offense violation in Georgia

2013J., 191 Ga. App. at 715 (3) (“public’s right to know the events and the outcome” of the case weighed in favor of community’s interest in having case transferred).

2013J., 191 Ga. App. at 715 (3) (“public’s right to know the events and the outcome” of the case weighed in favor of community’s interest in having case transferred).

2013N. J., 268 Ga. App. 637, 641 (2) ( 602 SE2d 173 ) (2004) (severity of the offense and fact that juvenile was the instigator of the offense were factors weighing in favor of community’s interest in having case transferred); In the Interest of R.

2013N. J., 268 Ga. App. 637, 641 (2) ( 602 SE2d 173 ) (2004) (severity of the offense and fact that juvenile was the instigator of the offense were factors weighing in favor of community’s interest in having case transferred); In the Interest of R.

2025But we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts.”2 So viewed, the record shows that Maddox was indicted for aggravated child molestation and child molestation, and he pled guilty to two counts of child molestation.3 The only facts proffered by the State during the plea hearing 1 See United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304, 307 ( 51 SCt 113 , 75 LEd 354 ) (1931) (“The distinction that the court during the same term may amend a sentence so as to mitigate the punishment, but not so as to increase it, is not based upon the ground that the court has lost control of t

2025But we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts.”2 So viewed, the record shows that Maddox was indicted for aggravated child molestation and child molestation, and he pled guilty to two counts of child molestation.3 The only facts proffered by the State during the plea hearing 1 See United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304, 307 ( 51 SCt 113 , 75 LEd 354 ) (1931) (“The distinction that the court during the same term may amend a sentence so as to mitigate the punishment, but not so as to increase it, is not based upon the ground that the court has lost control of t

2018See also United States v. Augustin , 661 F.3d 1105 , 1123 (V) (A) (11th Cir. 2011) (" (E)xpert testimony expressly stating an opinion as to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense is barred by rule 704(b).") (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis added); United States v. Kohring , 637 F.3d 895 , 911 (5) (A) (9th Cir. 2011) ("Rule 704(b) applies only to expert witnesses.") (emphasis in original).

2018See also United States v. Augustin , 661 F.3d 1105 , 1123 (V) (A) (11th Cir. 2011) (" (E)xpert testimony expressly stating an opinion as to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense is barred by rule 704(b).") (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis added); United States v. Kohring , 637 F.3d 895 , 911 (5) (A) (9th Cir. 2011) ("Rule 704(b) applies only to expert witnesses.") (emphasis in original).

2016Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 433 ( 349 SE2d 717 ) (1986); see Martin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 483, 496-497 ( 376 SE2d 888 ) (1988) (multiplicitous indictment and multiple punishments in violation of double jeopardy may be addressed and set aside even if not raised on appeal).

2016Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 433 ( 349 SE2d 717 ) (1986); see Martin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 483, 496-497 ( 376 SE2d 888 ) (1988) (multiplicitous indictment and multiple punishments in violation of double jeopardy may be addressed and set aside even if not raised on appeal).

2016Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 433 ( 349 SE2d 717 ) (1986); see Martin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 483, 496-497 ( 376 SE2d 888 ) (1988) (multiplicitous indictment and multiple punishments in violation of double jeopardy may be addressed and set aside even if not raised on appeal).

2016Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 433 ( 349 SE2d 717 ) (1986); see Martin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 483, 496-497 ( 376 SE2d 888 ) (1988) (multiplicitous indictment and multiple punishments in violation of double jeopardy may be addressed and set aside even if not raised on appeal).

2003See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968).

2003See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968).

2002And in Diamond v. State, 151 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) ( 261 SE2d 434 ) (1979), we held that the State Court of Chatham County had jurisdiction to try a misdemeanor traffic offense occurring within the city limits of Savannah, even where the offense was also a violation of a city ordinance.

2002And in Diamond v. State, 151 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) ( 261 SE2d 434 ) (1979), we held that the State Court of Chatham County had jurisdiction to try a misdemeanor traffic offense occurring within the city limits of Savannah, even where the offense was also a violation of a city ordinance.

1997Fricks v. State, 210 Ga. App. 562, 563 (2) ( 436 SE2d 752 ) (1993); Duke v. State, supra at 690.

1997Fricks v. State, 210 Ga. App. 562, 563 (2) ( 436 SE2d 752 ) (1993); Duke v. State, supra at 690.

1992Defendant next claims that she was placed in jeopardy more than once for the same offense in violation of the 1983 Constitution of the State of Georgia. “[I]n a criminal proceeding, the pendency of a former indictment for the same offense is no ground for a plea in abatement or in bar, although the accused may have been arraigned thereon and have filed a plea .... [W]here several indictments for the same offense are pending against the same person, it is immaterial upon which he is first tried.” (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Hobbs v. State, 229 Ga. 556, 557 (2) ( 192 SE2d 903 ) (1972).

1992Defendant next claims that she was placed in jeopardy more than once for the same offense in violation of the 1983 Constitution of the State of Georgia. “[I]n a criminal proceeding, the pendency of a former indictment for the same offense is no ground for a plea in abatement or in bar, although the accused may have been arraigned thereon and have filed a plea .... [W]here several indictments for the same offense are pending against the same person, it is immaterial upon which he is first tried.” (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Hobbs v. State, 229 Ga. 556, 557 (2) ( 192 SE2d 903 ) (1972).

1983See Rachel v. State, 247 Ga. 130, 131 (1) ( 274 SE2d 475 ); Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 754 ( 279 SE2d 678 ).

1983See Rachel v. State, 247 Ga. 130, 131 (1) ( 274 SE2d 475 ); Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 754 ( 279 SE2d 678 ).

1983See Rachel v. State, 247 Ga. 130, 131 (1) ( 274 SE2d 475 ); Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 754 ( 279 SE2d 678 ).

1983See Rachel v. State, 247 Ga. 130, 131 (1) ( 274 SE2d 475 ); Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 754 ( 279 SE2d 678 ).

1981See Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 181 (1) ( 263 SE2d 916 ); Sanders v. State, 246 Ga. 42 (1) ( 268 SE2d 628 ); Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 270 SE2d 201 ).

1981See Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 181 (1) ( 263 SE2d 916 ); Sanders v. State, 246 Ga. 42 (1) ( 268 SE2d 628 ); Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 270 SE2d 201 ).

1981See Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 181 (1) ( 263 SE2d 916 ); Sanders v. State, 246 Ga. 42 (1) ( 268 SE2d 628 ); Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 270 SE2d 201 ).

1981See Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 181 (1) ( 263 SE2d 916 ); Sanders v. State, 246 Ga. 42 (1) ( 268 SE2d 628 ); Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 270 SE2d 201 ).

1981See Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 181 (1) ( 263 SE2d 916 ); Sanders v. State, 246 Ga. 42 (1) ( 268 SE2d 628 ); Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 270 SE2d 201 ).

1981See Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 181 (1) ( 263 SE2d 916 ); Sanders v. State, 246 Ga. 42 (1) ( 268 SE2d 628 ); Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 270 SE2d 201 ).

1980Payne v. State, 151 Ga. App. 165, 166 ( 259 SE2d 168 ); Whatley v. State, 151 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 259 SE2d 175 ).

1980Payne v. State, 151 Ga. App. 165, 166 ( 259 SE2d 168 ); Whatley v. State, 151 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 259 SE2d 175 ).

1980Payne v. State, 151 Ga. App. 165, 166 ( 259 SE2d 168 ); Whatley v. State, 151 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 259 SE2d 175 ).

1980Payne v. State, 151 Ga. App. 165, 166 ( 259 SE2d 168 ); Whatley v. State, 151 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 259 SE2d 175 ).

1978See Richardson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 416, 417 (2) ( 240 SE2d 917 ).

1978See Richardson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 416, 417 (2) ( 240 SE2d 917 ).

1966"While Georgia has no statute requiring the appointment of counsel for an accused unable to employ his own counsel, this court has construed the constitutional provision that every person charged with an offense shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel to mean that, if said accused is not financially able to employ counsel and desires the court to appoint one to represent him, the court must do so, and failure to do so violates his constitutional right to benefit of counsel." Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 436 ( 86 SE2d 511 ).

1966"While Georgia has no statute requiring the appointment of counsel for an accused unable to employ his own counsel, this court has construed the constitutional provision that every person charged with an offense shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel to mean that, if said accused is not financially able to employ counsel and desires the court to appoint one to represent him, the court must do so, and failure to do so violates his constitutional right to benefit of counsel." Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 436 ( 86 SE2d 511 ).