14 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1936–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ercolanogreen1 sentence2024Linden, 251 N.J. at 428 (quoting State v. Ercolano, 335 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Jock v. Zoning Board of Adjustmentgreen2 sentences2018"The doctrine of equitable ownership or equitable conversion is not a fixed rule but a fiction devised to achieve justice between the parties to a real estate transaction." Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 184 N.J. 562, 587 (2005). 2018"The doctrine rests on the principle that, as between parties to a contract, equity regards things as done that were agreed to be done." Id. at 588 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millergreen1 sentence2011However, not even the decisions of our Supreme Court the dissent cites attempted to impose a fixed rule of procedure for every case. [9] *1066 The dissent also draws a distinction between indigent and financially able defendants, post at 83-85, 18 A. 3d at 1059-60, but nothing presented to us suggests that defendant in this case received inferior representation at trial because he required the services of the Public Defender's Office. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wardgreen2 sentences2010Noting that the statute in question expressly declared itself to be "civil in nature," id. at 368 , 106 S.Ct. at 2992 , 92 L.Ed. 2d at 304 (quoting Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, para. 105-3.01 (1985)), the Court fixed the standard that a challenger must meet: "Where a defendant has provided `the clearest proof' that `the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal." Id. at 369 , 106 S.Ct. at 2992 , 92 L.Ed. 2d at 304 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 2010Noting that the statute in question expressly declared itself to be "civil in nature," id. at 368 , 106 S.Ct. at 2992 , 92 L.Ed. 2d at 304 (quoting Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, para. 105-3.01 (1985)), the Court fixed the standard that a challenger must meet: "Where a defendant has provided `the clearest proof' that `the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal." Id. at 369 , 106 S.Ct. at 2992 , 92 L.Ed. 2d at 304 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 | 1 | 1 |
Societe Nat. Ind. Aero. v. US Dist. Courtgreen2 sentences1992No. 7444), is an international treaty, negotiated at the request of the United States, which prescribes methods for the gathering of evidence *114 in international disputes and is in force among numerous nations, including the United States and Germany (both countries with at least a potential interest in the present litigation). [2] The Supreme Court of the United States, in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522 , 540, 542, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 2554-56 , 96 L.Ed. 2d 461, 481, 482-83 (1987) (hereinafter "Aerospatiale" ), declined to hold that the 1992No. 7444), is an international treaty, negotiated at the request of the United States, which prescribes methods for the gathering of evidence *114 in international disputes and is in force among numerous nations, including the United States and Germany (both countries with at least a potential interest in the present litigation). [2] The Supreme Court of the United States, in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522 , 540, 542, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 2554-56 , 96 L.Ed. 2d 461, 481, 482-83 (1987) (hereinafter "Aerospatiale" ), declined to hold that the | 1 | 1 |
Harsen v. Bd. of Ed. of West Milford Tp.green1 sentence1977Bd. of Ed., 132 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Bachman Chocolate Manufacturing Co. v. Lehigh Warehouse & Transportation Co.green1 sentence1977Co., 1 N.J. 239, 244 (1949) (interest is allowed "where the damages are readily ascertainable" by computation using a fixed standard); Harsen v. West Milford Tp. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Norfolk v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.
green
2 sentences1978The rationale for this position is outlined in the leading case of City of Norfolk v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 505 , 90 S. E. 2d 140 (1955), where the court likened an automatic pass-through clause to a mathematical formula which was an integral part of the utility’s rates: The proposed escalator clause is nothing more or less than a fixed rule under which future rates to be charged the public are determined. 1978The rationale for this position is outlined in the leading case of City of Norfolk v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 505 , 90 S. E. 2d 140 (1955), where the court likened an automatic pass-through clause to a mathematical formula which was an integral part of the utility’s rates: The proposed escalator clause is nothing more or less than a fixed rule under which future rates to be charged the public are determined. | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Kleaver v. Jacobs
neutral
2 sentences1938The manifestation of that intent may appear in the gift over as well as elsewhere.' Kleaver v. Jacobs, 104 N.J. 1936The manifestation of that intent may appear in the gift over as well as elsewhere." Kleaver v. Jacobs, 104 N.J. | 2 | 1936–1938 |
Allen v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2010Noting that the statute in question expressly declared itself to be "civil in nature," id. at 368 , 106 S.Ct. at 2992 , 92 L.Ed. 2d at 304 (quoting Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, para. 105-3.01 (1985)), the Court fixed the standard that a challenger must meet: "Where a defendant has provided `the clearest proof' that `the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal." Id. at 369 , 106 S.Ct. at 2992 , 92 L.Ed. 2d at 304 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 2010Noting that the statute in question expressly declared itself to be "civil in nature," id. at 368 , 106 S.Ct. at 2992 , 92 L.Ed. 2d at 304 (quoting Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, para. 105-3.01 (1985)), the Court fixed the standard that a challenger must meet: "Where a defendant has provided `the clearest proof' that `the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal." Id. at 369 , 106 S.Ct. at 2992 , 92 L.Ed. 2d at 304 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bates v. Gambino
green
2 sentences1998For purposes of our analysis, we assume that Matlack’s failure to recognize that his client’s landlord could be a “named insured” established his failure to meet a “general level of competence.” See Bates v. Gambino, 72 N.J. 219, 225 , 370 A.2d 10 (1977) (it is a principle of negligence law that “there exists a fixed standard of conduct irrespective of the actual conduct of others”). 1998For purposes of our analysis, we assume that Matlack’s failure to recognize that his client’s landlord could be a “named insured” established his failure to meet a “general level of competence.” See Bates v. Gambino, 72 N.J. 219, 225 , 370 A.2d 10 (1977) (it is a principle of negligence law that “there exists a fixed standard of conduct irrespective of the actual conduct of others”). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, Reuben. Appeal of Reuben Dowling
green
2 sentences1988While the further questioning of any juror who indicates exposure must be conducted individually, infra at 86-87 & n. 27, we do not adopt here a fixed rule regarding the court's initial interrogation, see Virgin Islands v. Dowling, supra, 814 F. 2d at 137-38 ; United States v. Perrotta, supra, 553 F. 2d at 250 n. 6, since each case will arise in a different factual context. 1988While the further questioning of any juror who indicates exposure must be conducted individually, infra at 86-87 & n. 27, we do not adopt here a fixed rule regarding the court’s initial interrogation, see Virgin Islands v. Dowling, supra, 814 F.2d at 137-38 ; United States v. Perrotta, supra, 553 F.2d at 250 n. 6, since each case will arise in a different factual context. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Pasquale Perrotta, United States of America v. William Agnos
green
2 sentences1988While the further questioning of any juror who indicates exposure must be conducted individually, infra at 86-87 & n. 27, we do not adopt here a fixed rule regarding the court's initial interrogation, see Virgin Islands v. Dowling, supra, 814 F. 2d at 137-38 ; United States v. Perrotta, supra, 553 F. 2d at 250 n. 6, since each case will arise in a different factual context. 1988While the further questioning of any juror who indicates exposure must be conducted individually, infra at 86-87 & n. 27, we do not adopt here a fixed rule regarding the court’s initial interrogation, see Virgin Islands v. Dowling, supra, 814 F.2d at 137-38 ; United States v. Perrotta, supra, 553 F.2d at 250 n. 6, since each case will arise in a different factual context. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Bolitho
green
1 sentence1953From that rule, which was the fixed rule for over 70 years, State v. Bolitho, supra , is drawn the rule obtaining today. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Trafton v. Bainbridge
green
1 sentence1945The manifestation of that intent may appear in the gift over as well as elsewhere.' (Citing authorities.) * * * The cases rest upon the principle that the uncontrolled power of disposition in the first taker necessarily implies absolute ownership and that the limitation over is void as totally inconsistent with the rights of the first legatee. * * *" In Trafton v. Bainbridge, 125 N.J. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.