fixed rule in Arkansas

1985Trice v. City of Pine Bluff, 279 Ark. 125 , 649 S.W.2d 179 (1983).

1985Trice v. City of Pine Bluff, 279 Ark. 125 , 649 S.W.2d 179 (1983).

2007Standard of Review Recently, in Walker v. Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, 368 Ark. 357 , 246 S.W.3d 418 (2007), we reiterated the fixed standard of review for an appeal from the Committee: Pursuant to Section 12(B) of the Procedures, on appeal, this court carries out a de novo review on the record.

2007Standard of Review Recently, in Walker v. Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, 368 Ark. 357 , 246 S.W.3d 418 (2007), we reiterated the fixed standard of review for an appeal from the Committee: Pursuant to Section 12(B) of the Procedures, on appeal, this court carries out a de novo review on the record.

2007Lewellen v. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, 353 Ark. 641 , 110 S.W.3d 263 (2003).

2007Lewellen v. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, 353 Ark. 641 , 110 S.W.3d 263 (2003).

2001In the absence of judicial guidance on this point, I am unable to articulate a fixed standard that would apply to the pickup of juveniles in aftercare, other than to say that I believe a child picked up for indeterminate detention is at least entitled to a hearing for reasons set forth in Gagnon and Morrisey, supra. Various jurisdictions have adopted the position that a probationer or parolee — or, by logical extension, a juvenile in aftercare — remains in "constructive custody," thereby rendering his pickup something other than an arrest subject to constitutional restrictions.

1989In Long v. State, 284 Ark. 21 , 680 S.W.2d 686 (1984), we said that a law will be held to be vague when it leaves the police or the fact finder free to decide, without a fixed standard, what is prohibited.

1989In Long v. State, 284 Ark. 21 , 680 S.W.2d 686 (1984), we said that a law will be held to be vague when it leaves the police or the fact finder free to decide, without a fixed standard, what is prohibited.

1977(Omitting cases.) (2 Wigmore on Evidence § 248, p. 61 [3d Ed. 1940].) The admissibility of evidence pertaining to appellant’s knowledge of specific instances of violence by the deceased is discussed in Montague v. State, 213 Ark. 575 , 211 S.W. 2d 879 (1948), quoting from Pope v. State, 172 Ark. 61 , 287 S.W. 747 (1926): “At § 222 of the chapter on ‘Homicide,’ in 13 R.C.L., p. 919, it is said: ‘Where character evidence is offered in support of the contention that the deceased was the aggressor or to characterize and explain his acts, the defense is restricted to proof of general reputation in

1977(Omitting cases.) (2 Wigmore on Evidence § 248, p. 61 [3d Ed. 1940].) The admissibility of evidence pertaining to appellant’s knowledge of specific instances of violence by the deceased is discussed in Montague v. State, 213 Ark. 575 , 211 S.W. 2d 879 (1948), quoting from Pope v. State, 172 Ark. 61 , 287 S.W. 747 (1926): “At § 222 of the chapter on ‘Homicide,’ in 13 R.C.L., p. 919, it is said: ‘Where character evidence is offered in support of the contention that the deceased was the aggressor or to characterize and explain his acts, the defense is restricted to proof of general reputation in

1977(Omitting cases.) (2 Wigmore on Evidence § 248, p. 61 [3d Ed. 1940].) The admissibility of evidence pertaining to appellant’s knowledge of specific instances of violence by the deceased is discussed in Montague v. State, 213 Ark. 575 , 211 S.W. 2d 879 (1948), quoting from Pope v. State, 172 Ark. 61 , 287 S.W. 747 (1926): “At § 222 of the chapter on ‘Homicide,’ in 13 R.C.L., p. 919, it is said: ‘Where character evidence is offered in support of the contention that the deceased was the aggressor or to characterize and explain his acts, the defense is restricted to proof of general reputation in

1977(Omitting cases.) (2 Wigmore on Evidence § 248, p. 61 [3d Ed. 1940].) The admissibility of evidence pertaining to appellant’s knowledge of specific instances of violence by the deceased is discussed in Montague v. State, 213 Ark. 575 , 211 S.W. 2d 879 (1948), quoting from Pope v. State, 172 Ark. 61 , 287 S.W. 747 (1926): “At § 222 of the chapter on ‘Homicide,’ in 13 R.C.L., p. 919, it is said: ‘Where character evidence is offered in support of the contention that the deceased was the aggressor or to characterize and explain his acts, the defense is restricted to proof of general reputation in

1973In this opinion we do not intend to lay down a fixed rule for definition of the phrase “reasonable doubt.” Nevertheless, in Laird v. State, 251 Ark. 1074 , 476 S.W. 2d 811 (1972), the following definition of reasonable doubt was approved: “Reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, or imaginary doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon mortal evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt; but it is such a doubt as arises from such a candid and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case as would cause a reasonable and prudent man to pause and

1973In this opinion we do not intend to lay down a fixed rule for definition of the phrase “reasonable doubt.” Nevertheless, in Laird v. State, 251 Ark. 1074 , 476 S.W. 2d 811 (1972), the following definition of reasonable doubt was approved: “Reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, or imaginary doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon mortal evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt; but it is such a doubt as arises from such a candid and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case as would cause a reasonable and prudent man to pause and

1973In this opinion we do not intend to lay down a fixed rule for definition of the phrase “reasonable doubt.” Nevertheless, in Laird v. State, 251 Ark. 1074 , 476 S.W. 2d 811 (1972), the following definition of reasonable doubt was approved: “Reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, or imaginary doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon mortal evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt; but it is such a doubt as arises from such a candid and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case as would cause a reasonable and prudent man to pause and

1973In this opinion we do not intend to lay down a fixed rule for definition of the phrase “reasonable doubt.” Nevertheless, in Laird v. State, 251 Ark. 1074 , 476 S.W. 2d 811 (1972), the following definition of reasonable doubt was approved: “Reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, or imaginary doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon mortal evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt; but it is such a doubt as arises from such a candid and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case as would cause a reasonable and prudent man to pause and

1860Gotwalt, 3 Penn. 322 , decided long afterward, the court say: “ It is now more than twenty-three years since it was solemnly decided by this court, in the case of Gratz vs Ewalt, 2 Binn. 95 , that the words ‘ grant, bargain and sell’ under this act amount only to a covenant that the grantor has not done any act, or created any incumbrance whereby the estate granted by him may be defeated; and from that time to the present, has been considered, not only as a settled construction of the act, but as a fixed rule of property in the State, which no power but that of the Legislature can alter,” — ci

1860Henderson, 2 Binn. 108 ; Dorsey vs.