apparent that its author intended to establish a new line of inheritable succession from the first taker, and not through the writer, then the principle is controlling, even though other words be used which indicate a purpose to limit to a life estate, and this is what was held in Lauer v. Hoffman, 241 Pa. 315 , the case relied on by appellant here.

1924The rule in Shelley’s Case is a fixed rule of law, not depending on the intention of the decedent; in fact it generally does violence thereto, and is applied even contrary to the expressed direction of the maker: Glenn v. Stewart, 265 Pa. 208 .

1923Co., 265 Pa. 282 , where the passenger, who was held guilty of negligence, sat by the chauffeur and knowingly and without protest suffered the latter to violate a fixed rule of law by driving upon the railroad tracks, without stopping to look or listen; nor is it like that of Hill v. Phila.

1923Rapid Transit Co., 271 Pa. 232 , where the passenger, with better means of observation than the chauffeur, suffered the latter, without protest, to drive in front of a plainly visible approaching electric street car by which the automobile was almost immediately struck.

1919The rule in Shelley’s Case is a fixed rule of law, not depending upon the intention of the testator, in fact it generally does violence thereto and is applied even contrary to his express direction: See McElwain v. Whitacre, 251 Pa. 279 ; Leonard v. Leister, 233 Pa. 475 .