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6 Hawaii opinions name it 1 courts 1866–1996 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kahinugreen2 sentences1996Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe that discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such an examination. [Citation omitted.] Id. at 546-47, 498 P.2d at 642 (brackets and ellipses in original). 1996Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe that discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such an examination. [Citation omitted.] Id. at 546-47, 498 P.2d at 642 (brackets and ellipses in original). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kimballgreen2 sentences1978We must consider whether wholly unfettered discretion to impose an extended term sentence upon purely retributive considerations can constitutionally be conferred upon the sentencing court. 4 It is axiomatic that a criminal statute, to provide the due process protections mandated by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, § 4 of the Hawaii State Constitution, must prescribe a fixed standard by which guilt may be adjudged free from “the whim or caprice of.. . the judge or the jury.” State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 88 , 503 P.2d 176, 179 (1972). 1978We must consider whether wholly unfettered discretion to impose an extended term sentence upon purely retributive considerations can constitutionally be conferred upon the sentencing court. 4 It is axiomatic that a criminal statute, to provide the due process protections mandated by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, § 4 of the Hawaii State Constitution, must prescribe a fixed standard by which guilt may be adjudged free from “the whim or caprice of.. . the judge or the jury.” State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 88 , 503 P.2d 176, 179 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences1972Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe that discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such an examination. [Citation omitted.] Accord, State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 471-72 , 151 N.W.2d 157, 165 (1967). 7 Thus, we hold that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion based upon nothing more compelling than a bald allegation that the complainant may be mentally ill. 8 *548 III. 1972Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe that discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such an examination. [Citation omitted.] Accord, State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 471-72 , 151 N.W.2d 157, 165 (1967). 7 Thus, we hold that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion based upon nothing more compelling than a bald allegation that the complainant may be mentally ill. 8 *548 III. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Russel
green
2 sentences1996Buch argues that a subsequent California case, People v. Russel, 69 Cal.2d 187 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 210 , 443 P.2d 794 (1968), expanded the Ballard “compelling need” test by holding that a trial court’s discretion to order a mental examination of a complaining witness “is liberally exercised for defendants in sex abuse cases.” This argument, however, is specious. 1996Buch argues that a subsequent California case, People v. Russel, 69 Cal.2d 187 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 210 , 443 P.2d 794 (1968), expanded the Ballard “compelling need” test by holding that a trial court’s discretion to order a mental examination of a complaining witness “is liberally exercised for defendants in sex abuse cases.” This argument, however, is specious. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Grahovac
green
2 sentences1978In State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 535 , 480 P.2d 148 (1971), we held to be fatally vague and uncertain a statute which imposed sanctions against one who “wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the *82 night, without any visible or lawful business.” The word “wanders”, we said, was a definitional mystery in this context and “late or unusual hours” depended totally upon personal fancy. 1978In State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 535 , 480 P.2d 148 (1971), we held to be fatally vague and uncertain a statute which imposed sanctions against one who “wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the *82 night, without any visible or lawful business.” The word “wanders”, we said, was a definitional mystery in this context and “late or unusual hours” depended totally upon personal fancy. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Reuter v. Olson
neutral
2 sentences1965Reuter v. Olson, 79 N.D. 834 , 59 N.W.2d 830 ; Ridley v. Young, 127 Colo. 46 , 253 P.2d 433 . 1965Reuter v. Olson, 79 N.D. 834 , 59 N.W.2d 830 ; Ridley v. Young, 127 Colo. 46 , 253 P.2d 433 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Ridley v. Young
green
2 sentences1965Reuter v. Olson, 79 N.D. 834 , 59 N.W.2d 830 ; Ridley v. Young, 127 Colo. 46 , 253 P.2d 433 . 1965Reuter v. Olson, 79 N.D. 834 , 59 N.W.2d 830 ; Ridley v. Young, 127 Colo. 46 , 253 P.2d 433 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Fenton v. Aleshire
green
2 sentences1965In Franco , upholding the trial judge's refusal to give an unavoidable accident instruction, this court at page 437 declared that "whether or not such an instruction should be given depends entirely upon the facts of the particular case" since "it is impossible to announce a fixed rule applicable to all cases by which it can be decided just when the issue of unavoidable accident is presented." The test then suggested by Franco is that: "* * * In order to determine whether such issue [unavoidable accident] is involved, the facts of each particular case must be examined with the view of ascertai 1965In Franco , upholding the trial judge's refusal to give an unavoidable accident instruction, this court at page 437 declared that "whether or not such an instruction should be given depends entirely upon the facts of the particular case" since "it is impossible to announce a fixed rule applicable to all cases by which it can be decided just when the issue of unavoidable accident is presented." The test then suggested by Franco is that: "* * * In order to determine whether such issue [unavoidable accident] is involved, the facts of each particular case must be examined with the view of ascertai | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
2 sentences1965In Franco , upholding the trial judge's refusal to give an unavoidable accident instruction, this court at page 437 declared that "whether or not such an instruction should be given depends entirely upon the facts of the particular case" since "it is impossible to announce a fixed rule applicable to all cases by which it can be decided just when the issue of unavoidable accident is presented." The test then suggested by Franco is that: "* * * In order to determine whether such issue [unavoidable accident] is involved, the facts of each particular case must be examined with the view of ascertai 1965In Franco , upholding the trial judge's refusal to give an unavoidable accident instruction, this court at page 437 declared that "whether or not such an instruction should be given depends entirely upon the facts of the particular case" since "it is impossible to announce a fixed rule applicable to all cases by which it can be decided just when the issue of unavoidable accident is presented." The test then suggested by Franco is that: "* * * In order to determine whether such issue [unavoidable accident] is involved, the facts of each particular case must be examined with the view of ascertai | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Henriques v. Vinhaca
green
2 sentences1963H.1955, § 237-1, clearly expresses the intent of the legislature that the remedy shall be available only to enforce the payment of a "debt." Apart from providing none of the safeguards furnished elsewhere for the protection and relief of the defendant in his property rights, our statute contains no expression of legislative intent other than that found in the use of the words "creditor" and "debtor [5] ." Henriques v. *895 Vinhaca, supra, 20 Haw. 702 , clearly holds that a claim for unliquidated damages does not constitute a "debt." Nothing can be found to warrant and justify extending the con 1963H.1955, § 237-1, clearly expresses the intent of the legislature that the remedy shall be available only to enforce the payment of a "debt." Apart from providing none of the safeguards furnished elsewhere for the protection and relief of the defendant in his property rights, our statute contains no expression of legislative intent other than that found in the use of the words "creditor" and "debtor [5] ." Henriques v. *895 Vinhaca, supra, 20 Haw. 702 , clearly holds that a claim for unliquidated damages does not constitute a "debt." Nothing can be found to warrant and justify extending the con | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Yancy v. Smith
green
1 sentence1866Shepherd v. The Commonwealth, 2 Met., 419 ; Christian v. the same, 5 Met., 530 ; People v. Taylor, 3 Denio, 97 ; Wilde v. The Commonwealth, 2 Met., 408 . | 1 | 1866–1866 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.