42 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Gregggreen2 sentences2025This Court reviews de novo whether “multiple punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause.” Commonwealth v. Gregg, 295 Va. 293, 296 (2018). 2025This Court reviews de novo whether “multiple punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause.” Commonwealth v. Gregg, 295 Va. 293, 296 (2018). | 8 | 12 |
Johnson, Ronald v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025“We review de novo whether ‘multiple [criminal] punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause.’” Commonwealth v. Gregg, 295 Va. 293, 296 (2018) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 738, 741 (2016)). 2025“We review de novo whether ‘multiple punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause.’” Gregg, 295 Va. at 296 (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 738, 741 (2016)). | 6 | 7 |
Severance v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025Where a defendant is charged with multiple crimes in the same trial, “the double jeopardy defense does not apply unless: (a) the defendant is twice punished for one criminal act, and (b) the two punishments are either for the same crime or one punishment is for a crime which is a lesser included offense of the other.” Severance v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 564, 572 (2018) (emphasis omitted). 2020This general standard applies to claims, such as appellant’s here, “that multiple punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause.” Severance v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 629, 650 (2017) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187 , 227 (2013)), aff’d, 295 Va. 564 (2018). | 3 | 5 |
Kelsoe v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025“When considering multiple punishments for a single transaction, the controlling factor is legislative intent.” Id. at 298 (quoting Kelsoe v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 197, 199 (1983)). 2023“When considering multiple punishments for a single transaction, the controlling factor is legislative intent.” Id. at 298 (quoting Kelsoe v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 197, 199 (1983)). | 3 | 3 |
Johnson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2005Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 598, 601 , 347 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1986). 2005Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 598, 601 , 347 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1986). | 3 | 3 |
Blythe v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025Where, as here, a defendant is charged in a single-trial setting, “the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.” Gregg, 295 Va. at 298 (quoting Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725 (1981)). 2025Where, as here, a defendant is charged in a single-trial setting, “the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.” Gregg, 295 Va. at 298 (quoting Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725 (1981)). | 2 | 2 |
Langhorne v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004“As a general rule, only under limited circumstances may evidence of other offenses by an accused be admitted to prove the offense at bar.” Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 101 , 409 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1991). 2004“As a general rule, only under limited circumstances may evidence of other offenses by an accused be admitted to prove the offense at bar.” Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 101 , 409 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1991). | 2 | 2 |
Blockburger v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010Brown argued that his abduction charge must be dismissed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, specifically, that the rape for which he had already been convicted in Albemarle County necessarily involved some degree of forcible deprivation of the victim’s liberty, so an abduction trial after his rape conviction operated as a second prosecution for the same offense under the test articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 2002The Court rejected the “factually related” exception some courts had read into the McNeil offense-specific definition, id. at 168, and held that when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, it encompasses offenses not formally charged but only if they would be considered the same offense under the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not). | 1 | 3 |
Howard Allen Groffel v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen2 sentences2021“We review de novo whether ‘multiple punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause.’” Groffel, 70 Va. App. at 687 (quoting Commonwealth v. Gregg, 295 Va. 293, 298 (2018)). 2020This Court recently considered the question of “whether [Code § 18.2-308.2] penalizes the simultaneous possession of firearms and of separate ammunition . . . as one offense or two.” Groffel v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 681, 692 (2019). | 1 | 2 |
Hudson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025In determining whether a civil sanction constitutes a criminal punishment, we consider factors such as (1) “whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution or deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it app 2025In determining whether a civil sanction constitutes a criminal punishment, we consider factors such as (1) “whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution or deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it app | 1 | 1 |
Jonathan Marquis Holley v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2025“We review de novo claims that multiple punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause.” Holley v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 156, 160 (2014) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187 , 227 (2013)). | 1 | 1 |
Charles Stanard Severance v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2020This general standard applies to claims, such as appellant’s here, “that multiple punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause.” Severance v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 629, 650 (2017) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187 , 227 (2013)), aff’d, 295 Va. 564 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
Sheng Jie Jin v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2019Nevertheless, “determination of whether acts constitute a single continuing offense or separate offenses is a factual finding that we will not reverse unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Jin v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 294, 304-05 (2017). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Andrews v. Com.green1 sentence2017“The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy ... consists of three separate constitutional protections.” Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231 , 279, 699 S.E.2d 237, 264 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Riner v. Com.green2 sentences2017Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 391 , 728 S.E.2d 499, 504 (2012) (quoting Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296 , * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 1 Appellant’s conviction and sentencing orders list the offense as a violation of Code § 18.2-371.1. 2017While that statute has two subsections, counsel for both parties agreed at oral argument that appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted of a violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(A), and the indictment of appellant is clearly based on subsection A of the statute. 330, 601 S.E.2d 555, 574 (2004)). | 1 | 1 |
Van Andre Beasley v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen2 sentences2017Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 391 , 728 S.E.2d 499, 504 (2012) (quoting Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296 , * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 1 Appellant’s conviction and sentencing orders list the offense as a violation of Code § 18.2-371.1. 2017Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 391 , 728 S.E.2d 499, 504 (2012) (quoting Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296 , * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 1 Appellant’s conviction and sentencing orders list the offense as a violation of Code § 18.2-371.1. | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2017See Edwards, 41 Va.App. at 761 , 589 S.E.2d at 448 . 2017See Edwards, 41 Va.App. at 761 , 589 S.E.2d at 448 . | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Ohiogreen1 sentence2015Id. at 169-70 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Oliva v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2014Oliva v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 523, 527 , 452 S.E.2d 877, 880 (1995). 2014Oliva v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 523, 527 , 452 S.E.2d 877, 880 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Prasit Imngren, United States of America v. Kenneth Johnsongreen1 sentence2013Fullwood v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 531, 539 , 689 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2010) (citing United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir. 1996)). | 1 | 1 |
Fullwood v. Com.green2 sentences2013Fullwood v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 531, 539 , 689 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2010) (citing United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir. 1996)). 2013Fullwood v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 531, 539 , 689 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2010) (citing United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir. 1996)). | 1 | 1 |
Coles v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007She was indicted for uttering a check with “insufficient funds.” While the former is an offense in violation of Code § 18.2-172, 5 the latter violates Code § 18.2-181. 4 A “charge,” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 248 (8th ed. 2004), is a “formal accusation of an offense as a preliminary step to prosecution . . . . ” Coles v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 549, 558 , 605 S.E.2d 784, 788 (2004). 5 Code § 18.2-172 reads in relevant part: If any person forge any writing . . . to the prejudice of another’s right, or utter, or attempt to employ as true, such forged writing, knowing it to be forged, 2007She was indicted for uttering a check with “insufficient funds.” While the former is an offense in violation of Code § 18.2-172, 5 the latter violates Code § 18.2-181. 4 A “charge,” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 248 (8th ed. 2004), is a “formal accusation of an offense as a preliminary step to prosecution . . . . ” Coles v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 549, 558 , 605 S.E.2d 784, 788 (2004). 5 Code § 18.2-172 reads in relevant part: If any person forge any writing . . . to the prejudice of another’s right, or utter, or attempt to employ as true, such forged writing, knowing it to be forged, | 1 | 1 |
Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc.green2 sentences2007She was indicted for uttering a check with “insufficient funds.” While the former is an offense in violation of Code § 18.2-172, 5 the latter violates Code § 18.2-181. 4 A “charge,” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 248 (8th ed. 2004), is a “formal accusation of an offense as a preliminary step to prosecution . . . . ” Coles v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 549, 558 , 605 S.E.2d 784, 788 (2004). 5 Code § 18.2-172 reads in relevant part: If any person forge any writing . . . to the prejudice of another’s right, or utter, or attempt to employ as true, such forged writing, knowing it to be forged, 2007She was indicted for uttering a check with “insufficient funds.” While the former is an offense in violation of Code § 18.2-172, 5 the latter violates Code § 18.2-181. 4 A “charge,” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 248 (8th ed. 2004), is a “formal accusation of an offense as a preliminary step to prosecution . . . . ” Coles v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 549, 558 , 605 S.E.2d 784, 788 (2004). 5 Code § 18.2-172 reads in relevant part: If any person forge any writing . . . to the prejudice of another’s right, or utter, or attempt to employ as true, such forged writing, knowing it to be forged, | 1 | 1 |
Timbers v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2002In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, “we review the trial court’s ... legal conclusions de novo.” Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 193 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1998). *149 “As a general rule, only under limited circumstances may evidence of other offenses by an accused be admitted to prove the offense at bar.” Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 97, 101 , 409 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1991). 2002In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, “we review the trial court’s ... legal conclusions de novo.” Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 193 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1998). *149 “As a general rule, only under limited circumstances may evidence of other offenses by an accused be admitted to prove the offense at bar.” Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 97, 101 , 409 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Texas v. Cobbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burlile v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Graham v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bright v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ingram v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tench v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greenwalt v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brame v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Falden v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cartwright v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dykeman v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dorsey v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2025In determining whether a civil sanction constitutes a criminal punishment, we consider factors such as (1) “whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution or deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it app | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Depsky v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2025In determining whether a civil sanction constitutes a criminal punishment, we consider factors such as (1) “whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution or deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it app | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Jonathan Nathaniel Ramsey v. Commonwealth of Virginia
green
1 sentence2024At the hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion in limine on March 11, 2022, the circuit court inquired of Kamga, “[I]s your theory of defense going to be to pin it on this other guy, Kendall Smith?” Kamga responded that under Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 341 , 354 -5- (2014), evidence of third-party guilt is admissible “once the appropriate nexus between a third party and the offense at bar is established.” Kamga then contended that it would be error to exclude statements of a deceased victim. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Smith
green
2 sentences2012The Commonwealth asserted in Smith that there were “separate species” of capital murder in Virginia that were joined by “gradation”—i.e. “an aggravating circumstance, which is often a gradation or nexus crime, [and] is required to elevate the offense from a standard, premeditated first-degree murder to capital murder.” Id. at 18 , 557 S.E.2d at 226 . 2012The Commonwealth asserted in Smith that there were “separate species” of capital murder in Virginia that were joined by “gradation”—i.e. “an aggravating circumstance, which is often a gradation or nexus crime, [and] is required to elevate the offense from a standard, premeditated first-degree murder to capital murder.” Id. at 18 , 557 S.E.2d at 226 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Dixon
green
1 sentence2010Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Brown v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 313 , 337 S.E.2d at 712-13 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Estes v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Padgett v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Spencer v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Spigener v. Crews green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Brown v. New Jersey green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.