50 California opinions name it 5 courts 1870–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Campbellgreen2 sentences1980Allusion to the voir dire question, we further note, was in fact made by the prosecutor in closing argument. (2) It is a well fixed rule that under our discovery procedures a defendant may compel the prosecution to produce written statements such as the one in issue here. ( People v. Campbell (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 849, 855 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 118 ]; People v. Superior Court (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 694, 699 [ 70 Cal. Rptr. 480 ].) As the court in People v. *1002 Campbell, supra , said: "[W]henever any oral statement has been made by a defendant and the fact is known to the prosecution, such stateme 1980Allusion to the voir dire question, we further note, was in fact made by the prosecutor in closing argument. (2) It is a well fixed rule that under our discovery procedures a defendant may compel the prosecution to produce written statements such as the one in issue here. ( People v. Campbell (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 849, 855 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 118 ]; People v. Superior Court (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 694, 699 [ 70 Cal. Rptr. 480 ].) As the court in People v. *1002 Campbell, supra , said: "[W]henever any oral statement has been made by a defendant and the fact is known to the prosecution, such stateme | 2 | 2 |
People v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1980Allusion to the voir dire question, we further note, was in fact made by the prosecutor in closing argument. (2) It is a well fixed rule that under our discovery procedures a defendant may compel the prosecution to produce written statements such as the one in issue here. ( People v. Campbell (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 849, 855 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 118 ]; People v. Superior Court (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 694, 699 [ 70 Cal. Rptr. 480 ].) As the court in People v. *1002 Campbell, supra , said: "[W]henever any oral statement has been made by a defendant and the fact is known to the prosecution, such stateme 1980Allusion to the voir dire question, we further note, was in fact made by the prosecutor in closing argument. (2) It is a well fixed rule that under our discovery procedures a defendant may compel the prosecution to produce written statements such as the one in issue here. ( People v. Campbell (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 849, 855 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 118 ]; People v. Superior Court (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 694, 699 [ 70 Cal. Rptr. 480 ].) As the court in People v. *1002 Campbell, supra , said: "[W]henever any oral statement has been made by a defendant and the fact is known to the prosecution, such stateme | 2 | 2 |
Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Commissiongreen2 sentences2023Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 134 .) It is commonly understood to mean “ ‘the act of making good, or of giving an equivalent for, loss.’ ” (Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 263 .) “Restitutive damages . . . are quantifiable amounts of money due an injured private party from another party to compensate for the pecuniary 15 loss directly resulting from the second party’s violation of law.” (Ibid.) By contrast, general compensatory damages (e.g., for emotional distress) “are not pecuniarily measurable, defy a fixed rule 2014The amount of such damages is necessarily left to the subjective discretion of the trier of fact.” (Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 103 [160 Cal. Rotr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329 ]; see Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 263 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 ] [noneconomic damages “defy a fixed rule of quantification” and are traditionally left to the trier of fact].) Accordingly, the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms indicates that the noneconomic “damages” identified in section 3333.2, subdivision (b) are | 1 | 3 |
People v. Ledesmagreen1 sentence2016(See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 95 [noting that “the ‘shall’/‘may’ dichotomy . . . is not a fixed rule of statutory construction. [Citations.] Moreover, unlike some codes that expressly define ‘shall’ as mandatory and ‘may’ as permissive [citations], the Penal Code provides only that ‘[w]ords and phrases must be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language . . . .’ (§ 7, subd. 16.).”].) In the context of the entire instruction, the use of “may” together with “only” conveys a restricted permission or authorization, instructing the jurors that the | 1 | 1 |
Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2014The amount of such damages is necessarily left to the subjective discretion of the trier of fact.” (Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 103 [160 Cal. Rotr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329 ]; see Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 263 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 ] [noneconomic damages “defy a fixed rule of quantification” and are traditionally left to the trier of fact].) Accordingly, the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms indicates that the noneconomic “damages” identified in section 3333.2, subdivision (b) are 2014The amount of such damages is necessarily left to the subjective discretion of the trier of fact.” (Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 103 [160 Cal. Rotr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329 ]; see Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 263 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 ] [noneconomic damages “defy a fixed rule of quantification” and are traditionally left to the trier of fact].) Accordingly, the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms indicates that the noneconomic “damages” identified in section 3333.2, subdivision (b) are | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hawthornegreen2 sentences2007The legal definition of mental retardation for purposes of Atkins’s constitutional rule does not incorporate a fixed requirement of a particular test score. (§ 1376, subd. (a); see In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal.4th 40 , 48—49 [24 *1004 Cal.Rptr.3d 189, 105 P.3d 552 ] (Hawthorne).) The trial court, therefore, did not commit legal error in giving less weight to Vidal’s Full Scale IQ scores and greater weight to other evidence of significantly impaired intellectual functioning, including Verbal Intelligence Quotient scores on Wechsler IQ tests (Verbal IQ) in the mental retardation range. 2007The legal definition of mental retardation for purposes of Atkins’s constitutional rule does not incorporate a fixed requirement of a particular test score. (§ 1376, subd. (a); see In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal.4th 40 , 48—49 [24 *1004 Cal.Rptr.3d 189, 105 P.3d 552 ] (Hawthorne).) The trial court, therefore, did not commit legal error in giving less weight to Vidal’s Full Scale IQ scores and greater weight to other evidence of significantly impaired intellectual functioning, including Verbal Intelligence Quotient scores on Wechsler IQ tests (Verbal IQ) in the mental retardation range. | 1 | 1 |
Societe Nat. Ind. Aero. v. US Dist. Courtgreen2 sentences2002But we prefer to believe that the Hague Convention establishes not a fixed rule but rather a minimum measure of international cooperation; our reading of article 27 of the convention encourages us to conclude that this is, indeed, what the ratifying states intend.” (Id. at p. 859.) 1 In Aérospatiale, the United States Supreme Court also ruled that the Hague Convention is not the exclusive means of obtaining evidence abroad. “[A] rule of exclusivity would subordinate the court’s supervision of even the most routine of these pretrial proceedings to the actions or, equally, to the inactions of fo 2002But we prefer to believe that the Hague Convention establishes not a fixed rule but rather a minimum measure of international cooperation; our reading of article 27 of the convention encourages us to conclude that this is, indeed, what the ratifying states intend.” (Id. at p. 859.) 1 In Aérospatiale, the United States Supreme Court also ruled that the Hague Convention is not the exclusive means of obtaining evidence abroad. “[A] rule of exclusivity would subordinate the court’s supervision of even the most routine of these pretrial proceedings to the actions or, equally, to the inactions of fo | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Mooregreen2 sentences2001(Reed v. Moore (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 43, 47 [ 319 P.2d 80 ]; see also Howe v. City Title Ins. 2001(Reed v. Moore (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 43, 47 [ 319 P.2d 80 ]; see also Howe v. City Title Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Bare v. Richman & Samuels, Inc.green2 sentences1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels 1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels | 1 | 1 |
Leff v. Guntergreen2 sentences1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels 1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels | 1 | 1 |
Tripp v. Swoapgreen2 sentences1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels 1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels | 1 | 1 |
Anselmo v. Sebastianigreen2 sentences1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels 1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels | 1 | 1 |
Elkins v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982The maintenance of judicial integrity has been a fixed principle in our jurisprudence. ( Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 215 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1676 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 ].) In California we have recently emphasized that "`It is essential that the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice.'" ( People v. Superior Court ( Greer ) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 268 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 , 561 P.2d 1164 ], quoting from People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180, 185 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 235 , 524 P.2d 363 ].) *634 The majority's conclusion is also cont 1982The maintenance of judicial integrity has been a fixed principle in our jurisprudence. ( Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 215 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1676 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 ].) In California we have recently emphasized that "`It is essential that the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice.'" ( People v. Superior Court ( Greer ) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 268 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 , 561 P.2d 1164 ], quoting from People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180, 185 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 235 , 524 P.2d 363 ].) *634 The majority's conclusion is also cont | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rhodesgreen2 sentences1982The maintenance of judicial integrity has been a fixed principle in our jurisprudence. ( Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 215 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1676 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 ].) In California we have recently emphasized that "`It is essential that the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice.'" ( People v. Superior Court ( Greer ) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 268 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 , 561 P.2d 1164 ], quoting from People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180, 185 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 235 , 524 P.2d 363 ].) *634 The majority's conclusion is also cont 1982The maintenance of judicial integrity has been a fixed principle in our jurisprudence. ( Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 215 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1676 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 ].) In California we have recently emphasized that "`It is essential that the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice.'" ( People v. Superior Court ( Greer ) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 268 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 , 561 P.2d 1164 ], quoting from People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180, 185 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 235 , 524 P.2d 363 ].) *634 The majority's conclusion is also cont | 1 | 1 |
People v. Superior Court (Greer)green2 sentences1982The maintenance of judicial integrity has been a fixed principle in our jurisprudence. ( Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 215 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1676 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 ].) In California we have recently emphasized that "`It is essential that the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice.'" ( People v. Superior Court ( Greer ) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 268 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 , 561 P.2d 1164 ], quoting from People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180, 185 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 235 , 524 P.2d 363 ].) *634 The majority's conclusion is also cont 1982The maintenance of judicial integrity has been a fixed principle in our jurisprudence. ( Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 215 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1676 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 ].) In California we have recently emphasized that "`It is essential that the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice.'" ( People v. Superior Court ( Greer ) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 268 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 , 561 P.2d 1164 ], quoting from People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180, 185 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 235 , 524 P.2d 363 ].) *634 The majority's conclusion is also cont | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carr v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| DiGenova v. State Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Renchiegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Young v. Gnossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Moralesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sticegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sticegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. J. B. Hill Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Webster v. Webstergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Building Maintenance Contractors' Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rudnick v. Jacobsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. De Mossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Zerbstgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foster v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lanigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Simpsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Ridergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Megee v. Fasulisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Battellegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lineman v. Schmidgreen1 sentence1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Dinsmore
neutral
2 sentences2022As Dinsmore, supra, 102 Cal. 381 held, such a fixed rule would be impossible to fashion as the unique facts of each case must govern the court’s analysis. 2022As Dinsmore, supra, 102 Cal. 381 held, such a fixed rule would be impossible to fashion as the unique facts of each case must govern the court’s analysis. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Tensfeldt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.
green
2 sentences2017Nor would such an inflexible rule be justified by the plain language of section 1871.5." ( Tensfeldt, supra , 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 124 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ; italics added.) Thus "[a]bsent a clear and express intention of the Legislature, we cannot interpret section 1871.5 to bar without qualification receipt of all classes of compensation benefits as a result of the fraudulent receipt of any one benefit unless there is substantial proof that those benefits in question were owed or received as a result of the fraud." ( Id . at p. 126, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) Accordingly, the court in Tensfeldt e 2017Nor would such an inflexible rule be justified by the plain language of section 1871.5." ( Tensfeldt, supra , 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 124 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ; italics added.) Thus "[a]bsent a clear and express intention of the Legislature, we cannot interpret section 1871.5 to bar without qualification receipt of all classes of compensation benefits as a result of the fraudulent receipt of any one benefit unless there is substantial proof that those benefits in question were owed or received as a result of the fraud." ( Id . at p. 126, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) Accordingly, the court in Tensfeldt e | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.
green
2 sentences1953Section 16723 provides that “No agreement, combination or association is unlawful or within the provisions of this chapter, the object and purpose of which are to conduct operations at a reasonable profit or to market at a reasonable profit those products which can not otherwise be so marketed.” *724 In Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 [ 47 S.Ct. 681 , 71 L.Ed. 1146 ], it was held that the same exemption contained in the Colorado Anti-Trust Act left the whole statute “without a fixed standard of guilt ’ ’ and thus rendered it unconstitutional. 1953Section 16723 provides that “No agreement, combination or association is unlawful or within the provisions of this chapter, the object and purpose of which are to conduct operations at a reasonable profit or to market at a reasonable profit those products which can not otherwise be so marketed.” *724 In Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 [ 47 S.Ct. 681 , 71 L.Ed. 1146 ], it was held that the same exemption contained in the Colorado Anti-Trust Act left the whole statute “without a fixed standard of guilt ’ ’ and thus rendered it unconstitutional. | 2 | 1931–1953 |
Prentiss v. City of South Pasadena
green
1 sentence2025Code, § 129.0715(a)(1).) That assessment involves “‘discretion or judgment in reaching a decision.’” (Prentiss, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 90 .) Like the appellants in Collins, Twins Luck does not point us to any authority setting a fixed standard or objective measurement for determining the potential effect on the public’s safety. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. McNeal
green
1 sentence2024The statement that every person at a .05% BAC is driving under the influence is also a misstatement of case law. ““To be ‘under the influence’ within the meaning of the Vehicle Code, the liquor . . . must have so far affected the nervous system, the brain, or muscles as to impair to an appreciable degree the ability to operate a vehicle in a manner like that of an ordinarily prudent and cautious person in full possession of his faculties.” (People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183 , 1192–1193.) This language is not language that dictates a particular fixed standard; it calls for an individualiz | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People Ex Rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd.
green
1 sentence2023Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 134 .) It is commonly understood to mean “ ‘the act of making good, or of giving an equivalent for, loss.’ ” (Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 263 .) “Restitutive damages . . . are quantifiable amounts of money due an injured private party from another party to compensate for the pecuniary 15 loss directly resulting from the second party’s violation of law.” (Ibid.) By contrast, general compensatory damages (e.g., for emotional distress) “are not pecuniarily measurable, defy a fixed rule | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Stringham
green
1 sentence2016(People v. Stringham, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 199 .) When either law or a fixed rule is lacking, a judge is to decide a question with a view of expediency, or in the interests of equity and justice. “ ‘The term implies absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Isenor
green
1 sentence2009As the court observed in Isenor , “It is not error to deny a motion to sever based solely on defendant’s bald assertion that someone has made an exonerating statement in his behalf. [Citation.]” (Isenor, supra, 17 Cal.App.3d at p. 333 .) The court in Isenor did not set out a fixed rule for determining when the moving party’s showing is adequate. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Pennell
green
2 sentences1991Doctor Conneally testified that resolution limits are commonly used in biology. 15 See State v. Pennell, supra, 584 A.2d 513, 518 , in which the superior court held that the bin or frequency at which an allele occurs in the population must be calculated using the widest range Cellmark would use to declare a match on any individual test, i.e., by two resolution limits. 1991Doctor Conneally testified that resolution limits are commonly used in biology. 15 See State v. Pennell, supra, 584 A.2d 513, 518 , in which the superior court held that the bin or frequency at which an allele occurs in the population must be calculated using the widest range Cellmark would use to declare a match on any individual test, i.e., by two resolution limits. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
In Re Rodriguez
green
1 sentence1987(In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 651 ; 66 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 4 87-403 367, 368 (1983).) In the last cited opinion, we quoted City of Crowley Firemen v. City of Crowley (Supreme Ct. La. 1973) 280 S.2d 897, 901, regarding the constitutional standard of reasonableness: "The fixed rule and basic standard by which the validity of all exercise of the police power is tested is that the police power of the state extends only to such measures as are reasonable and that all police regulations must be reasonable under all circumstances. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1985In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 423 [ 333 P.2d 745 ], the Bowles rule of convenience and economy was expressed as a fixed rule of substance and procedure. 1985In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 423 [ 333 P.2d 745 ], the Bowles rule of convenience and economy was expressed as a fixed rule of substance and procedure. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Esgro Central, Inc. v. General Insurance
green
1 sentence1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc.
green
2 sentences1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels 1983Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060 .) Damages will be deemed “capable of being made certain by calculation” if the amount due can be determined by reference to a fixed standard: e.g., a payment schedule (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 683 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 789 , 552 P.2d 749 ] [welfare benefits]; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 749 ] [payments on rescinded automobile sales contract]); a readily ascertainable market value (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 519 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 658 P.2d 740 ] [appraised value of building]; Bare v. Richman & Samuels | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Chadd
green
2 sentences1982In People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 [ 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 , 621 P.2d 837 ] (cert. den., sub nom., California v. Chadd (1981) 452 U.S. 931 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 431 , 101 S.Ct. 3066 ]) we were faced with the question whether a defendant in a capital case could plead guilty without the concurrence of counsel. 1982In People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 [ 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 , 621 P.2d 837 ] (cert. den., sub nom., California v. Chadd (1981) 452 U.S. 931 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 431 , 101 S.Ct. 3066 ]) we were faced with the question whether a defendant in a capital case could plead guilty without the concurrence of counsel. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Federal Communications Commission green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Manson v. Villafane green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Harris v. Bermudez green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. McRae green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Reyes green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Riser green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Powell v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Sweetser v. Pacheco green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego County red | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| cluster 233484 green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Hartshorn neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| The People v. Hudson green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| State v. Palmer green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Taborsky v. State green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| State v. Driver neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| State v. Klueber green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Commonwealth v. Kosh green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| People v. One 1939 Plymouth 6 Coupe green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters red | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Bradwell v. Pittsb. Etc. Pass. Ry. Co. green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Kraas v. American Bakeries Co. green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Bute v. Illinois green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Barlow v. Crome green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Reuter v. Hill green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| People v. Garcia green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Kerckhoff-Cuzner Mill & Lumber Co. v. Olmstead green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.