fixed rule in Texas

2006It is simply an addition of a mathematical formula to the filed schedules of the Company under which the rates and charges fluctuate as the wholesale cost of gas to the Company fluctuates." City of Norfolk , 90 S.E.2d at 148 ; see also Louisiana Pub.

2006It is simply an addition of a mathematical formula to the filed schedules of the Company under which the rates and charges fluctuate as the wholesale cost of gas to the Company fluctuates.” City of Norfolk, 90 S.E.2d at 148 ; see also Louisiana Pub.

1937It is also a fixed rule that a court of equity will not interfere to set aside a judgment, and grant a new trial, except upon a showing of strict diligence in the prosecution of the cause, and upon proof that, after doing all that such diligence required to be done, he had been deprived, by fraud, accident, mistake, or other uncontrollable circumstance, of the opportunity of properly presenting his case upon the, trial.” Brownson et al. v. Reynolds et al., 77 Tex. 254 , 13 S.W. 986 , 987.

1926In Brownson v. Reynolds, 77 Tex. 254 , 13 S.W. 986 , which was a suit to set aside a judgment rendered in a former suit, the following was said: "It is also a fixed rule that a court of equity will not interfere to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial except upon a showing of strict diligence in the presentation of the cause, and upon proof that, after doing all that such diligence required to be done, he had been deprived by fraud, accident, mistake, or other uncontrollable circumstance of the opportunity of properly presenting his case upon the trial.

1986See also Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Zamora v. State, 449 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1969); DuPont v. State, 641 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet. ref’d).

1982Brown v. State, supra; Zamora v. State, 449 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Bundren v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 45 , 211 S.W.2d 197 (1948).

1937It is also a fixed rule that a court of equity will not interfere to set aside a judgment, and grant a new trial, except upon a showing of strict diligence in the prosecution of the cause, and upon proof that, after doing all that such diligence required to be done, he had been deprived, by fraud, accident, mistake, or other uncontrollable circumstance, of the opportunity of properly presenting his case upon the, trial.” Brownson et al. v. Reynolds et al., 77 Tex. 254 , 13 S.W. 986 , 987.

1926In Brownson v. Reynolds, 77 Tex. 254 , 13 S.W. 986 , which was a suit to set aside a judgment rendered in a former suit, the following was said: "It is also a fixed rule that a court of equity will not interfere to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial except upon a showing of strict diligence in the presentation of the cause, and upon proof that, after doing all that such diligence required to be done, he had been deprived by fraud, accident, mistake, or other uncontrollable circumstance of the opportunity of properly presenting his case upon the trial.

1930It is the fixed rule of this court that, unless an application for leave to file a second motion for rehearing sets up as ground therefor some matter such as is comprehended by our opinion in Hickman v. State, 93 Tex. Cr.

1929It is the fixed rule of this court that unless an application for leave to file a second motion for rehearing sets up as ground therefor some matter such as is comprehended by our opinion in Hickman v. State, 93 Texas Crim.

1926Franklin v. Coffee, 18 Tex. 413 , 70 Am.

1924Franklin v. Coffee, 18 Tex. 413 , 70 Am.

1921In the case of Hickman v. Swain, 210 S. W. 548 , this court reversed a judgment of the trial court denying to plaintiff relief from a judgment obtained at a former term of the court, and said: “The motion to vacate the order of dismissal is in the nature of a bill in equity, and, as said by our Supreme Court in the case of Brownson v. Reynolds, 77 Tex. 256 , 13 S. W. 986 , which was likewise a suit to set aside a judgment rendered at a former term of court: ‘It is also a fixed rule that a court of equity will not interfere to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial except upon a showing of

1919The motion for reinstatement was replete with allegations showing that plaintiff had a meritorious suit against all of the defendants, and upon the hearing of the motion to reinstate the case those allegations were supported by proof. [5] The motion to vacate the order of dismissal is in the nature of a bill in equity, and as said by our Supreme Court in the case of Brownson v. Beynolds, 77 Tex. 256 , 13 S. W. 986 , which was likewise a suit to 'set aside a judgment rendered at a former term of court: “It is also a fixed rule that a court of equity will not interfere to set aside a judgment an

1920Stone v. Sledge, 87 Tex. 49 , 26 S. W. 1068 , 47 Am.

1920Stone v. Sledge, 87 Tex. 49 , 26 S. W. 1068 , 47 Am.

2024Although there is not a fixed standard for measuring damages for good will, “opinions as to the amount of good will damages must at least ‘be based on objective facts, figures or data from which the loss of good[]will may be ascertained.’” Id. (quoting Auburn Invs., Inc. v. Lyda Swinerton Builder, Inc., No. 04-08-00067-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5667 , at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 30, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

2018However, the nature of good will "preclude[s] a fixed standard by which its value might be determined in every case." Taormina , 355 S.W.2d at 575 .

1999For instance, in Perlman v. Pioneer Limited Partnership, 918 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir.1990), the court viewed the concept as "not a fixed rule of law that regulates the content of all force majeure clauses, but instead [as] a term that describes a particular type of event ... which may excuse performance....” Id. at 1248 n. 5.

1999For instance, in Perlman v. Pioneer Limited Partnership, 918 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir.1990), the court viewed the concept as "not a fixed rule of law that regulates the content of all force majeure clauses, but instead [as] a term that describes a particular type of event ... which may excuse performance....” Id. at 1248 n. 5.

1986See also Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Zamora v. State, 449 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1969); DuPont v. State, 641 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet. ref’d).

1966Civil Statutes of Texas, provides that, ‘Every gift, conveyance, assignment, or transfer of, or charge upon, any estate real or personal, * * * given with intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers, or other persons of or from what they are, or may be, lawfully entitled to, shall, as to such creditors, purchasers or other persons, their representatives or assigns, be void.’ In interpreting that article, the Supreme Court of Texas in Biccochi v. Casey-Swasey, 91 Tex. 259 , 42 S.W. 963, 964 , said: “ ‘Under this statute we do not consider it material to determine whether the wife c

1966Civil Statutes of Texas, provides that, ‘Every gift, conveyance, assignment, or transfer of, or charge upon, any estate real or personal, * * * given with intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers, or other persons of or from what they are, or may be, lawfully entitled to, shall, as to such creditors, purchasers or other persons, their representatives or assigns, be void.’ In interpreting that article, the Supreme Court of Texas in Biccochi v. Casey-Swasey, 91 Tex. 259 , 42 S.W. 963, 964 , said: “ ‘Under this statute we do not consider it material to determine whether the wife c

1956The element of rule was also involved in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 297 S.W. 267 .

1956The element of rule was also involved in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 297 S.W. 267 .

1956Co. v. Gorman, 237 Ala. 146 , 185 So. 743 , where the defendant company had put in force a fixed rule of practice that its messengers wear uniforms only when on duty, and the boy who collided with the plaintiff did have on a uniform.

1956Co. v. Gorman, 237 Ala. 146 , 185 So. 743 , where the defendant company had put in force a fixed rule of practice that its messengers wear uniforms only when on duty, and the boy who collided with the plaintiff did have on a uniform.

1941What was said by Chief Justice Gaines in Baker v. Smelser, 88 Tex. 26 , 29 S.W. 377, 378 , 33 L.R.A. 163 , is very much in point here, to-wit: “The rate of interest established by law, being a fixed standard of the value of the use of money, is adopted by the court as the measure of that damage in such a case.

1941What was said by Chief Justice Gaines in Baker v. Smelser, 88 Tex. 26 , 29 S.W. 377, 378 , 33 L.R.A. 163 , is very much in point here, to-wit: “The rate of interest established by law, being a fixed standard of the value of the use of money, is adopted by the court as the measure of that damage in such a case.

1940Many Texas authorities so holding are collated in Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Bryan, 101 S. W. (2d) 895 . *490 The above is a rule of equity, and not a fixed rule of universal application.

1935The rule regarding identification such as here involved, seems more in line with what we said in Hodges v. State, 71 S. W. (2d) 520 .

1932Miller v. State, 112 Texas Crim.

1928The Supreme Court of Michigan, Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Company, 191 Mich. 122 , 157 N. W. 437 , and the Court of Appeals of New York, Littler v. George A. Fuller Co., 223 N. Y. 369 , 119 N. E. 554 , announced the same holding under similar facts, in construing statutes very similar to our own.

1928The Supreme Court of Michigan, Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Company, 191 Mich. 122 , 157 N. W. 437 , and the Court of Appeals of New York, Littler v. George A. Fuller Co., 223 N. Y. 369 , 119 N. E. 554 , announced the same holding under similar facts, in construing statutes very similar to our own.

1928The Supreme Court of Michigan, Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Company, 191 Mich. 122 , 157 N. W. 437 , and the Court of Appeals of New York, Littler v. George A. Fuller Co., 223 N. Y. 369 , 119 N. E. 554 , announced the same holding under similar facts, in construing statutes very similar to our own.

1928The Supreme Court of Michigan, Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Company, 191 Mich. 122 , 157 N. W. 437 , and the Court of Appeals of New York, Littler v. George A. Fuller Co., 223 N. Y. 369 , 119 N. E. 554 , announced the same holding under similar facts, in construing statutes very similar to our own.

1924L., 214, 14 Cyc., 581, and it was the rules of these latter forums our early courts "followed in divorce matters, Wright v. Wright 6 Texas, 3 , Nogees v. Nogees, 7 Texas,. 538, but in our jurisprudence, partly because of the disqualification of all parties to suits arising from interest, and because of a consideration of public policy which looked askance at divorces, and sought to preserve the marriage relation against rupture and dissolution, it early became a fixed rule of the common law as existing in, and adapted to the changed conditions of' the American states, that neither husband nor

1922Welder v. Hunt, 34 Tex. 47 ; Buford v. Gray, 51 Tex. 336 ; Ayers v. Harris, 64 Tex. 302 .