18 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roviaro v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1998“In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639) [(1957)], [which was embraced by our Supreme Court in Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160 ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977),] the United States *331 Supreme Court held that the government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of a confidential informant is limited by the underlying purpose of the privilege itself and ‘the fundamental requirements of fairness.’ Thus, the court concluded that ‘(w)here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an ac 1989The Supreme Court declined to adopt a fixed rule of disclosure, opting instead for a balancing test which would balance ‘the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.’ Id. at 62 . | 1 | 3 |
Lowry v. Cochrangreen2 sentences2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote 2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote | 1 | 1 |
Hunsucker v. Belfordgreen2 sentences2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote 2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote | 1 | 1 |
Clayton v. Lariseygreen2 sentences2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote 2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote | 1 | 1 |
Cline v. McLeodgreen2 sentences2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote 2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Ammonsgreen2 sentences2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote 2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Stategreen2 sentences1998“In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639) [(1957)], [which was embraced by our Supreme Court in Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160 ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977),] the United States *331 Supreme Court held that the government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of a confidential informant is limited by the underlying purpose of the privilege itself and ‘the fundamental requirements of fairness.’ Thus, the court concluded that ‘(w)here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an ac 1998“In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639) [(1957)], [which was embraced by our Supreme Court in Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160 ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977),] the United States *331 Supreme Court held that the government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of a confidential informant is limited by the underlying purpose of the privilege itself and ‘the fundamental requirements of fairness.’ Thus, the court concluded that ‘(w)here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an ac | 1 | 1 |
Halliburton v. Colliergreen2 sentences1988However, where a part of such property may be of greater value than other portions this is not necessarily a fixed rule.” Halliburton v. Collier, 75 Ga. App. 316, 324 ( 43 SE2d 339 ) (1947); accord Woodstock Village v. Fowler, 154 Ga. App. 82 (1) ( 267 SE2d 558 ) (1980). 1988However, where a part of such property may be of greater value than other portions this is not necessarily a fixed rule.” Halliburton v. Collier, 75 Ga. App. 316, 324 ( 43 SE2d 339 ) (1947); accord Woodstock Village v. Fowler, 154 Ga. App. 82 (1) ( 267 SE2d 558 ) (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Woodstock Village v. Fowlergreen2 sentences1988However, where a part of such property may be of greater value than other portions this is not necessarily a fixed rule.” Halliburton v. Collier, 75 Ga. App. 316, 324 ( 43 SE2d 339 ) (1947); accord Woodstock Village v. Fowler, 154 Ga. App. 82 (1) ( 267 SE2d 558 ) (1980). 1988However, where a part of such property may be of greater value than other portions this is not necessarily a fixed rule.” Halliburton v. Collier, 75 Ga. App. 316, 324 ( 43 SE2d 339 ) (1947); accord Woodstock Village v. Fowler, 154 Ga. App. 82 (1) ( 267 SE2d 558 ) (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Milner v. Tylergreen1 sentence1980White v. Adams...” (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, we note that in Milner v. Tyler, 9 Ga. App. 659, 660 ( 71 SE 1123 ), it was held: "There are cases where the apportionment according to relative value is not to be determined by a mere comparison of the number of acres described in the bond for title with the admitted deficiency, though that is the ordinary rule by which the calculation is to be made.” We are persuaded that the trial court in this case erred in inflexibly applying the rule of strict apportionment. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Beasley v. State
neutral
2 sentences2024“It is a fixed rule that the determination of whether a cautionary instruction is to be given generally addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Beasley v. State, 198 Ga. App. 418 ( 401 SE2d 610 ) (1991) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2024“It is a fixed rule that the determination of whether a cautionary instruction is to be given generally addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Beasley v. State, 198 Ga. App. 418 ( 401 SE2d 610 ) (1991) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Alexander v. Harnick
green
2 sentences2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote 2012Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (2009). 11 Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 858 ( 188 SE2d 866 ) (1972) (“The fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so.”). 12 Id. 13 180 Ga. App. 286 ( 349 SE2d 232 ) (1986). 14 Id. at 293 (4) (citations omitted). 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 142 Ga. App. 816 ( 237 SE2d 221 ) (1977). 20 Lowry v. Cochran, 305 Ga. App. 240, 246 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 325 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Sosebee v. State
green
2 sentences1999The victim’s trial testimony in the case sub judice was sufficient under Sosebee v. State, 257 Ga. 298 ( 357 SE2d 562 ), to afford the trial court an opportunity to weigh the indicia of reliability — a finding which is implicit under the trial court’s admission of the victim’s out-of-court statement. 1999The victim’s trial testimony in the case sub judice was sufficient under Sosebee v. State, 257 Ga. 298 ( 357 SE2d 562 ), to afford the trial court an opportunity to weigh the indicia of reliability — a finding which is implicit under the trial court’s admission of the victim’s out-of-court statement. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Thornton v. State
green
2 sentences1998“In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639) [(1957)], [which was embraced by our Supreme Court in Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160 ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977),] the United States *331 Supreme Court held that the government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of a confidential informant is limited by the underlying purpose of the privilege itself and ‘the fundamental requirements of fairness.’ Thus, the court concluded that ‘(w)here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an ac 1998“In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639) [(1957)], [which was embraced by our Supreme Court in Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160 ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977),] the United States *331 Supreme Court held that the government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of a confidential informant is limited by the underlying purpose of the privilege itself and ‘the fundamental requirements of fairness.’ Thus, the court concluded that ‘(w)here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an ac | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Curry
neutral
1 sentence1980White v. Adams...” (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, we note that in Milner v. Tyler, 9 Ga. App. 659, 660 ( 71 SE 1123 ), it was held: "There are cases where the apportionment according to relative value is not to be determined by a mere comparison of the number of acres described in the bond for title with the admitted deficiency, though that is the ordinary rule by which the calculation is to be made.” We are persuaded that the trial court in this case erred in inflexibly applying the rule of strict apportionment. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Wright v. Bales
green
2 sentences1950In Wright v. Bales, 62 Ga. App. 328 ( 7 S. E. 2d, 765 ), it is stated: “It cannot be affirmed as a fixed rule that one crossing a street or highway diagonally must turn and look back. 1950In Wright v. Bales, 62 Ga. App. 328 ( 7 S. E. 2d, 765 ), it is stated: “It cannot be affirmed as a fixed rule that one crossing a street or highway diagonally must turn and look back. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
White v. Adams
green
1 sentence1947White v. Adams, 7 Ga. App. 764 ( 68 S. E. 271 ). | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Chapman v. State
neutral
1 sentence1947White v. Adams, 7 Ga. App. 764 ( 68 S. E. 271 ). | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co.
green
1 sentence1936In this connection it would seem not to be inappropriate to quote the language of Mr. Justice Bradley in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (21 L. ed. 394), as follows: “The right to choose one’s calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the object of' government to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a man’s property right.” That an injunction is the appropriate remedy for any encroachment on a property right in the nature of a franchise is stated as a fixed principle in 5 Pomeroy’s Eq. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Cason v. State
neutral
1 sentence1934It was held in Zipperer v. Helmly, 148 Ga. 480 ( 97 S. E. 74 ): “Under proper construction of the order allowing the plaintiff thirty days in which to present to the court an amendment of his petition, it was within the power of the court, to allow an amendment which had been filed, within the thirty days so allowed, in the office of the clerk of the court where the case was pending, but had not been presented to the judge within the thirty days.” In that case the amendment was filed within the time required by the judge’s order, as in Richards v. Shields, Johnson v. Vassar , and Clark v. Gans | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Zipperer v. Helmnly
green
1 sentence1934It was held in Zipperer v. Helmly, 148 Ga. 480 ( 97 S. E. 74 ): “Under proper construction of the order allowing the plaintiff thirty days in which to present to the court an amendment of his petition, it was within the power of the court, to allow an amendment which had been filed, within the thirty days so allowed, in the office of the clerk of the court where the case was pending, but had not been presented to the judge within the thirty days.” In that case the amendment was filed within the time required by the judge’s order, as in Richards v. Shields, Johnson v. Vassar , and Clark v. Gans | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Clark v. Ganson
green
1 sentence1934It was held in Zipperer v. Helmly, 148 Ga. 480 ( 97 S. E. 74 ): “Under proper construction of the order allowing the plaintiff thirty days in which to present to the court an amendment of his petition, it was within the power of the court, to allow an amendment which had been filed, within the thirty days so allowed, in the office of the clerk of the court where the case was pending, but had not been presented to the judge within the thirty days.” In that case the amendment was filed within the time required by the judge’s order, as in Richards v. Shields, Johnson v. Vassar , and Clark v. Gans | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Smith v. Duggan
green
2 sentences1934Smith v. Duggan, 153 Ga. 463 ( 112 S. E. 458 ); Rhodes v. Jernigan, 155 Ga. 523 ( 117 S. E. 432 ). 1934Smith v. Duggan, 153 Ga. 463 ( 112 S. E. 458 ); Rhodes v. Jernigan, 155 Ga. 523 ( 117 S. E. 432 ). | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Rhodes v. Jernigan
green
2 sentences1934Smith v. Duggan, 153 Ga. 463 ( 112 S. E. 458 ); Rhodes v. Jernigan, 155 Ga. 523 ( 117 S. E. 432 ). 1934Smith v. Duggan, 153 Ga. 463 ( 112 S. E. 458 ); Rhodes v. Jernigan, 155 Ga. 523 ( 117 S. E. 432 ). | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Felton v. Highlands Hotel Co.
green
2 sentences1934"It is a fixed rule of jurisprudence that a general demurrer is insufficient to dismiss a- cause of action if any portion of the petition affords good ground for recovery in behalf of the plaintiff.” Felton v. Highlands Hotel Co., 165 Ga. 598 ( 141 S. E. 793 , 57 A. L. 1934"It is a fixed rule of jurisprudence that a general demurrer is insufficient to dismiss a- cause of action if any portion of the petition affords good ground for recovery in behalf of the plaintiff.” Felton v. Highlands Hotel Co., 165 Ga. 598 ( 141 S. E. 793 , 57 A. L. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
The Lottawanna
green
1 sentence1929It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States.” The Lottawanna, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 558 (22 L. ed. 654). | 1 | 1929–1929 |
French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.
green
1 sentence1922Co., 181 U. S. 324 (21 Sup. Ct. 625, 45 L ed. 879). | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Sawyer v. City of Blakely
green
2 sentences1915Sawyer v. City of Blakely, 2 Ga. App. 159 ( 58 S. E. 399 ); Simpkins v. Hester, 3 Ga. App. 160 ( 59 S. E. 322 ); Robertson v. Russell, 13 Ga. App. 27 ( 78 S. E. 682 ). 1915Sawyer v. City of Blakely, 2 Ga. App. 159 ( 58 S. E. 399 ); Simpkins v. Hester, 3 Ga. App. 160 ( 59 S. E. 322 ); Robertson v. Russell, 13 Ga. App. 27 ( 78 S. E. 682 ). | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Cochran v. Holleman neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Simpkins & Co. v. Hester
neutral
1 sentence1915Sawyer v. City of Blakely, 2 Ga. App. 159 ( 58 S. E. 399 ); Simpkins v. Hester, 3 Ga. App. 160 ( 59 S. E. 322 ); Robertson v. Russell, 13 Ga. App. 27 ( 78 S. E. 682 ). | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Youmans v. State green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Robertson v. Russell green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Southern Railway Co. v. Fleming
green
1 sentence1915Sawyer v. City of Blakely, 2 Ga. App. 159 ( 58 S. E. 399 ); Simpkins v. Hester, 3 Ga. App. 160 ( 59 S. E. 322 ); Robertson v. Russell, 13 Ga. App. 27 ( 78 S. E. 682 ). | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.