21 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1915–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blockburger v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025"In Blockburger v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States enumerated the 'same elements' test for determining whether two charges constitute the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 2024See Ex parte Benefield, 932 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 2005). 7 CR-2024-0333 "…. " '(a) … An offense is an included if: " '(1) It is established by proof of the same or fewer than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged. " '…. " '(4) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interests, or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.' "§ 13A-1-9, Ala. Code 1975. " 'In Blockburger v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States enumerated the "sa | 2 | 9 |
Gholston v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Under the Blockburger test, 'where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses 19 CR-2023-0826 or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.' Id. (emphasis added)." Gholston v. State, 57 So. 3d 178, 184 (Ala. Crim. 2017Under the Blockburger test, 'where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.' Id. (emphasis added)." Gholston v. State , 57 So.3d 178 , 184 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 3 |
Ex Parte Benefieldgreen1 sentence2024See Ex parte Benefield, 932 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 2005). 7 CR-2024-0333 "…. " '(a) … An offense is an included if: " '(1) It is established by proof of the same or fewer than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged. " '…. " '(4) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interests, or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.' "§ 13A-1-9, Ala. Code 1975. " 'In Blockburger v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States enumerated the "sa | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Funches v. State
neutral
2 sentences1983In Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), it was held: "In order to make operative Title 22, Section 258 (53)(a)(b), supra, evidence of a former conviction is not admissible unless it is alleged in the indictment and proof offered in support thereof." In Napier v. State , 344 So.2d 1235 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 344 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 1977), this court observed: "We hold that it is proper for an indictment for an offense in violation of the Uniform Alabama Controlled Substances Act to contain the averment that the 1983In Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), it was held: "In order to make operative Title 22, Section 258 (53)(a)(b), supra, evidence of a former conviction is not admissible unless it is alleged in the indictment and proof offered in support thereof." In Napier v. State , 344 So.2d 1235 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 344 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 1977), this court observed: "We hold that it is proper for an indictment for an offense in violation of the Uniform Alabama Controlled Substances Act to contain the averment that the | 2 | 1977–1983 |
Weaver v. State
neutral
2 sentences1983In Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), it was held: "In order to make operative Title 22, Section 258 (53)(a)(b), supra, evidence of a former conviction is not admissible unless it is alleged in the indictment and proof offered in support thereof." In Napier v. State , 344 So.2d 1235 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 344 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 1977), this court observed: "We hold that it is proper for an indictment for an offense in violation of the Uniform Alabama Controlled Substances Act to contain the averment that the 1983The trial court, in the absence of such averment in the indictment, was without authority to impose an imprisonment sentence in excess of fifteen years imprisonment." Also, in Kidd v. State , 398 So.2d 349 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 398 So.2d 353 (Ala. 1981), this court held: "It is reasonably clear from Napier , supra, and from Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 , cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), that when the State wishes to bring a defendant under the ambit of Section 20-2-76 the prior conviction must be alleged in the indictment and later proven at tri | 2 | 1977–1983 |
Funches v. State
neutral
2 sentences1983In Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), it was held: "In order to make operative Title 22, Section 258 (53)(a)(b), supra, evidence of a former conviction is not admissible unless it is alleged in the indictment and proof offered in support thereof." In Napier v. State , 344 So.2d 1235 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 344 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 1977), this court observed: "We hold that it is proper for an indictment for an offense in violation of the Uniform Alabama Controlled Substances Act to contain the averment that the 1983The trial court, in the absence of such averment in the indictment, was without authority to impose an imprisonment sentence in excess of fifteen years imprisonment." Also, in Kidd v. State , 398 So.2d 349 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 398 So.2d 353 (Ala. 1981), this court held: "It is reasonably clear from Napier , supra, and from Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 , cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), that when the State wishes to bring a defendant under the ambit of Section 20-2-76 the prior conviction must be alleged in the indictment and later proven at tri | 2 | 1977–1983 |
Whitehead v. State
green
2 sentences1977Whitehead v. State, 206 Ala. 288 , 90 So. 351 ; Ward v. State, 19 Ala.App. 398 , 98 So. 208 , cert. denied 210 Ala. 366 , 98 So. 210 . 1977Whitehead v. State, 206 Ala. 288 , 90 So. 351 ; Ward v. State, 19 Ala.App. 398 , 98 So. 208 , cert. denied 210 Ala. 366 , 98 So. 210 . | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Fuller v. State
neutral
2 sentences1977Whitehead v. State, 206 Ala. 288 , 90 So. 351 ; Ward v. State, 19 Ala.App. 398 , 98 So. 208 , cert. denied 210 Ala. 366 , 98 So. 210 . 1977Whitehead v. State, 206 Ala. 288 , 90 So. 351 ; Ward v. State, 19 Ala.App. 398 , 98 So. 208 , cert. denied 210 Ala. 366 , 98 So. 210 . | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Ex Parte Ward
neutral
2 sentences1977Whitehead v. State, 206 Ala. 288 , 90 So. 351 ; Ward v. State, 19 Ala.App. 398 , 98 So. 208 , cert. denied 210 Ala. 366 , 98 So. 210 . 1977Whitehead v. State, 206 Ala. 288 , 90 So. 351 ; Ward v. State, 19 Ala.App. 398 , 98 So. 208 , cert. denied 210 Ala. 366 , 98 So. 210 . | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Ward v. State
neutral
2 sentences1977Whitehead v. State, 206 Ala. 288 , 90 So. 351 ; Ward v. State, 19 Ala.App. 398 , 98 So. 208 , cert. denied 210 Ala. 366 , 98 So. 210 . 1977Whitehead v. State, 206 Ala. 288 , 90 So. 351 ; Ward v. State, 19 Ala.App. 398 , 98 So. 208 , cert. denied 210 Ala. 366 , 98 So. 210 . | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Kellam v. State
neutral
2 sentences1988Kellam v. State, 36 Ala.App. 332 , 55 So.2d 517 (1951) states, "Where another who was under indictment for the same offense took the stand to testify for the defendant but, upon being advised by the court of his constitutional rights, elected to claim privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify, refusal to permit introduction into evidence of his written *330 declaration as to commission of the offense was not error." But, in this case, the declaration is not an admission to a crime. 1988Kellam v. State, 36 Ala.App. 332 , 55 So.2d 517 (1951) states, "Where another who was under indictment for the same offense took the stand to testify for the defendant but, upon being advised by the court of his constitutional rights, elected to claim privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify, refusal to permit introduction into evidence of his written *330 declaration as to commission of the offense was not error." But, in this case, the declaration is not an admission to a crime. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Mosley v. City of Auburn
green
1 sentence1987Therefore, in allowing the State to amend the original complaint to include a violation of subsection (a)(1), supra, the trial judge permitted the addition of a different offense in violation of the rules as herein set out in Mosley , supra (as limited), Edwards , supra, and Rule 15.5(a), A.Temp.R.Crim.P. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Edwards v. State
green
1 sentence1987Therefore, in allowing the State to amend the original complaint to include a violation of subsection (a)(1), supra, the trial judge permitted the addition of a different offense in violation of the rules as herein set out in Mosley , supra (as limited), Edwards , supra, and Rule 15.5(a), A.Temp.R.Crim.P. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Ex Parte Kidd
green
1 sentence1983The trial court, in the absence of such averment in the indictment, was without authority to impose an imprisonment sentence in excess of fifteen years imprisonment." Also, in Kidd v. State , 398 So.2d 349 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 398 So.2d 353 (Ala. 1981), this court held: "It is reasonably clear from Napier , supra, and from Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 , cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), that when the State wishes to bring a defendant under the ambit of Section 20-2-76 the prior conviction must be alleged in the indictment and later proven at tri | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Kidd v. State
green
2 sentences1983The trial court, in the absence of such averment in the indictment, was without authority to impose an imprisonment sentence in excess of fifteen years imprisonment." Also, in Kidd v. State , 398 So.2d 349 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 398 So.2d 353 (Ala. 1981), this court held: "It is reasonably clear from Napier , supra, and from Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 , cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), that when the State wishes to bring a defendant under the ambit of Section 20-2-76 the prior conviction must be alleged in the indictment and later proven at tri 1983The trial court, in the absence of such averment in the indictment, was without authority to impose an imprisonment sentence in excess of fifteen years imprisonment." Also, in Kidd v. State , 398 So.2d 349 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 398 So.2d 353 (Ala. 1981), this court held: "It is reasonably clear from Napier , supra, and from Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 , cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), that when the State wishes to bring a defendant under the ambit of Section 20-2-76 the prior conviction must be alleged in the indictment and later proven at tri | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1983In Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), it was held: "In order to make operative Title 22, Section 258 (53)(a)(b), supra, evidence of a former conviction is not admissible unless it is alleged in the indictment and proof offered in support thereof." In Napier v. State , 344 So.2d 1235 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 344 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 1977), this court observed: "We hold that it is proper for an indictment for an offense in violation of the Uniform Alabama Controlled Substances Act to contain the averment that the | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Napier v. State
green
2 sentences1983In Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), it was held: "In order to make operative Title 22, Section 258 (53)(a)(b), supra, evidence of a former conviction is not admissible unless it is alleged in the indictment and proof offered in support thereof." In Napier v. State , 344 So.2d 1235 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 344 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 1977), this court observed: "We hold that it is proper for an indictment for an offense in violation of the Uniform Alabama Controlled Substances Act to contain the averment that the 1983The trial court, in the absence of such averment in the indictment, was without authority to impose an imprisonment sentence in excess of fifteen years imprisonment." Also, in Kidd v. State , 398 So.2d 349 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 398 So.2d 353 (Ala. 1981), this court held: "It is reasonably clear from Napier , supra, and from Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 , cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), that when the State wishes to bring a defendant under the ambit of Section 20-2-76 the prior conviction must be alleged in the indictment and later proven at tri | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Luttrell v. State
neutral
2 sentences1983In Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), it was held: "In order to make operative Title 22, Section 258 (53)(a)(b), supra, evidence of a former conviction is not admissible unless it is alleged in the indictment and proof offered in support thereof." In Napier v. State , 344 So.2d 1235 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 344 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 1977), this court observed: "We hold that it is proper for an indictment for an offense in violation of the Uniform Alabama Controlled Substances Act to contain the averment that the 1983The trial court, in the absence of such averment in the indictment, was without authority to impose an imprisonment sentence in excess of fifteen years imprisonment." Also, in Kidd v. State , 398 So.2d 349 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied , 398 So.2d 353 (Ala. 1981), this court held: "It is reasonably clear from Napier , supra, and from Funches v. State , 56 Ala. App. 22 , 318 So.2d 762 , cert. denied , 294 Ala. 757 , 318 So.2d 768 (1975), that when the State wishes to bring a defendant under the ambit of Section 20-2-76 the prior conviction must be alleged in the indictment and later proven at tri | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Highsmith v. State
green
2 sentences1981Highsmith v. State , 55 Ala. App. 272 , 314 So.2d 874 (1975). 1981Highsmith v. State , 55 Ala. App. 272 , 314 So.2d 874 (1975). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
O'TINGER v. State
green
1 sentence1978Ex parte Holt, Ala. [Ms. August 4, 1978, SC 77-150]; O’Tinger v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 342 So.2d 1343 (1977). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Parsons v. State
green
1 sentence1977We decline petitioner's invitation to overrule Parsons v. State , 81 Ala. 577 , 2 So. 854 (1887). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Dickey v. State
green
2 sentences1948The sentence imposed affords *581 no ground for such an inference, as was the situation in Dickey v. State, 32 Ala.App. 413 , 26 So.2d 532 , nor does describing the offense as a violation of the Internal Revenue Act. 1948The sentence imposed affords *581 no ground for such an inference, as was the situation in Dickey v. State, 32 Ala.App. 413 , 26 So.2d 532 , nor does describing the offense as a violation of the Internal Revenue Act. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Ex Parte Watts
green
1 sentence1923Lon Gilbert v. State, ante, p. 104, 95 South. 502 . | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Battle v. Mayor of Marietta
neutral
2 sentences1915The Supreme Court of Georgia, acting upon the common-law principle embodied in the maxim, “Nullus tern-pus occurrit regem,” have held that, where the municipal charter fails to provide a limitation, no lapse of time after the commission of an offense in violation of a city will bar ’a prosecution therefor, unless the ordinance itself, or other ordinances of the city, prescribe some limitation. —Battle v. Marietta, 118 Ga. 242 , 44 S. E. 994 ; Bell v. Forsyth, 126 Ga. 443 , 55 S. E. 230 ; Norris v. Thompson (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 866 ; Ramsey v. Atlanta (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 148 . 1915The Supreme Court of Georgia, acting upon the common-law principle embodied in the maxim, “Nullus tern-pus occurrit regem,” have held that, where the municipal charter fails to provide a limitation, no lapse of time after the commission of an offense in violation of a city will bar ’a prosecution therefor, unless the ordinance itself, or other ordinances of the city, prescribe some limitation. —Battle v. Marietta, 118 Ga. 242 , 44 S. E. 994 ; Bell v. Forsyth, 126 Ga. 443 , 55 S. E. 230 ; Norris v. Thompson (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 866 ; Ramsey v. Atlanta (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 148 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Bell v. Mayor of Forsyth
green
2 sentences1915The Supreme Court of Georgia, acting upon the common-law principle embodied in the maxim, “Nullus tern-pus occurrit regem,” have held that, where the municipal charter fails to provide a limitation, no lapse of time after the commission of an offense in violation of a city will bar ’a prosecution therefor, unless the ordinance itself, or other ordinances of the city, prescribe some limitation. —Battle v. Marietta, 118 Ga. 242 , 44 S. E. 994 ; Bell v. Forsyth, 126 Ga. 443 , 55 S. E. 230 ; Norris v. Thompson (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 866 ; Ramsey v. Atlanta (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 148 . 1915The Supreme Court of Georgia, acting upon the common-law principle embodied in the maxim, “Nullus tern-pus occurrit regem,” have held that, where the municipal charter fails to provide a limitation, no lapse of time after the commission of an offense in violation of a city will bar ’a prosecution therefor, unless the ordinance itself, or other ordinances of the city, prescribe some limitation. —Battle v. Marietta, 118 Ga. 242 , 44 S. E. 994 ; Bell v. Forsyth, 126 Ga. 443 , 55 S. E. 230 ; Norris v. Thompson (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 866 ; Ramsey v. Atlanta (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 148 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Saunders v. State
neutral
1 sentence1915The Supreme Court of Georgia, acting upon the common-law principle embodied in the maxim, “Nullus tern-pus occurrit regem,” have held that, where the municipal charter fails to provide a limitation, no lapse of time after the commission of an offense in violation of a city will bar ’a prosecution therefor, unless the ordinance itself, or other ordinances of the city, prescribe some limitation. —Battle v. Marietta, 118 Ga. 242 , 44 S. E. 994 ; Bell v. Forsyth, 126 Ga. 443 , 55 S. E. 230 ; Norris v. Thompson (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 866 ; Ramsey v. Atlanta (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 148 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Norris v. Mayor of Thomson
neutral
1 sentence1915The Supreme Court of Georgia, acting upon the common-law principle embodied in the maxim, “Nullus tern-pus occurrit regem,” have held that, where the municipal charter fails to provide a limitation, no lapse of time after the commission of an offense in violation of a city will bar ’a prosecution therefor, unless the ordinance itself, or other ordinances of the city, prescribe some limitation. —Battle v. Marietta, 118 Ga. 242 , 44 S. E. 994 ; Bell v. Forsyth, 126 Ga. 443 , 55 S. E. 230 ; Norris v. Thompson (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 866 ; Ramsey v. Atlanta (Ga. App.) 83 S. E. 148 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.