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8 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wintergreen2 sentences2018To be admissible, other-act evidence must "relate to an element of the offense or the defense that is genuinely in issue." Winter , 162 Vt. at 393 , 648 A.2d at 627 (refusing to admit uncharged misconduct evidence as bearing on uncontested issue). 2018To be admissible, other-act evidence must "relate to an element of the offense or the defense that is genuinely in issue." Winter , 162 Vt. at 393 , 648 A.2d at 627 (refusing to admit uncharged misconduct evidence as bearing on uncontested issue). | 3 | 4 |
Hurtado v. Californiagreen2 sentences2014Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (“[B]y barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, . . . [the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause] serves to prevent governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression.” (quotation omitted)); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (explaining that Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government” (quotation omitted)). 2014Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (“[B]y barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, . . . [the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause] serves to prevent governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression.” (quotation omitted)); Hurtado v. California , 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (explaining that Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government” (quotation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Daniels v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2014Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (“[B]y barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, . . . [the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause] serves to prevent governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression.” (quotation omitted)); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (explaining that Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government” (quotation omitted)). 2014Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (“[B]y barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, . . . [the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause] serves to prevent governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression.” (quotation omitted)); Hurtado v. California , 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (explaining that Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government” (quotation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Messiergreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., State v. Messier, 145 Vt. 622, 629 , 497 A.2d 740, 744 (1985) (“When the defendant puts in issue whether he had the mental state required for the offense charged, the State’s burden of proof remains unchanged. 2010See, e.g., State v. Messier, 145 Vt. 622, 629 , 497 A.2d 740, 744 (1985) (“When the defendant puts in issue whether he had the mental state required for the offense charged, the State’s burden of proof remains unchanged. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blackeygreen1 sentence1994Id.; see also State v. Goodrich, 432 A.2d 413, 417 (Me. 1981); State v. Blackey, 623 A.2d 1331, 1333 (N.H. 1993). *394 Recognizing that it could not admit S.M.’s testimony on propensity grounds, the trial court relied on two nonpropensity grounds, motive and common scheme. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Goodrichgreen1 sentence1994Id.; see also State v. Goodrich, 432 A.2d 413, 417 (Me. 1981); State v. Blackey, 623 A.2d 1331, 1333 (N.H. 1993). *394 Recognizing that it could not admit S.M.’s testimony on propensity grounds, the trial court relied on two nonpropensity grounds, motive and common scheme. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. MacHia
green
2 sentences1996To reach this conclusion, he relies mainly on the reasoning of this Court in State v. Machia, 155 Vt. 192 , 583 A.2d 556 (1990), where we concluded that consent to an eleven-person jury did not have to meet the procedural requirements of a jury trial waiver. 1996To reach this conclusion, he relies mainly on the reasoning of this Court in State v. Machia, 155 Vt. 192 , 583 A.2d 556 (1990), where we concluded that consent to an eleven-person jury did not have to meet the procedural requirements of a jury trial waiver. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.