fixed rule in Illinois

2011There is a diversity of rule in different jurisdictions as to the time when a taking for public use occurs, but in this State that question has passed beyond the stage of discussion and has become a fixed rule, which is, that the compensation is to be determined as of the date of filing the petition and not at the time of the trial." Farwell, 286 Ill. at 417 , 121 N.E. 795 .

2011There is a diversity of rule in different jurisdictions as to the time when a taking for public use occurs, but in this State that question has passed beyond the stage of discussion and has become a fixed rule, which is, that the compensation is to be determined as of the date of filing the petition and not at the time of the trial." Farwell, 286 Ill. at 417 , 121 N.E. 795 .

2022Nemeth, 125 Ill.

2022Nemeth, 125 Ill.

2007Beach, 118 Ill. 2d at 10 .

2007Beach, 118 Ill. 2d at 10 .

1973People v. Smith, 105 Ill.App.2d 14, 18 , 245 N.E.2d 13 (1969). [2, 3] The granting of a continuance is also a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this discretion will not be interfered with on review unless it has been clearly abused.

1973People v. Smith, 105 Ill.App.2d 14, 18 , 245 N.E.2d 13 (1969). [2, 3] The granting of a continuance is also a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this discretion will not be interfered with on review unless it has been clearly abused.

1973(People v, Tomaszek, 54 Ill.App.2d 254 , 204 N.E.2d 30 (1964).) The standard of proof at a hearing to determine whether probation should be terminated is one of the preponderance of the evidence, not the fixed standard of reasonable doubt applied to a finding of guilty in an actual criminal trial.

1973(People v, Tomaszek, 54 Ill.App.2d 254 , 204 N.E.2d 30 (1964).) The standard of proof at a hearing to determine whether probation should be terminated is one of the preponderance of the evidence, not the fixed standard of reasonable doubt applied to a finding of guilty in an actual criminal trial.

1961The use of a mathematical formula for "purely illustrative purposes" was also permitted in Boutang v. Twin City Bus Co., 284 Minn. 240 , 80 N.W.2d 30, 39 .

1961The use of a mathematical formula for “purely illustrative purposes” was also permitted in Boutang v. Twin City Bus Co., 284 Minn. 240 , 80 N.W.2d 30, 39 .

1953(Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 3, p. 1167; Story’s Equity, vol. 2, p. 1101; Smith v. Smith, 174 Ill. 52 .) In partition proceedings where the real estate is sold because not susceptible of division, the proceeds of the sale are impressed with the character of the real estate and divided among the parties according to their respective interests in the land.

1944(Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 3, p. 1167; Story’s Equity, vol. 2, p. 1101; Smith v. Smith, 174 Ill. 52 .) In partition proceedings where the real estate is sold because not susceptible of division, the proceeds of the sale are impressed with the character of the real estate and divided among the parties according to their respective interests in the land.

1932It is likewise the rule that if the distribution of the estate devised is not deferred for some reason personal to the devisee but merely because the testator desires to appropriate the subject matter of the devise to the use and benefit of another for and during the natural life of the latter, the vesting of the gift by remainder- will not be postponed but will occur at once, the right of enjoyment only being deferred.” (Citing, among others, the leading case of Knight v. Pottgieser, 176 Ill. 368 .) In that case it appears that by the will of Pottgieser, Sr., he devised a life estate in certa

1910In the case of Knight v. Pottgieser, 176 Ill. 368 , the Supreme Court of this state in construing a will almost identical with the one at bar says: “It is not the policy of our law to favor the abeyance of estates, and for this reason it long ago became a fixed rule to be observed in the construction of wills in the courts of America and England, that estates should be deemed to vest upon the death of the testator unless very clear words were found in the will evincing that it was the manifest intention of the testator that the estate should not vest except on the happening of a certain contin

1923Illinois Iron & Metal Co. v. Weber, 196 Ill. 526 ; Burke v. Waterman, 187 Ill.

1906Children who have arrived at sufficient age to be capable of exercising some degree of care for their own safety must exercise the ordinary and reasonable care which ought to be expected of children of like age, capacity, intelligence and experience, (1 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 309; Illinois Iron and Metal Co. v. Weber, 196 Ill. 526 .) In this case there was no evidence to take the deceased out of the ordinary class of boys of his age in respect to capacity, intelligence or experience, and the omission of some of the elements to be considered may not have been of much importance.

2022The amount of evidence required to rebut the presumption is not determined by a fixed rule, but where, for example, a strong presumption arises, a party may have to respond with substantial - 23 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210053 evidence.

1987It may mean children or, where there are no children, it may mean some other class of heirs *** if the context of the entire will plainly shows such to have been the intention of the testator.” (Emphasis added.) (Stites v. Gray (1955), 4 Ill. 2d 510, 513 .) A determination of the class of heirs, therefore, is governed by the settlor’s or testator’s intention rather than by a fixed rule of law.

1979(Rosenthal v. First National Bank (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 266, 276 .) Further, “[t]he intention of the testator is to be ascertained by examining the entire will and by giving to the words employed their plain and ordinary meanings.” (Feder v. Luster (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 6, 11 .) Although, because of the record made by the plaintiff, we do not have the entire will to construe, it is possible to construe the intent of the testator from the plain language used in Article Four.

1979(Rosenthal v. First National Bank (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 266, 276 .) Further, “[t]he intention of the testator is to be ascertained by examining the entire will and by giving to the words employed their plain and ordinary meanings.” (Feder v. Luster (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 6, 11 .) Although, because of the record made by the plaintiff, we do not have the entire will to construe, it is possible to construe the intent of the testator from the plain language used in Article Four.

1973Defendant, relying upon Roviaro and People v. Williams, 40 Ill.2d 367 , contends that the circumstances require that the identities of the informer or “special employee” be disclosed.

1973Defendant, relying upon Roviaro and People v. Williams, 40 Ill.2d 367 , contends that the circumstances require that the identities of the informer or "special employee" be disclosed.

1956(In re Veach, 1 Ill.2d 264 .) Courts, however, are reluctant to expound a fixed rule of what constitutes solicitation of legal business to warrant disbarment or suspension.

1953The same question was presented to the Supreme Court in the case of Lewis v. Hill, 387 Ill. 542 , at page 547 and the court uses the following language: “Where land is sold by an order of court for any purpose, it is a fixed principle upon which the court always proceeds that the character of the property shall be changed only so far as may be necessary to accomplish the particular purpose.

1945Gill v. Schweitzer, 366 Ill. 568 , this court approved a levy of 11 per cent for loss and cost, based upon the showing in that case that the average tax delinquency for the preceding seven years, ending with the year 1934, was 24.64 percent, this fixed a standard for the ratio between the percentage of tax delinquencies and the percentage levied for loss and cost.

1945The facts in this case are quite similar to the facts in Lasdon v. Hallihan, 377 Ill. 187 .

1945In Comstock v. Cover, 35 Ill. 470, 478 , the court said in the opinion: “The doctrine is, where a statute uses language of doubtful import, acting under it for a long course of years in one way, may well give an interpretation to that obscure meaning, • and reduce that uncertainty to a fixed rule»” See also People v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 153 Ill. 25 and Nye v. Foreman, 215 Ill. 285 .

1945In Comstock v. Cover, 35 Ill. 470, 478 , the court said in the opinion: “The doctrine is, where a statute uses language of doubtful import, acting under it for a long course of years in one way, may well give an interpretation to that obscure meaning, • and reduce that uncertainty to a fixed rule»” See also People v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 153 Ill. 25 and Nye v. Foreman, 215 Ill. 285 .

1945In Comstock v. Cover, 35 Ill. 470, 478 , the court said in the opinion: “The doctrine is, where a statute uses language of doubtful import, acting under it for a long course of years in one way, may well give an interpretation to that obscure meaning, • and reduce that uncertainty to a fixed rule»” See also People v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 153 Ill. 25 and Nye v. Foreman, 215 Ill. 285 .

1944We think the distinction running through all of the cases is pointed out in Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 77 , 186 S. W. 919 , where agents or runners are deemed as persons stirring up strife or litigation for a stipulated consideration or a contingent fee.

1944We think the distinction running through all of the cases is pointed out in Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 77 , 186 S. W. 919 , where agents or runners are deemed as persons stirring up strife or litigation for a stipulated consideration or a contingent fee.

1932It is proper to take into consideration the established rules for the construction of wills and determine whether they apply to the terms of the will under consideration, if the meaning of the will is uncertain owing to the language used by the testator; but such rules “yield to the intention of the testator plainly expressed.” O’Hare v. Johnston, 273 Ill. 458 ; Walker v. Walker, 283 Ill. 11 .

1932It is proper to take into consideration the established rules for the construction of wills and determine whether they apply to the terms of the will under consideration, if the meaning of the will is uncertain owing to the language used by the testator; but such rules “yield to the intention of the testator plainly expressed.” O’Hare v. Johnston, 273 Ill. 458 ; Walker v. Walker, 283 Ill. 11 .

1932While it is true that a court, in construing a will, should ascertain the intention of the testator from the provisions of the will and give that intention effect unless prevented by some settled rule of law, and while it is also true that the construction adopted under similar wills in adjudicated cases is not necessarily controlling (as the intention of the testator is the thing sought), yet, as said in Dustin v. Brown, 297 Ill. 499, 508 , “unless there be in the language something to suggest a different construction that generally adopted should be adhered to.” In the Dustin .case it is als

1924In Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425 , we said with respect to the legislative power of classification: “Its classification of the objects of legislation is not required to be scientific, logical or consistent if it is reasonably adapted to secure the purpose for which it is intended and is not purely arbitrary.

1924(Carpenter v. VanOlinder, 127 Ill. 42 .) The testator having a right to dispose of his property by will may devise it according to his intention, provided such intention is not contrary to a fixed rule of law, such as the rule against perpetuities or the rule in Shelley's case.

1923Illinois Iron & Metal Co. v. Weber, 196 Ill. 526 ; Burke v. Waterman, 187 Ill.