fixed rule in New Mexico

2016Summit Electric, 2010-NMCA-086, ¶ 6 .

1980Justice Tobriner said: Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe that discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such an examination. [Emphasis added.] [ 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313 , 410 P.2d at 849 .] This rule is applicable in any case that rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of a victim.

1980Justice Tobriner said: Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe that discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such an examination. [Emphasis added.] [ 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313 , 410 P.2d at 849 .] This rule is applicable in any case that rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of a victim.

1976We do not believe this position is in accordance with Roviaro v. United States, supra. While Roviaro warns against a fixed rule with respect to the disclosure of an informer’s identity, United States v. Martinez, supra, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ opinion attempt to formulate one.

1972Geeslin v. Goodno, Inc., 75 N.M. 174 , 402 P.2d 156 (1965).

1972Geeslin v. Goodno, Inc., 75 N.M. 174 , 402 P.2d 156 (1965).

1961Section 20-2-2, 1953 Comp., reads: “If a witness, upon cross-examination as to a former statement made by him relative to the subject-matter of the cause, and inconsistent with his present testimony, does not distinctly admit that he did make such statement, proof may be given that he did in fact make it, but before such proof can be given the circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the particular occasion, must be mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not he did make such statement.” In construing the statute we held in State v. Fletcher, 36 N.M. 4

1961Section 20-2-2, 1953 Comp., reads: “If a witness, upon cross-examination as to a former statement made by him relative to the subject-matter of the cause, and inconsistent with his present testimony, does not distinctly admit that he did make such statement, proof may be given that he did in fact make it, but before such proof can be given the circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the particular occasion, must be mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not he did make such statement.” In construing the statute we held in State v. Fletcher, 36 N.M. 4

1961And this must be done with particularity as to time, place, and circumstances, so that he can deny it, or make any explanation intending to reconcile what he formerly said with what he is now testifying. * * * The protection furnished by the rule is primarily for the benefit of the witness, not the parties. * * * ” The correctness of the above holding was reaffirmed in Maestas v. Christmas, 63 N.M. 447 , 321 P.2d 631 , and from a consideration of the quoted testimony we must conclude that there is prejudicial error in this case.

1961And this must be done with particularity as to time, place, and circumstances, so that he can deny it, or make any explanation intending to reconcile what he formerly said with what he is now testifying. * * * The protection furnished by the rule is primarily for the benefit of the witness, not the parties. * * * ” The correctness of the above holding was reaffirmed in Maestas v. Christmas, 63 N.M. 447 , 321 P.2d 631 , and from a consideration of the quoted testimony we must conclude that there is prejudicial error in this case.