fixed rule in Missouri

44 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1877–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (17)

Case	Followed	Cited
Pittman v. Great American Life Insurance Co.green moctapp · 1974 · cited in 6 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1975–1979 2 sentences 1979Where there is a conflict in the evidence in a court-tried case, we adhere to the fixed principle that appellate courts resolve the conflict by according due deference to the trial court because of its superior opportunity “ ‘to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their witnesses and to weigh, evaluate and assess their testimony’ ” [Pittman v. Great American Life Insurance Co., 512 S.W.2d 857, 861-862 [7] (Mo.App.1974)], and because the trial judge has leave to believe or disbelieve all, part or none of the testimony of any witness. 1978In such a situation, we ‘heed the well fixed principle that in court tried cases where the evidence conflicts sharply, appellate courts resolve the conflict by according due deference to the trial court because of its superior opportunity “to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their witnesses and to weigh, evaluate and assess their testimony” ’ [Pittman v. Great American Life Insurance Co., 512 S.W.2d 857, 861-862 [7] (Mo.App.1974)], and because the trial judge has leave to disbelieve all the testimony of any witness [Southwestern Bell Tel.	6	6
Hinnah v. Director of Revenuegreen mo · 2002 · cited in 6 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2006–2020 2 sentences 2020Missouri’s Implied Consent Law, adopted “to establish a fixed standard for procuring admissible evidence of blood alcohol for use against persons operating automobiles while intoxicated,” Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Mo. banc 2002) (quoting State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo. App. 1969)), provides that any person who drives on the public highways is deemed to have consented to a chemical test in order to determine the alcohol or drug content of the person's blood. § 577.020. 2014Applicable Law Section 577.041 was adopted “to establish a fixed standard for procuring admissible evidence of blood alcohol for use against persons operating automobiles while intoxicated.” Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Mo.2002).	5	6
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Crown Insurance Co.green moctapp · 1967 · cited in 4 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1975–1978 2 sentences 1978Co. v. Crown Insurance Co., 416 S.W.2d 705, 711 [6] (Mo.App.1967)] or to believe part of a witness’ testimony and reject the rest. 1978Co. v. Crown Insurance Co., 416 S.W.2d 705, 711 [6] (Mo.App.1967)] or to believe part of a witness’ testimony and reject the rest.	4	4
State v. Paulgreen moctapp · 1969 · cited in 3 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2002–2020 2 sentences 2020Missouri’s Implied Consent Law, adopted “to establish a fixed standard for procuring admissible evidence of blood alcohol for use against persons operating automobiles while intoxicated,” Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Mo. banc 2002) (quoting State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo. App. 1969)), provides that any person who drives on the public highways is deemed to have consented to a chemical test in order to determine the alcohol or drug content of the person's blood. § 577.020. 2012The implied consent law was adopted “to establish a fixed standard for procuring admissible evidence of blood alcohol for use against persons operating automobiles while intoxicated.” State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo.App.1969).	3	3
State v. Schlagelgreen mo · 1973 · cited in 2 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974 2 sentences 1974It is a well fixed principle in this state that “evidence fairly showing any form of affirmative participation in a crime is sufficient to support a conviction.” State v. Schlagel, 490 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Mo.1973). 1974It is a well fixed principle in this state that "evidence fairly showing any form of affirmative participation in a crime is sufficient to support a conviction." State v. Schlagel, 490 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Mo. 1973).	2	2
State v. Gettygreen mo · 1954 · cited in 2 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1974–2005 2 sentences 2005In doing so we are to determine the intent of the Legislature, but in making this determination ‘it is a fixed rule that such statutes must be strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the defendant, and that no one is to be made subject to criminal prosecution by implication.’ State v. Lancaster, 506 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Mo.1974) (quoting State v. Getty, 273 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo.1954)). 8 This is particularly so where, as here, the criminal statute under consideration is ambiguous and is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction. “[W]hen ambiguity exists in criminal 2005In doing so we are to determine the intent of the Legislature, but in making this determination `it is a fixed rule that such statutes must be strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the defendant, and that no one is to be made subject to criminal prosecution by implication.' State v. Lancaster, 506 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Mo.1974) (quoting State v. Getty, 273 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo.1954)). [8] This is particularly so where, as here, the criminal statute under consideration is ambiguous and is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction. "[W]hen ambiguity exists in crimin	1	2
Sellenriek v. Director of Revenuegreen mo · 1992 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006“The statutes and corresponding regulations establish the foundation which justifies the admission of a chemical analysis for blood alcohol independent of common law rules of evidence.” Sellenriek v. Director of Revenue, 826 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1992). 2006"The statutes and corresponding regulations establish the foundation which justifies the admission of a chemical analysis for blood alcohol independent of common law rules of evidence." Sellenriek v. Director of Revenue, 826 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1992).	1	1
State v. Lancastergreen mo · 1974 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 2 sentences 2005In doing so we are to determine the intent of the Legislature, but in making this determination ‘it is a fixed rule that such statutes must be strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the defendant, and that no one is to be made subject to criminal prosecution by implication.’ State v. Lancaster, 506 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Mo.1974) (quoting State v. Getty, 273 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo.1954)). 8 This is particularly so where, as here, the criminal statute under consideration is ambiguous and is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction. “[W]hen ambiguity exists in criminal 2005In doing so we are to determine the intent of the Legislature, but in making this determination `it is a fixed rule that such statutes must be strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the defendant, and that no one is to be made subject to criminal prosecution by implication.' State v. Lancaster, 506 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Mo.1974) (quoting State v. Getty, 273 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo.1954)). [8] This is particularly so where, as here, the criminal statute under consideration is ambiguous and is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction. "[W]hen ambiguity exists in crimin	1	1
State v. Withrowgreen mo · 1999 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 2 sentences 2005In doing so we are to determine the intent of the Legislature, but in making this determination ‘it is a fixed rule that such statutes must be strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the defendant, and that no one is to be made subject to criminal prosecution by implication.’ State v. Lancaster, 506 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Mo.1974) (quoting State v. Getty, 273 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo.1954)). 8 This is particularly so where, as here, the criminal statute under consideration is ambiguous and is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction. “[W]hen ambiguity exists in criminal 2005In doing so we are to determine the intent of the Legislature, but in making this determination `it is a fixed rule that such statutes must be strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the defendant, and that no one is to be made subject to criminal prosecution by implication.' State v. Lancaster, 506 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Mo.1974) (quoting State v. Getty, 273 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo.1954)). [8] This is particularly so where, as here, the criminal statute under consideration is ambiguous and is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction. "[W]hen ambiguity exists in crimin	1	1
Clark v. City of St. Josephgreen moctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 1 sentence 1987Joseph, 606 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo.App.1980).	1	1
Moran v. Suttergreen mo · 1950 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985 2 sentences 1985In Moran v. Sutter, 360 Mo. 304 , 228 S.W.2d 682, 687 [7] (1950), our Supreme Court applied equitable conversion to hold a daughter’s rights as cestui quie trust attached to the money from the sale of stock which had been held in trust, in lieu of the stock itself. 1985In Moran v. Sutter, 360 Mo. 304 , 228 S.W.2d 682, 687 [7] (1950), our Supreme Court applied equitable conversion to hold a daughter’s rights as cestui quie trust attached to the money from the sale of stock which had been held in trust, in lieu of the stock itself.	1	1
Gerald v. Caterers, Inc.green moctapp · 1964 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981 1 sentence 1981Conley, supra at 50 [2]; Gerald v. Caterers, Inc., 382 S.W.2d 740, 744 [12] (Mo.App.1964).	1	1
Conley v. Commerce Bank of St. Charlesgreen moctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981 1 sentence 1981Conley, supra at 50 [2]; Gerald v. Caterers, Inc., 382 S.W.2d 740, 744 [12] (Mo.App.1964).	1	1
Haley v. Edwardsgreen mo · 1955 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980 1 sentence 1980Haley v. Edwards, 276 S.W.2d 153, 158 [1] (Mo.1955); MAI 17:19.	1	1
Bodine v. Wood Tech Corp.green moctapp · 1967 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974 1 sentence 1974In this latter respect, Willing is apparently “unwilling” to heed the well fixed principle that in court tried cases where the evidence conflicts sharply, appellate courts resolve the conflict by according due deference to the trial court be *862 cause of its superior opportunity “to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their witnesses and to weigh, evaluate and assess their testimony.” Bodine v. Wood Tech Corporation, 423 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Mo.App.1967).	1	1
Clinton v. Staplesgreen moctapp · 1967 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974 1 sentence 1974See also Clinton v. Staples, 423 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.App.1967).	1	1
State v. Hicksgreen mo · 1930 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1973–1973 2 sentences 1973See also, State v. Hicks, 326 Mo. 1056 , 33 S.W.2d 923, 925 [1-8]. 1973See also, State v. Hicks, 326 Mo. 1056 , 33 S.W.2d 923, 925 [1-8].	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (41)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Ramsey green mo · 1963 2 sentences 1974See also: State v. Cobb, 444 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. banc 1969); State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.1958); State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413 (Mo.1963); and State v. Reed, 453 S.W.2d 946 (Mo.1970). 1974See also: State v. Cobb, 444 S.W. 2d 408 (Mo. banc 1969); State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.1958); State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413 (Mo.1963); and State v. Reed, 453 S.W.2d 946 (Mo.1970).	2	1974–1974
State v. Cobb green mo · 1969 2 sentences 1974See also: State v. Cobb, 444 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. banc 1969); State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.1958); State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413 (Mo.1963); and State v. Reed, 453 S.W.2d 946 (Mo.1970). 1974See also: State v. Cobb, 444 S.W. 2d 408 (Mo. banc 1969); State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.1958); State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413 (Mo.1963); and State v. Reed, 453 S.W.2d 946 (Mo.1970).	2	1974–1974
State v. Butler green mo · 1958 2 sentences 1974See also: State v. Cobb, 444 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. banc 1969); State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.1958); State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413 (Mo.1963); and State v. Reed, 453 S.W.2d 946 (Mo.1970). 1974See also: State v. Cobb, 444 S.W. 2d 408 (Mo. banc 1969); State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.1958); State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413 (Mo.1963); and State v. Reed, 453 S.W.2d 946 (Mo.1970).	2	1974–1974
State v. Reed green mo · 1970 2 sentences 1974See also: State v. Cobb, 444 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. banc 1969); State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.1958); State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413 (Mo.1963); and State v. Reed, 453 S.W.2d 946 (Mo.1970). 1974See also: State v. Cobb, 444 S.W. 2d 408 (Mo. banc 1969); State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.1958); State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413 (Mo.1963); and State v. Reed, 453 S.W.2d 946 (Mo.1970).	2	1974–1974
Matthew D. Vacca, Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Division of Workers' Compensation, and Brian May, Appellants/Cross-Respondents. green mo · 2019 2 sentences 2020Although a court may consider various factors in determining whether to permit invocation of judicial estoppel, “the only fixed requirement for application of the doctrine is that the party against whom judicial estoppel is invoked must have taken inconsistent positions in two proceedings.” Id. at 234-35 . 20 The Missouri Supreme Court has recently noted that the doctrine of judicial estoppel operates differently than an affirmative defense in that it does not set out “additional facts that defeat the claim of the pleader,” but rather “is in the nature of a sanction for misuse of the courts.” 2020Although a court may consider various factors in determining whether to permit invocation of judicial estoppel, “the only fixed requirement for application of the doctrine is that the party against whom judicial estoppel is invoked must have taken inconsistent positions in two proceedings.” Id. at 234-35 . 20 The Missouri Supreme Court has recently noted that the doctrine of judicial estoppel operates differently than an affirmative defense in that it does not set out “additional facts that defeat the claim of the pleader,” but rather “is in the nature of a sanction for misuse of the courts.”	1	2020–2020
Fust v. Francois green moctapp · 1995 1 sentence 2001Id.	1	2001–2001
Lee Young v. Jack Boring's, Inc. green moctapp · 1976 1 sentence 1995Id. at 897 .	1	1995–1995
Finn v. Newsam green moctapp · 1986 1 sentence 1992This rationale has been applied in such cases as Finn v. Newsam, 709 S.W.2d 889 (Mo.App.1986), and Henderson v. Terminal Railroad Association of St.	1	1992–1992
Roviaro v. United States green scotus · 1957 2 sentences 1982While it has been stated that a fixed rule with respect to disclosure is not justifiable, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. at 62 , 77 S.Ct. at 628 , we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to disclose the identity of this informant. 1982While it has been stated that a fixed rule with respect to disclosure is not justifiable, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. at 62 , 77 S.Ct. at 628 , we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to disclose the identity of this informant.	1	1982–1982
McCray v. Illinois green scotus · 1967 2 sentences 1979This radical departure should not be adopted as the law in Missouri and indeed in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), the Supreme Court reexamining Ro-viaro ten years later made clear that it should not be read broadly to require disclosure of an informant’s identity in various procedural stages of criminal prosecutions, that there is no justification for a fixed rule with respect to disclosure and reiterated that in Roviaro the informer “was the sole participant, other than the accused.” Id. at 310-311, 87 S.Ct. at 1062 . 1979This radical departure should not be adopted as the law in Missouri and indeed in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), the Supreme Court reexamining Ro-viaro ten years later made clear that it should not be read broadly to require disclosure of an informant’s identity in various procedural stages of criminal prosecutions, that there is no justification for a fixed rule with respect to disclosure and reiterated that in Roviaro the informer “was the sole participant, other than the accused.” Id. at 310-311, 87 S.Ct. at 1062 .	1	1979–1979
Cameron Mutual Insurance Co. v. Madden green mo · 1976 1 sentence 1978The doctrine that uninsured motorist coverage in a single policy, which by the terms are made to apply separately to each vehicle listed shall be stacked in favor of the insured, was not declared until our decision in Cameron Mutual Insurance Company v. Madden [No. 26556 adopted May 5, 1975] and decided on transfer by the Missouri Supreme Court en banc on February 9, 1976 and reported at 533 S.W.2d 538 .	1	1978–1978
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. green scotus · 1931 1 sentence 1964The court in the course of the opinion quoted with approval a ruling made in Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117 ; 282 U.S. 555 , 51 S.Ct. l. c. 251, 75 L.Ed, 544, where the court held in substance that where, from the nature of the case, damages could not be measured with certainty by a fixed rule, the facts and circumstances tending to show the probable amount of such damages should be submitted to a jury.	1	1964–1964
Gilbert v. Kennedy green mich · 1871 1 sentence 1964The court in the course of the opinion quoted with approval a ruling made in Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117 ; 282 U.S. 555 , 51 S.Ct. l. c. 251, 75 L.Ed, 544, where the court held in substance that where, from the nature of the case, damages could not be measured with certainty by a fixed rule, the facts and circumstances tending to show the probable amount of such damages should be submitted to a jury.	1	1964–1964
Gast Realty & Investment Co. v. Schneider Granite Co. green scotus · 1916	1	1940–1940
Goodfellow v. Shannon neutral mo · 1906	1	1931–1931
Major v. Kidd green mo · 1914	1	1931–1931
Smarr v. Smarr green mo · 1928	1	1931–1931
Berkemeier v. Reller green · 1927	1	1931–1931
Meier v. Buchter neutral mo · 1906	1	1922–1922
Holton v. Cochran green mo · 1907	1	1922–1922
Whitehead v. Ragan neutral mo · 1891	1	1915–1915
Ross v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs Railroad neutral ca1 · 1892	1	1915–1915
Darling v. Potts neutral mo · 1893	1	1915–1915
Whitehead v. Atchison neutral mo · 1896	1	1915–1915
Schawacker v. McLaughlin green · 1897	1	1915–1915
Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Meservey neutral · 1903	1	1915–1915
Edwards v. Thomas neutral · 1877	1	1912–1912
Seehorn v. American National Bank neutral mo · 1899	1	1910–1910
First State Bank v. Hammond neutral moctapp · 1907	1	1910–1910
Francisco v. Wingfield neutral mo · 1901	1	1907–1907
Baldwin v. Dalton green mo · 1902	1	1907–1907
Johnson v. Johnson neutral moctapp · 1897	1	1907–1907
In re Corrington green ill · 1888	1	1907–1907
Grier v. St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Co. neutral moctapp · 1904	1	1905–1905
Dart v. Bagley green mo · 1892	1	1902–1902
Roth v. Gabbert green nysd · 1894	1	1902–1902
Rutherford v. Tracy neutral mo · 1871	1	1899–1899
West v. Bretelle neutral mo · 1893	1	1899–1899
Burnham v. Hitt green · 1898	1	1899–1899
Shelby v. Guy green scotus · 1826	1	1877–1877

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MO § Mo. Rev. Stat. § 577.041 (7) MO § Mo. Rev. Stat. § 577.020 (5) MO § Mo. Rev. Stat. § 302.505 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

WA 82 (1921–2026) CA 50 (1870–2025) TX 44 (1898–2024) MO 44 (1877–2020) IL 38 (1887–2024) NY 34 (1875–2012) PA 30 (1891–2017) KY 30 (1885–2026) LA 23 (1920–2019) AL 21 (1870–2010) GA 18 (1915–2024) OK 18 (1926–2016) MI 15 (1912–2021) NJ 14 (1936–2024) NC 14 (1918–2021) OR 13 (1939–1976) IN 11 (1899–2005) WV 11 (1886–1985) OH 11 (1943–2011) CT 10 (1916–2016) IA 10 (1878–2023) MN 10 (1901–2002) MA 9 (1888–2013) CO 9 (1903–1995) AR 8 (1860–2007) MD 8 (1905–2010) RI 8 (1979–2009) TN 7 (1917–2025) WY 7 (1965–1991) FL 7 (1908–2020) WI 6 (1895–1982) ID 6 (1947–2012) VA 6 (1935–2014) SC 6 (1912–2006) HI 6 (1866–1996) NM 6 (1946–2016) KS 4 (1917–1995) AZ 4 (1960–2004) ND 3 (1952–2002) SD 3 (1909–1993) NV 2 (1870–1924) NH 2 (1984–1991) DE 2 (1945–2020) MS 2 (1911–1914)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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