fixed rule in West Virginia

1961In McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588 , 104 So.2d 315 , in approving an argument of *34 counsel in which a mathematical or per diem formula was used in the trial of a case in which a jury returned a verdict for $50,000.00, the opinion contains this language: "* * * counsel may, in his argument, state or comment on all proper inferences from the evidence and may draw conclusions from the evidence based on his own reasoning.

1961In McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588 , 104 So.2d 315 , in approving an argument of *34 counsel in which a mathematical or per diem formula was used in the trial of a case in which a jury returned a verdict for $50,000.00, the opinion contains this language: "* * * counsel may, in his argument, state or comment on all proper inferences from the evidence and may draw conclusions from the evidence based on his own reasoning.

1932Co. , 55 W.

1932Co., 55 W.

1920Judy v. Lashley. 50 W.

1911Irwin v. Zane, 15 W.

1905Findley v. Smith, 42 W.

1900Lowe v. Settle, 22 W.

1888In Ayers v. Watson, 113 U. S. 594 , 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641, the court, following the Texas decisions, in which state the land in controversy lay, held that, “ in the location of lands described in a grant, course controls distance, and distance controls quantity.” This seems to be the rule in the Texas courts, but I have found no decision in any other State which holds the doctrine that it is a fixed rule that courses should control distances.

1886Similar views as to the verity of a record of a court of general jurisdiction, it would seem, are held in Missouri (Howard v. Thornton, 50 Mo. 291 ); and holding such views, they seem to have followed them to their natural conclusion, that the certificate of an acknowledgment by a married woman of a deed made by a proper officer is never conclusive of any of the facts stated in it, but is only prima facie true and may be contradicted by parol evidence.

1886In sec. 124, he says: “ It was reserved to the court deciding the case of Steen v. Steen, 25 Miss. 513 , to exhibit extraordinary misconception of the law by the use of the following language: ‘It is also a fixed rule on this subject, that the record of a judgment must show upon its face, that the court did have jurisdiction of the person, unless it so appears, the judgment is a nullity, for it will not be presumed, the court had jurisdiction, unless the record shows the fact.’ ” The only wonder is, that with the peculiar^views of the law with reference to the verity of the records of courts o