fixed rule in Louisiana

1991Also see Bludsworth v. State, 98 Nev. 289 , 646 P.2d 558 (1982).

1991Also see Bludsworth v. State, 98 Nev. 289 , 646 P.2d 558 (1982).

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

1979The entire context of every will must be taken into consideration and from the whole document it must be determined whether the expression of the wish was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of property.’ See, also, Succession of Allen, 48 La.Ann. 1036 , 20 So. 193 ; 55 Am.St.Rep. 295 ; Gueydan v. Montagne, 109 La. 38 , 33 So. 61 ; Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463 , 80 So. 659 ; Succession of LaBarre, 179 La. 45 , 153 So. 15 ; Succession of Price, 202 La. 842 , 13 So.2d 240 ; Succession of Lacoume, 205 La. 511 , 17 So.2d 726 ; Succession of Kamlad

2019Moreover, “[t]he Jackson doctrine involves more than simply applying a fixed standard to measure the simple quantum of the evidence produced in a case.” Id. (quoting State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1309 (La. 1988)).

2008It is simply an addition of a mathematical formula to the filed schedules of the Company under which the rates and charges fluctuate as the wholesale cost of gas to the Company fluctuates." City of Norfolk v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 197 Va. 505 , 90 S.E.2d 140, 148 (1955). 612 So.2d at 22 .

2000In State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1309 (La.1988), the supreme court noted that the review required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) "involve[s] more than simply applying a fixed standard to measure the simple quantum of the evidence produced in a case." Applying the three-step process suggested in Mussall , I conclude that the litigation can be condensed into nothing more than a personal dispute which does not warrant a felony conviction, given the nature of the intent evidence presented.

2000In State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1309 (La.1988), the supreme court noted that the review required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) "involve[s] more than simply applying a fixed standard to measure the simple quantum of the evidence produced in a case." Applying the three-step process suggested in Mussall , I conclude that the litigation can be condensed into nothing more than a personal dispute which does not warrant a felony conviction, given the nature of the intent evidence presented.

1986Also see Bludsworth v. State, 98 N.W. 289 , 646 P.2d 558 (1982).

1979App., 180 So.2d 74 (second). “[3] In the Solari case the court observed that no ‘* * * case has laid down or could lay down a fixed rule that the word “wish” should always be interpreted as disposing of property, or, on the other hand, that it should always be interpreted as precatory.

1971Cf. Arts. 11, 1891, 1892, LSA-C.C; Conques v. Andrus, 162 La. 73 , 110 So. 93 . `It is a fixed rule of law that where the parties have the capacity to stipulate for liquidated damages, and when agreed upon, courts will not inquire whether the actual damage suffered equaled or approximated the agreed amount.'" * * * [ 235 So. 2d 386, 390 .] The only ground that plaintiff relies on herein to reverse the holding of the trial court is that bad faith is a material fact to be considered in awarding attorney's fees, and supporting this position are the cases of Berry v. Ginsburg, 98 So.2d 548 , La.Ap

1971Cf. Arts. 11, 1891, 1892, LSA-C.C; Conques v. Andrus, 162 La. 73 , 110 So. 93 . `It is a fixed rule of law that where the parties have the capacity to stipulate for liquidated damages, and when agreed upon, courts will not inquire whether the actual damage suffered equaled or approximated the agreed amount.'" * * * [ 235 So. 2d 386, 390 .] The only ground that plaintiff relies on herein to reverse the holding of the trial court is that bad faith is a material fact to be considered in awarding attorney's fees, and supporting this position are the cases of Berry v. Ginsburg, 98 So.2d 548 , La.Ap

1971Cf. Arts. 11, 1891, 1892, LSA-C.C; Conques v. Andrus, 162 La. 73 , 110 So. 93 . `It is a fixed rule of law that where the parties have the capacity to stipulate for liquidated damages, and when agreed upon, courts will not inquire whether the actual damage suffered equaled or approximated the agreed amount.'" * * * [ 235 So. 2d 386, 390 .] The only ground that plaintiff relies on herein to reverse the holding of the trial court is that bad faith is a material fact to be considered in awarding attorney's fees, and supporting this position are the cases of Berry v. Ginsburg, 98 So.2d 548 , La.Ap

1971Cf. Arts. 11, 1891, 1892, LSA-C.C; Conques v. Andrus, 162 La. 73 , 110 So. 93 . `It is a fixed rule of law that where the parties have the capacity to stipulate for liquidated damages, and when agreed upon, courts will not inquire whether the actual damage suffered equaled or approximated the agreed amount.'" * * * [ 235 So. 2d 386, 390 .] The only ground that plaintiff relies on herein to reverse the holding of the trial court is that bad faith is a material fact to be considered in awarding attorney's fees, and supporting this position are the cases of Berry v. Ginsburg, 98 So.2d 548 , La.Ap

1971Cf. Arts. 11, 1891, 1892, LSA-C.C; Conques v. Andrus, 162 La. 73 , 110 So. 93 . `It is a fixed rule of law that where the parties have the capacity to stipulate for liquidated damages, and when agreed upon, courts will not inquire whether the actual damage suffered equaled or approximated the agreed amount.'" * * * [ 235 So. 2d 386, 390 .] The only ground that plaintiff relies on herein to reverse the holding of the trial court is that bad faith is a material fact to be considered in awarding attorney's fees, and supporting this position are the cases of Berry v. Ginsburg, 98 So.2d 548 , La.Ap

1970“It is a fixed rule of law that where the parties have the capacity to stipulate for liquidated damages, and when agreed upon, courts will not inquire whether the actual damage suffered equaled or approximated the agreed amount.” Lama v. Manale, 218 La. 511 , 50 So.2d 15 .

1970“It is a fixed rule of law that where the parties have the capacity to stipulate for liquidated damages, and when agreed upon, courts will not inquire whether the actual damage suffered equaled or approximated the agreed amount.” Lama v. Manale, 218 La. 511 , 50 So.2d 15 .

1970Further, in Sullivan v. Diaz, La.App., 145 So.2d 634 (1962), and in Ford v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, La.App., 139 So.2d 798 (1962) it was stated that awards for pain and suffering should not be determined by a fixed standard.

1970Later, the Supreme Court in the case of Lomenick v. Schoeffler, 250 La. 959 , 200 So.2d 127 (1967) rejected the categorization of whiplash injuries and required the Court to consider the specific symptoms of pain and discomfort, their severity, effect, and duration.

1970Later, the Supreme Court in the case of Lomenick v. Schoeffler, 250 La. 959 , 200 So.2d 127 (1967) rejected the categorization of whiplash injuries and required the Court to consider the specific symptoms of pain and discomfort, their severity, effect, and duration.

1970Further, in Sullivan v. Diaz, La.App., 145 So.2d 634 (1962), and in Ford v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, La.App., 139 So.2d 798 (1962) it was stated that awards for pain and suffering should not be determined by a fixed standard.

1963In Succession of Rougon, supra, for instance, our Supreme Court held that provisions of a will in which the words "wish" and "desire" were used were not mere precatory suggestions, but that the bequests expressed in those words were couched in "language ordinarily and usually dispositive." In our opinion the rule which should be applied here was correctly stated in Heikamp v. Succession of Solari, La.App., Orl., 54 So.2d 347 , as follows: "It is our opinion that neither the Ledbetter case nor any other case has laid down, or could lay down, a fixed rule that the word `wish' should always be in

1961In Schwegmann Bros. v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 216 La. 148 , 43 So.2d 248, 255 , 146 A.L.R.2d 680 , the opinion of the court quoted and approved the general rule as to the valid exercise of the police power set forth in Sections 302 and 303 of 11 Amer.Juris., verbo "Constitutional Law," which quotation we repeat as follows: *316 "The fixed rule and basic standard by which the validity of all exercise of the police power is tested is that the police power of the state extends only to such measures as are reasonable, and that all police regulations must be reasonable under

1961In Schwegmann Bros. v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 216 La. 148 , 43 So.2d 248, 255 , 146 A.L.R.2d 680 , the opinion of the court quoted and approved the general rule as to the valid exercise of the police power set forth in Sections 302 and 303 of 11 Amer.Juris., verbo "Constitutional Law," which quotation we repeat as follows: *316 "The fixed rule and basic standard by which the validity of all exercise of the police power is tested is that the police power of the state extends only to such measures as are reasonable, and that all police regulations must be reasonable under

1956The children of the respective marriages have therefore no interest in it. * * * » In support of this statement the court relied on the cases of Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La.Ann. 98 ; Hubbell v. Inkstein, 7 La.Ann. 252 ; Succession of Navarro, 24 La.Ann. 298 , and Jermann v. Tenneas, 39 La.Ann. 1021 , 3 So. 229 , Id., 44 La.Ann. 620 , 11 So. 80 .

1956The children of the respective marriages have therefore no interest in it. * * * » In support of this statement the court relied on the cases of Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La.Ann. 98 ; Hubbell v. Inkstein, 7 La.Ann. 252 ; Succession of Navarro, 24 La.Ann. 298 , and Jermann v. Tenneas, 39 La.Ann. 1021 , 3 So. 229 , Id., 44 La.Ann. 620 , 11 So. 80 .

1956The children of the respective marriages have therefore no interest in it. * * * » In support of this statement the court relied on the cases of Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La.Ann. 98 ; Hubbell v. Inkstein, 7 La.Ann. 252 ; Succession of Navarro, 24 La.Ann. 298 , and Jermann v. Tenneas, 39 La.Ann. 1021 , 3 So. 229 , Id., 44 La.Ann. 620 , 11 So. 80 .