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10 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1901–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Osborne v. McMastersgreen2 sentences2002Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 105 , 41 N.W. 543, 543-44 (1889). 11 . 2002Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 105 , 41 N.W. 543, 543-44 (1889). 11 . | 1 | 1 |
Regie De L'Assurance Automobile Du Quebec v. Jensengreen1 sentence1994“The doctrine of subrogation is not a fixed rule of law or of equity.” Regie de l'Assurance Auto. du Quebec v. Jensen, 389 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn.App.1986), rev’d on other grounds, 399 N.W.2d 85 (Minn.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Breen v. Maynegreen2 sentences1937The court in Breen v. Mayne, 141 Iowa, 399, 403, 404 , 118 N. W. 441, 443 , said: “The only fixed rule regarding the manner of the exercise of an option under a contract'granting it, is to discover from the language of the instrument, construed in the light of competent parol testimony, the intent of the parties with reference thereto. 1937The court in Breen v. Mayne, 141 Iowa, 399, 403, 404 , 118 N. W. 441, 443 , said: “The only fixed rule regarding the manner of the exercise of an option under a contract'granting it, is to discover from the language of the instrument, construed in the light of competent parol testimony, the intent of the parties with reference thereto. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Regie De L'Assurance Automobile Du Quebec v. Jensen
green
1 sentence1994“The doctrine of subrogation is not a fixed rule of law or of equity.” Regie de l'Assurance Auto. du Quebec v. Jensen, 389 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn.App.1986), rev’d on other grounds, 399 N.W.2d 85 (Minn.1987). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Kronzer v. First Nat. Bank of Minneapolis
green
2 sentences1977Bank of Minneapolis, 305 Minn. 415 , 235 N.W.2d 187 (1975); Restatement, Torts 2d § 286. 1977Bank of Minneapolis, 305 Minn. 415 , 235 N.W.2d 187 (1975); Restatement, Torts 2d § 286. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Teas v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1968Co. 244 Minn. 427 , 70 N. W. (2d) 358 , which grew out of an accident occurring on a street near the University of Minnesota football stadium in a congested movement of traffic resulting from the activities in the stadium, this court saying ( 244 Minn. 433 , 70 N. W. [2d] 362): “* * * Just how close an automobile may be followed and what precautions a driver must take in the exercise of due care to avoid colliding with the automobile ahead * * * cannot be stated in a fixed rule. 1968Co. 244 Minn. 427 , 70 N. W. (2d) 358 , which grew out of an accident occurring on a street near the University of Minnesota football stadium in a congested movement of traffic resulting from the activities in the stadium, this court saying ( 244 Minn. 433 , 70 N. W. [2d] 362): “* * * Just how close an automobile may be followed and what precautions a driver must take in the exercise of due care to avoid colliding with the automobile ahead * * * cannot be stated in a fixed rule. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Ryan v. Griffin
green
2 sentences1968In each case, except where reasonable minds may not differ, what due care requires and whether it has been exercised is for the jury.” See, Ryan v. Griffin, 241 Minn. 91, 94 , 62 N. W. (2d) 504, 507 . 1968In each case, except where reasonable minds may not differ, what due care requires and whether it has been exercised is for the jury.” See, Ryan v. Griffin, 241 Minn. 91, 94 , 62 N. W. (2d) 504, 507 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Schutt v. Adair
neutral
2 sentences1947It is immaterial whether the duty is one imposed by the rule of common law requiring the exercise of ordinary care not to injure another, or is imposed by a statute designed for the protection of others. * * * The only difference is that in the one case the measure of legal duty is to be determined upon common-law principles, while in the other the statute fixes it, so that the violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence, or, in other words, negligence per se * * * All that the statute does is to establish a fixed standard by which the fact of negligence may be deter 1947It is immaterial whether the duty is one imposed by the rule of common law requiring the exercise of ordinary care not to injure another, or is imposed by a statute designed for the protection of others. * * * The only difference is that in the one case the measure of legal duty is to be determined upon common-law principles, while in the other the statute fixes it, so that the violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence, or, in other words, negligence per se * * * All that the statute does is to establish a fixed standard by which the fact of negligence may be deter | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Schaar v. Conforth
green
2 sentences1947It is immaterial whether the duty is one imposed by the rule of common law requiring the exercise of ordinary care not to injure another, or is imposed by a statute designed for the protection of others. * * * The only difference is that in the one case the measure of legal duty is to be determined upon common-law principles, while in the other the statute fixes it, so that the violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence, or, in other words, negligence per se * * * All that the statute does is to establish a fixed standard by which the fact of negligence may be deter 1947It is immaterial whether the duty is one imposed by the rule of common law requiring the exercise of ordinary care not to injure another, or is imposed by a statute designed for the protection of others. * * * The only difference is that in the one case the measure of legal duty is to be determined upon common-law principles, while in the other the statute fixes it, so that the violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence, or, in other words, negligence per se * * * All that the statute does is to establish a fixed standard by which the fact of negligence may be deter | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Craig v. Pennsylvania Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1925Co. 243 Pa. St. 455, 90 Atl. 135 , in which it was held that where the view of the track is obstructed it is the duty of the approaching automobilist to stop at a point where looking will be effective. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Terryberry v. Woods
neutral
1 sentence1908Terryberry v. Woods, 69 Vt. 94 , 37 Atl. 246 ; Rapp v. Sarpy, 71 Neb. 382 , 98 N. W. 1042 , 102 N. W. 242 . | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Rapp v. Sarpy County
neutral
2 sentences1908Terryberry v. Woods, 69 Vt. 94 , 37 Atl. 246 ; Rapp v. Sarpy, 71 Neb. 382 , 98 N. W. 1042 , 102 N. W. 242 . 1908Terryberry v. Woods, 69 Vt. 94 , 37 Atl. 246 ; Rapp v. Sarpy, 71 Neb. 382 , 98 N. W. 1042 , 102 N. W. 242 . | 1 | 1908–1908 |
State v. Brimmer
neutral
1 sentence1908Terryberry v. Woods, 69 Vt. 94 , 37 Atl. 246 ; Rapp v. Sarpy, 71 Neb. 382 , 98 N. W. 1042 , 102 N. W. 242 . | 1 | 1908–1908 |
State ex rel. Scotten v. Brill
green
2 sentences1901To the same effect see State v. Brill, 58 Minn. 152 , 59 N. W. 989 . 1901To the same effect see State v. Brill, 58 Minn. 152 , 59 N. W. 989 . | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Koslowski v. Thayer
neutral
2 sentences1901But in State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 66 Minn. 217 , 68 N. W. 973 , this assertion was criticized, and it was said that “The fourth subdivision has reference more particularly to cases in which there is no- rule for estimating the amount of damages, except that found in the discretion of the jury, as where the damages are for personal injury,” and, further, “The Nelson case has never been followed, and, in our opinion, should not be, even in cases where the ■ fourth subdivision more properly applies, to wit, cases where expert evidence as to value or amount of damages is incompetent.” The sta 1901State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 66 Minn. 217 , 68 N. W. 973 , was an action in conversion, and the plaintiff secured a verdict for $9,000. | 1 | 1901–1901 |
State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co.
neutral
2 sentences1901But in State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 66 Minn. 217 , 68 N. W. 973 , this assertion was criticized, and it was said that “The fourth subdivision has reference more particularly to cases in which there is no- rule for estimating the amount of damages, except that found in the discretion of the jury, as where the damages are for personal injury,” and, further, “The Nelson case has never been followed, and, in our opinion, should not be, even in cases where the ■ fourth subdivision more properly applies, to wit, cases where expert evidence as to value or amount of damages is incompetent.” The sta 1901State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 66 Minn. 217 , 68 N. W. 973 , was an action in conversion, and the plaintiff secured a verdict for $9,000. | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.