120 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1966–2026 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2026R.C. 2923.03 governs complicity and states, in relevant part: (A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; To prove complicity by aiding and abetting, “the evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and 2020At this point, we do not know whether the state will choose sentencing for aggravated murder or kidnapping, so we review all four convictions for sufficiency. 10 January Term, 2020 (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. {¶ 27} The statute does not define “aid or abet,” but this court has stated that to aid or abet is “ ‘[t]o assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to promote its accomplishment,’ ” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 243 , 754 N.E.2d 796 | 2 | 12 |
State v. Childsgreen2 sentences2025The court explained: “An indictment is multiplicitous where it charges a single offense in multiple counts.” State v. Hendrix, 2012-Ohio-2832 , ¶ 51 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Ross, 2012-Ohio-536, ¶ 69 (9th Dist.). . . . “‘[T]he vice of a multiplicitous indictment lies in the possibility of multiple punishments for a single offense in violation of the cumulative punishment branch of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’” Id., quoting State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 561 , 2000-Ohio 425, 728 N.E.2d 379 (2000). . . . 2025The court explained: “An indictment is multiplicitous where it charges a single offense in multiple counts.” State v. Hendrix, 2012-Ohio-2832 , ¶ 51 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Ross, 2012-Ohio-536, ¶ 69 (9th Dist.). . . . “‘[T]he vice of a multiplicitous indictment lies in the possibility of multiple punishments for a single offense in violation of the cumulative punishment branch of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’” Id., quoting State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 561 , 2000-Ohio 425, 728 N.E.2d 379 (2000). . . . | 2 | 5 |
State v. Gustafsongreen2 sentences2012See State v. Gustafson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432 , 668 N.E.2d 435 , 441” Hines at 123 . 2012See State v. Gustafson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432 , 668 N.E.2d 435 , 441” Hines at 123 . | 2 | 4 |
State v. Rossgreen2 sentences2025The court explained: “An indictment is multiplicitous where it charges a single offense in multiple counts.” State v. Hendrix, 2012-Ohio-2832 , ¶ 51 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Ross, 2012-Ohio-536, ¶ 69 (9th Dist.). . . . “‘[T]he vice of a multiplicitous indictment lies in the possibility of multiple punishments for a single offense in violation of the cumulative punishment branch of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’” Id., quoting State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 561 , 2000-Ohio 425, 728 N.E.2d 379 (2000). . . . 2025The court explained: “An indictment is multiplicitous where it charges a single offense in multiple counts.” State v. Hendrix, 2012-Ohio-2832 , ¶ 51 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Ross, 2012-Ohio-536, ¶ 69 (9th Dist.). . . . “‘[T]he vice of a multiplicitous indictment lies in the possibility of multiple punishments for a single offense in violation of the cumulative punishment branch of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’” Id., quoting State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 561 , 2000-Ohio 425, 728 N.E.2d 379 (2000). . . . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Kiddergreen2 sentences2023“First, the trial court must determine whether the offense on which the instruction is requested is a lesser included offense of the crime charged.” Id., citing Kidder at 280 . 1990R. 31(C), a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense when the trial court determines that: "(1) * * * the offense on which the instruction is requested is necessarily lesser than and included within the charged offense, under the statutory elements test announced in State v. Kidder (1987), 32 Ohio St. 3d 279 , 513 N.E. 2d 311 ; and (2) after examining the facts of the case, ascertains that the jury could reasonably conclude that the evidence supports a conviction for the lesser offense and not the greater." (Citations omitted.) State v. Johnson (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3 | 1 | 11 |
State v. Simsgreen2 sentences2004Ohio's complicity statute provides, in pertinent part: "(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: "(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; "(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; "(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of [R.C. 2923.01 ]; "(4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense." R.C. 2923.03 (A). {¶ 19} "To aid is to assist." State v. Sims (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 56 , 58 . 1994“Complicity” is defined in R.C. 2923.03 as follows: “(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: “(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; “(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; “(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; “(4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense.” In State v. Sims (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 56 , 10 OBR 65, 460 N.E.2d 672 , this court reviewed the standard to convict for complicity. | 1 | 5 |
State v. Leasuregreen2 sentences2025State v. Whitman, 2019-Ohio-2307 ¶30-31 (5th Dist.); State v. Kraus, 2013-Ohio-393 ¶3 (2d Dist.); Parma v. Benedict, 2015-Ohio-3340 ¶13 (8th Dist.); State v. Leasure, 2015-Ohio-5327 ¶36 (4th Dist.); State v. Harris, 2017-Ohio-5594 ¶19 (1st Dist.); State v. Varner 2020-Ohio-1329 ¶ 33 (11th Dist.). {¶ 17} Here, the trial court's judgment entry acknowledges that Mason's prior OVI is an essential element of the offense of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2). 2019No. 15CA3484, 2015-Ohio-5327 , 43 N.E.3d 477 {¶28} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a trial court abuses its discretion when it refuses to accept the offer of defense counsel to stipulate to the fact of a prior conviction for the purpose of establishing the element of an offense that requires proof of a prior conviction. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hoovergreen2 sentences2019A Richland County, Case No. 2019CA0019 and 2019CA0020 10 person’s refusal to take a chemical test is simply an additional element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt along with the person’s previous DUI conviction to distinguish the offense from a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). 123 Ohio St.3d 418 , 2009-Ohio-4993 , 916 N.E.2d 1056, ¶21 [Emphasis added.] We have therefore previously found that a trial court did not err in allowing appellee to present evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction “as such was an element of the offense for which the State bears the burden of proof.” H 2019A Richland County, Case No. 2019CA0019 and 2019CA0020 10 person’s refusal to take a chemical test is simply an additional element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt along with the person’s previous DUI conviction to distinguish the offense from a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). 123 Ohio St.3d 418 , 2009-Ohio-4993 , 916 N.E.2d 1056, ¶21 [Emphasis added.] We have therefore previously found that a trial court did not err in allowing appellee to present evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction “as such was an element of the offense for which the State bears the burden of proof.” H | 1 | 3 |
State v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2024Pickaway No. 11CA22, 2012-Ohio- 3377, ¶ 9, citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶34} Complicity is defined as: (A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. 2024Pickaway No. 11CA22, 2012-Ohio- 3377, ¶ 9, citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶34} Complicity is defined as: (A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. | 1 | 2 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2017That being true, the Court found the use of a juvenile adjudication to enhance the degree of, or the sentence for a subsequent offense a violation of due process under Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). 2017That being true, the Court found the use of a juvenile adjudication to enhance the degree of, or the sentence for a subsequent offense a violation of due process under Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Widnergreen2 sentences2013Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime.” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240 , 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001), syllabus. “ ‘[T]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.’ ” Id. at 243 , quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 , 431 N.E.2d 1025 (1982). {¶25} R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), the trafficking statute at issue, states: “(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following: (1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog[.]” If t 2013Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime.” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240 , 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001), syllabus. “ ‘[T]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.’ ” Id. at 243 , quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 , 431 N.E.2d 1025 (1982). {¶25} R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), the trafficking statute at issue, states: “(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following: (1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog[.]” If t | 1 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2011See State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2001-Ohio-1336 , 754 N.E.2d 796 , syllabus. “‘Participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed.’” State v. Mendoza, 137 Ohio App.3d 336, 342 , 2000-Ohio-1689 , 738 N.E.2d 822 , quoting State v. Stepp, (1997), 117 Ohio App.3d 561, 568-569 , 690 N.E.2d 1342 . 2011State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2001-Ohio-1336 ; State v. Hickman, Stark App. No.2003-CA-00408, 2004-Ohio-6760 . {¶ 22} The bill of particulars filed August 25, 2010 alleged the following: {¶ 23} "COUNT I: JOHN MILLS, DOB: 01/31/1959, SSN: [XXX/XX/XXXX], on or about the 27th day of August, 2009, at the County of Richland, while aiding and abetting another, did cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence, to-wit: Felonious assault, and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 or the Revised Code, | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cartellonegreen1 sentence2026“Aiding and abetting may be shown by both direct and circumstantial evidence, and participation may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed.” State v. Lett, 2005-Ohio-1308, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Cartellone, 3 Ohio App.3d 145, 150 (8th Dist. 1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lettgreen1 sentence2026“Aiding and abetting may be shown by both direct and circumstantial evidence, and participation may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed.” State v. Lett, 2005-Ohio-1308, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Cartellone, 3 Ohio App.3d 145, 150 (8th Dist. 1981). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ladsongreen1 sentence2025“In Ohio, the primary legislative statement on the multiplicity issue is found in R.C. 2941.25, concerning allied offenses of similar import.” Childs at 561 . . . . “[C]ourts cannot apply the allied-offense analysis to specifications because the sentence imposed for a specification is a sentencing enhancement.” State v. Ladson, 2017-Ohio-7715, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.) . . . . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rossgreen1 sentence2025State v. Ross, 2023-Ohio-1185, ¶ 50 (9th Dist.). {¶25} As to complicity, R.C. 2923.03 states, in relevant part: (A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. ... | 1 | 1 |
In re M.D.green1 sentence2025R.C. 2923.03(A)(1) through (4). {¶ 59} The Supreme Court has found that an “offense must actually be committed before a person may be convicted as an accomplice.” In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 151 (1988); see also R.C. 2923.03 1974 Committee Comment to H 511. | 1 | 1 |
| Parma v. Benedictgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Whitmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Remillardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Krausgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Varnergreen1 sentence2025State v. Whitman, 2019-Ohio-2307 ¶30-31 (5th Dist.); State v. Kraus, 2013-Ohio-393 ¶3 (2d Dist.); Parma v. Benedict, 2015-Ohio-3340 ¶13 (8th Dist.); State v. Leasure, 2015-Ohio-5327 ¶36 (4th Dist.); State v. Harris, 2017-Ohio-5594 ¶19 (1st Dist.); State v. Varner 2020-Ohio-1329 ¶ 33 (11th Dist.). {¶ 17} Here, the trial court's judgment entry acknowledges that Mason's prior OVI is an essential element of the offense of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Robert H. Gullett (81-1536), Marvin Fox (81-1537)green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. James Henry Gibbonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Solomongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sowellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martin v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Powellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Adaranijogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Steppgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mendozagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mathisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Martingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Deem
green
2 sentences1991(Crim.R. 30[A], construed.)” State v. Comen (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 206 , 553 N.E.2d 640 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 1 A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense if (1) the offense on which the instruction is requested is lesser than and included within the charged offense under the analysis set forth in State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205 , 533 N.E.2d 294 ; and (2) the jury could reasonably conclude that the evidence supports a finding of guilt on the lesser offense and not the greater offense. 1991(Crim.R. 30[A], construed.)” State v. Comen (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 206 , 553 N.E.2d 640 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 1 A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense if (1) the offense on which the instruction is requested is lesser than and included within the charged offense under the analysis set forth in State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205 , 533 N.E.2d 294 ; and (2) the jury could reasonably conclude that the evidence supports a finding of guilt on the lesser offense and not the greater offense. | 7 | 1991–2021 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2006The trial court erred and denied appellant his constitutional right to due process when it denied defense counsel's request for a lesser included jury instruction." {¶ 22} "[A] criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense whenever the trial court: (1) determines that the offense on which the instruction is requested is necessarily lesser than and included within the charged offense, * * *; and (2) after examining the facts of the case, ascertains that the jury could reasonably conclude that the evidence supports a conviction for the lesser offense and not the g 2006The trial court erred and denied appellant his constitutional right to due process when it denied defense counsel's request for a lesser included jury instruction." {¶ 22} "[A] criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense whenever the trial court: (1) determines that the offense on which the instruction is requested is necessarily lesser than and included within the charged offense, * * *; and (2) after examining the facts of the case, ascertains that the jury could reasonably conclude that the evidence supports a conviction for the lesser offense and not the g | 6 | 1990–2008 |
State v. Jenks
red
2 sentences2026State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus (1991). {¶11} Complicity is defined by R.C. 2911.03: (A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. {¶12} Aggravated burglary is defined by R.C. 2911.11(A): (A) No person, by force 2014State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 , paragraph two of the syllabus (1991). {¶10} R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) defines trafficking in drugs: {¶11} “(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following: {¶12} “(1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog[.]” {¶13} R.C. 2923.02(A) defines complicity: Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 11 0042 4 {¶14} “(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: {¶15} “(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; {¶16} “(2) Aid or | 3 | 2005–2026 |
State v. Foster
green
2 sentences2023The Court makes all findings based upon the sentencing factors contained in Ohio Revised Code 2929.11, 2929.12, 2929.13 and 2929.14, as such have been amended and/or modified by State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , and in accordance with House Bill 86, effective September 30, 2011, and Senate Bill 160, effective March 22, 2013. 2007In his second assignment, Springs argues that the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of eighteen months for the fourth-degree felonies after making the judicial fact finding that he committed the worst form of the offense in violation of State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 . | 3 | 2007–2023 |
State v. Thompkins
red
2 sentences2011“When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Id., citing Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 . {¶ 21} R.C. 2925.11(A) states: “No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance.” The degrees of the offense for a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) when the controlled substance is cocaine are set out in R.C. 2925.11(C)(4). 2004State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 386 , 1997-Ohio-52 . {¶ 26} Moore was convicted of complicity to commit murder by aiding or abetting the offense in violation of R.C. 2903.02 (A) and 2923.03 (A)(2). | 3 | 2004–2011 |
State v. Coulter
green
2 sentences2005State v. Kidder (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 279 , 280-281 ; State v. Coulter (1992), 75 Ohio App.3d 219 , 225 . 2003State v. Kidder (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 279 , 280-281 ; State v. Coulter (1992), 75 Ohio App.3d 219 , 225 . | 3 | 1999–2005 |
State v. Holland
green
2 sentences2019A Richland County, Case No. 2019CA0019 and 2019CA0020 10 person’s refusal to take a chemical test is simply an additional element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt along with the person’s previous DUI conviction to distinguish the offense from a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). 123 Ohio St.3d 418 , 2009-Ohio-4993 , 916 N.E.2d 1056, ¶21 [Emphasis added.] We have therefore previously found that a trial court did not err in allowing appellee to present evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction “as such was an element of the offense for which the State bears the burden of proof.” H 2019A Richland County, Case No. 2019CA0019 and 2019CA0020 10 person’s refusal to take a chemical test is simply an additional element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt along with the person’s previous DUI conviction to distinguish the offense from a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). 123 Ohio St.3d 418 , 2009-Ohio-4993 , 916 N.E.2d 1056, ¶21 [Emphasis added.] We have therefore previously found that a trial court did not err in allowing appellee to present evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction “as such was an element of the offense for which the State bears the burden of proof.” H | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2011Instead, over Defendant’s objection, the court “corrected” the defect by amending the complaint to change the numerical designation of the offense charged to a first-degree misdemeanor offense, R.C. 11 2921.33(B), and convicted Defendant of that first degree misdemeanor offense. {¶ 54} In State v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008-Ohio-4537 , the Supreme Court held that amending an indictment to change the penalty or degree of the charged offense changes the identity of the offense in violation of Crim.R. 7(D), and is error. 2010The original indictment was therefore in error when it named the offense trafficking in drugs. {¶80} The amendment changed the name of the offense in violation of Crim.R. 7(D) because the indictment alleged “trafficking in drugs” but the amendment alleged “aggravated trafficking in drugs.” See State v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008-Ohio- Highland App. No. 09CA29 23 4537, at ¶8 (indicating that trafficking in drugs is a lesser offense compared to aggravated trafficking in drugs), citing State v. Headley (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 479 . | 2 | 2010–2011 |
State v. Sapp
green
2 sentences2011State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St. 3d 104 , 822 N.E. 2d 1239 , 2004-Ohio-7008, ¶ 52 . “[T]he factual link might be one of time, location, murder weapon, or cause of death. 2011State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St. 3d 104 , 822 N.E. 2d 1239 , 2004-Ohio-7008, ¶ 52 . “[T]he factual link might be one of time, location, murder weapon, or cause of death. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
City of Euclid v. El-Zant
green
2 sentences2005The procedures for sealing of a record of conviction are set forth in specific statutory provisions (R.C. 2953.31 through 2953.36 ), and "the conviction records of some offenders cannot be sealed." Id., citing R.C. 2953.36 . {¶ 6} R.C. 2953.36 provides in relevant part: Sections 2953.31 to 2953.35 of the Revised Code do not apply to any of the following: * * * (C) [C]onvictions of an offense of violence when the offense is a misdemeanor of the first degree or a felony and when the offense is not a violation of section 2917.03 of the Revised Code and is not a violation of section 2903.13 , 2917 2002That statute provides that expungement is precluded for: {¶ 4} “Convictions of an offense of violence when the offense is a misdemean- or of the first degree or a felony and when the offense is not a violation of section 2917.03 [riot] of the Revised Code and is not a violation of section 2903.13 [assault], 2917.01 [inciting to violence] or 2917.31 [inducing panic] of the Revised Code that is a misdemeanor of the first degree.” *686 {¶ 5} P.D. admits that the statute is not a model of clarity, but she submits that the first part of R.C. 2953.36(C) states the general proposition that expungemen | 2 | 2002–2005 |
State v. Ellison
green
2 sentences1994State v. Ellison (Fla. 1990), 561 So.2d 576 . 1994State v. Ellison (Fla.1990), 561 So.2d 576 . | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1992Reversal of a conviction or sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel requires meeting the two-prong standard of Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . 1992Reversal of a conviction or sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel requires meeting the two-prong standard of Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . | 2 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Casalicchio green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Steger green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Evans green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Blanton green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. McFarland (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Ohio v. Miller, Unpublished Decision (11-28-2006) green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Klempay green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Hitchcock (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Henderson green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Treesh green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Rahab (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Martin green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Ventura, Unpublished Decision (9-26-2005) green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Horner green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| U.S. Bank v. Schubert neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Coleman green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Braverman v. United States green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Childs green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Dwight Rashad v. Sherry Burt green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Gilliam neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Cadiou, 91696 (4-16-2009) neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Davis v. Flickinger green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Woods v. Telb green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Woods v. Telb green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Futrall green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Tibbs v. Florida green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.