17 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1945–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mannsgreen1 sentence2016See State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 658-59 (Minn. 2007) (stating that “jury instructions must include all elements of the offense” and that failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense is error that is plain), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vancegreen1 sentence2016See State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 658-59 (Minn. 2007) (stating that “jury instructions must include all elements of the offense” and that failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense is error that is plain), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
State of Minnesota v. Michael David Franklingreen1 sentence2016See State v. Franklin, 861 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Minn. 2015) (“When the Legislature’s intent is clear from the unambiguous statutory language, [appellate courts] apply the plain meaning of the 6 statute.”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Welfare of N.J.S.green1 sentence2015The district court concluded that under the N.J.S. decision, it was proper to consider this charge because it “resulted in [a] petition[] to court.” In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 2008). 6 N.J.S. also informs this court’s review of J.G.G.’s prior record of delinquency. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carlsongreen1 sentence2015See id.; see also Burg, 648 N.W.2d at 680 (concluding that an erroneous jury instruction omitting an element of the offense was 1 It bears mentioning that at the time the jury instructions were given, the state’s case rested on appellant’s possession of the 133 grams of marijuana—an amount that exceeds the statutory definition of “small amount.” See Minn. Stat. § 152.01 , subd. 16 (2010) (“‘Small amount’ as applied to marijuana means 42.5 grams or less.”). 13 plain error even though there were no published decisions explicitly concluding that the omitted language was an element of the offense) | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burggreen1 sentence2015See id.; see also Burg, 648 N.W.2d at 680 (concluding that an erroneous jury instruction omitting an element of the offense was 1 It bears mentioning that at the time the jury instructions were given, the state’s case rested on appellant’s possession of the 133 grams of marijuana—an amount that exceeds the statutory definition of “small amount.” See Minn. Stat. § 152.01 , subd. 16 (2010) (“‘Small amount’ as applied to marijuana means 42.5 grams or less.”). 13 plain error even though there were no published decisions explicitly concluding that the omitted language was an element of the offense) | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leakegreen1 sentence2009The supreme court noted that the district court’s additional reliance on the testimony of the victim of the prior offense was error “as it does not meet the requirements of Blakely.” Id. at 325, n. 9. | 1 | 1 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2006We see no principled basis for differentiating between a waiver of the right to a jury trial on the elements of an offense and a waiver of the right to a jury determination of aggravating sentencing factors. 3 Both rights arise from the same Sixth Amendment guarantee, and the Supreme Court has said that a fact used to enhance a sentence is the “functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; see also id. at 494 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 (commenting that the distinction between elements and sentencing factors is “constitutionally novel and elu 2006We see no principled basis for differentiating between a waiver of the right to a jury trial on the elements of an offense and a waiver of the right to a jury determination of aggravating sentencing factors. 3 Both rights arise from the same Sixth Amendment guarantee, and the Supreme Court has said that a fact used to enhance a sentence is the “functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; see also id. at 494 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 (commenting that the distinction between elements and sentencing factors is “constitutionally novel and elu | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rewitzergreen1 sentence2001Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d at 413 (quotation and citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONSgreen1 sentence1995Butler v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 609 So.2d 790, 797 (La.1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parkergreen2 sentences1988State v. Parker, 282 Minn. 343, 355 , 164 N.W.2d 633, 641 (1969). 1988State v. Parker, 282 Minn. 343, 355 , 164 N.W.2d 633, 641 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. HEIGES
green
1 sentence2016Viewing the jury instructions in their entirety, we conclude that they “fairly and adequately explained the law of the case.” Heiges, 779 N.W.2d at 913 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
1 sentence2014UNPUBLISHED OPINION HALBROOKS, Judge In this combined direct and postconviction appeal, appellant challenges his conviction of refusal to submit to a test required under the implied-consent law, arguing that the factual basis for his guilty plea is invalid because it did not support the offense of test refusal and that criminalizing test refusal is unconstitutional under Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Dettman
green
2 sentences2008Noting “that a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial on the elements of an offense must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,” we concluded that there is “no principled basis for differentiating between a waiver of the right to a jury trial on the elements of an offense and a waiver of the right to a jury determination of aggravating sentencing factors.” Id. at 651 . 2008Noting "that a defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial on the elements of an offense must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary," we concluded that there is "no principled basis for differentiating between a waiver of the right to a jury trial on the elements of an offense and a waiver of the right to a jury determination of aggravating sentencing factors." Id. at 651 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Lothenbach
green
1 sentence2003The matter was submitted to the district court on stipulated facts pursuant to State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn.1980). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Bajakajian
green
1 sentence2000Federal statutes further provided that “[t]he court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section * 5316, * shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense * See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 325 , 118 S.Ct. 2028 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 982 (a)(1) (1994)). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Beltowski v. State
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294 , 161 N.W.2d 650 (1968), this court held that the imposition of a longer sentence after a new trial and second conviction for the same offense was a violation of public policy. 4 In Beltowski v. State, 289 Minn. 215 , 183 N.W.2d 563 (1971), the defendant was charged with burglary, permitted to plead guilty to a lesser included offense, and was sentenced. 1980In State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294 , 161 N.W.2d 650 (1968), this court held that the imposition of a longer sentence after a new trial and second conviction for the same offense was a violation of public policy. 4 In Beltowski v. State, 289 Minn. 215 , 183 N.W.2d 563 (1971), the defendant was charged with burglary, permitted to plead guilty to a lesser included offense, and was sentenced. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Holmes
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294 , 161 N.W.2d 650 (1968), this court held that the imposition of a longer sentence after a new trial and second conviction for the same offense was a violation of public policy. 4 In Beltowski v. State, 289 Minn. 215 , 183 N.W.2d 563 (1971), the defendant was charged with burglary, permitted to plead guilty to a lesser included offense, and was sentenced. 1980In State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294 , 161 N.W.2d 650 (1968), this court held that the imposition of a longer sentence after a new trial and second conviction for the same offense was a violation of public policy. 4 In Beltowski v. State, 289 Minn. 215 , 183 N.W.2d 563 (1971), the defendant was charged with burglary, permitted to plead guilty to a lesser included offense, and was sentenced. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Autheman
green
2 sentences1948If the word ‘secretly’ is to be understood as modifying this clause, for the same reason it must also be understood as modifying the clause ‘to be sent out of the state,’ whereas the element of secrecy has never been regarded as a concomitant of the act denounced as an offense by this clause, when the act is accompanied by unlawful violence and the necessary intent; for no intelligent person, upon reading the statute, could escape the conclusion that if one person should seize another without authority of law with the intent to cause him to be sent out of the state, that act would come within 1948If the word ‘secretly’ is to be understood as modifying this clause, for the same reason it must also be understood as modifying the clause ‘to be sent out of the state,’ whereas the element of secrecy has never been regarded as a concomitant of the act denounced as an offense by this clause, when the act is accompanied by unlawful violence and the necessary intent; for no intelligent person, upon reading the statute, could escape the conclusion that if one person should seize another without authority of law with the intent to cause him to be sent out of the state, that act would come within | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Ex Parte Lange
green
1 sentence1945Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 , 21 L. ed. 872, supra. The rule requiring resort to appellate procedure when the trial court has determined its own jurisdiction of an offense is not a rule denying the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus when it appears that nevertheless the trial court was without jurisdiction. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.