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18 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lambertgreen2 sentences1989Rather, "[i]f the record reflects, as it does here, that the trial court had assured itself that the defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligently entered with full knowledge of the nature and elements of the offense and of the waiver of his rights as an accused person, then lack of precise language in the record expressing these things is not of itself a valid reason to reverse the trial court." People v. Lambert, 189 Colo. 264, 267 , 539 P.2d 1238, 1240 (1975). 1989Rather, "[i]f the record reflects, as it does here, that the trial court had assured itself that the defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligently entered with full knowledge of the nature and elements of the offense and of the waiver of his rights as an accused person, then lack of precise language in the record expressing these things is not of itself a valid reason to reverse the trial court." People v. Lambert, 189 Colo. 264, 267 , 539 P.2d 1238, 1240 (1975). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Durangreen1 sentence2025See § 18-2-101(1) (“Factual or legal impossibility of committing the offense is not a defense . . . .”); People v. Duran, 272 P.3d 1084, 1093-94 (Colo. App. 2011) (holding that second set of gunshots was sufficient to support attempted murder conviction even though victim was killed by prior gunshots). | 1 | 1 |
Garcia v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2025The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Conlon’s Conviction for Violation of a Protection Order ¶ 109 The prosecution bore the burden of proving that, in the State of Colorado between March 27, 2019, and August 25, 2019, Conlon (1) was “personally served with a protection order” or had “actual knowledge” of its contents from the court or law enforcement 49 personnel; and (2) knowingly “[c]ontact[ed], harasse[d], injure[d], intimidate[d], molest[ed], threaten[ed], or touche[d] the protected person.” § 18-6-803.5(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025; see People v. Garcia, 2017 COA 1 , ¶ 37, 452 P.3d 55 , 61 (“T 2025The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Conlon’s Conviction for Violation of a Protection Order ¶ 109 The prosecution bore the burden of proving that, in the State of Colorado between March 27, 2019, and August 25, 2019, Conlon (1) was “personally served with a protection order” or had “actual knowledge” of its contents from the court or law enforcement 49 personnel; and (2) knowingly “[c]ontact[ed], harasse[d], injure[d], intimidate[d], molest[ed], threaten[ed], or touche[d] the protected person.” § 18-6-803.5(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025; see People v. Garcia, 2017 COA 1 , ¶ 37, 452 P.3d 55 , 61 (“T | 1 | 1 |
People v. DeHerreragreen1 sentence2015See DeHerrera, 697 P.2d at 740 (“Since one of the elements of the second degree assault charges was an attempt to cause bodily injury to another person, it was certainly proper for the court to give some instruction to the jury on the meaning of the term ‘attempt’ in the context of assault in the second degree.”). ¶ 53 But the error that our supreme court discussed in DeHerrera concerned the structure of -the attempt instruction. | 1 | 1 |
Cheek v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013"Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law." Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199 , 111 S.Ct. at 609 (emphasis added). [16 A person is not relieved of criminal liability due to a mistake of law unless permitted by statute, administrative regulation, or an official written interpretation. § 18-1-504(2), C.R.S.2012; see People v. Bossert, 722 P.2d 998, 1008 (Colo.1986) ("A sincere but mistaken belief as to whether particular con-duet constitutes an offense is not a defense to prosecution for such conduct under this statute unless the cond 2013"Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law." Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199 , 111 S.Ct. at 609 (emphasis added). [16 A person is not relieved of criminal liability due to a mistake of law unless permitted by statute, administrative regulation, or an official written interpretation. § 18-1-504(2), C.R.S.2012; see People v. Bossert, 722 P.2d 998, 1008 (Colo.1986) ("A sincere but mistaken belief as to whether particular con-duet constitutes an offense is not a defense to prosecution for such conduct under this statute unless the cond | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bossertgreen2 sentences2013"Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law." Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199 , 111 S.Ct. at 609 (emphasis added). [16 A person is not relieved of criminal liability due to a mistake of law unless permitted by statute, administrative regulation, or an official written interpretation. § 18-1-504(2), C.R.S.2012; see People v. Bossert, 722 P.2d 998, 1008 (Colo.1986) ("A sincere but mistaken belief as to whether particular con-duet constitutes an offense is not a defense to prosecution for such conduct under this statute unless the cond 2013"Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law." Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199 , 111 S.Ct. at 609 (emphasis added). [16 A person is not relieved of criminal liability due to a mistake of law unless permitted by statute, administrative regulation, or an official written interpretation. § 18-1-504(2), C.R.S.2012; see People v. Bossert, 722 P.2d 998, 1008 (Colo.1986) ("A sincere but mistaken belief as to whether particular con-duet constitutes an offense is not a defense to prosecution for such conduct under this statute unless the cond | 1 | 1 |
People v. Boykinsgreen1 sentence2012See Grizsle, 140 P.3d at 226 ; see also § 18-3-305(1) ("[a] person commits the crime of enticement" if he or she "attempts to invite or persuade, a child under the age of fifteen years to enter any ... secluded place") (emphasis added); § 18-2-101(1) ("Factual or legal impossibility of committing the offense is not a defense if the offense could have been committed had the attendant cireumstances been as the actor believed them to be...."). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Caldwellgreen1 sentence2008People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 671 (Colo.App.2001) ("The preferable practice is to include the mens rea element of an offense in the instruction defining the offense."). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Juradogreen1 sentence2003See People v. Jurado, 30 P.3d 769 (Colo.App.2001)(upon review, we consider the entire record, including the jury instructions as a whole and the evidence and arguments presented at trial). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mattasgreen1 sentence1987E.g., People v. Mattas, 645 P.2d 254, 257-58 (Colo.1982); People v. Martinez, 634 P.2d 26, 30 (Colo.1981). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martinezgreen1 sentence1987E.g., People v. Mattas, 645 P.2d 254, 257-58 (Colo.1982); People v. Martinez, 634 P.2d 26, 30 (Colo.1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yates v. People
green
2 sentences2026Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M, ¶ 35 . ¶ 65 The Eighth Amendment and article II, section 20 provide that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. 2025Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M, ¶ 35 . ¶ 25 Both the Eighth Amendment and its Colorado analogue provide that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. | 2 | 2025–2026 |
Doubleday v. People
green
1 sentence2025Relying on Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3 , he contends that “the impossibility of obtaining a conviction on the underlying offense is a bar to conviction of felony murder.” We think Ewing’s reliance on Doubleday is entirely misplaced, but we need not reach the merits of his argument because, as he acknowledges, his felony murder convictions were vacated as multiplicitous. ¶ 36 That leaves Ewing with a vague and undeveloped argument that the mere submission of the felony murder counts to the jury prejudiced him. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gann v. People
green
1 sentence2003Gann v. People, supra. However, “[t]he failure to include the culpable mental state in the instruction defining the offense is not plain error so long as the instructions, read and considered in their entirety, clearly instruct the jury as to the required mens rea.” Gann v. People, supra, 736 P.2d at 39 ; see People v. Caldtoell, supra. Here, the jury was instructed that the elements of attempted first degree murder after deliberation are that defendant intentionally engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of murder in the first degree after deliberation. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Frysig
green
1 sentence1985We recognize that our' conclusion that attempt liability may be based on knowing conduct or knowingly attained results conflicts with a plausible reading of People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo.1981) that knowledge cannot substitute for intent as a predicate for attempt liability. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Hunter v. District Ct. in & for Twentieth Jud. Dist.
green
1 sentence1983The attempt statute further provides that “[fjactual or legal impossibility of committing the offense is not a defense if the offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be” Id. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Berry
neutral
2 sentences1982Section 18-2-206(2), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), provides that: "A person may not be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense if he is acquitted of the offense which is the object of the conspiracy where the sole evidence of conspiracy is the evidence establishing the commission of the offense which is the object of the conspiracy." [1] As the majority notes, this rule was extended to inchoate crimes in People v. Berry, 191 Colo. 125 , 550 P.2d 332 (1976). [2] For example, in People v. Berry, supra , involving the two inchoate crimes of attempt and conspiracy as in the present case, the 1982Section 18-2-206(2), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), provides that: "A person may not be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense if he is acquitted of the offense which is the object of the conspiracy where the sole evidence of conspiracy is the evidence establishing the commission of the offense which is the object of the conspiracy." [1] As the majority notes, this rule was extended to inchoate crimes in People v. Berry, 191 Colo. 125 , 550 P.2d 332 (1976). [2] For example, in People v. Berry, supra , involving the two inchoate crimes of attempt and conspiracy as in the present case, the | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.