offense violation in District of Columbia

14 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

Case	Followed	Cited
Brown v. United Statesgreen dc · 2002 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2007 2 sentences 2007See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 795 A.2d 56, 60 (D.C.2002) (noting that appellant’s procedurally barred 23-110 motion to vacate his sentence could be properly construed as a Rule 35 motion, since he was claiming that the trial court "imposed multiple punishments for a single offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause,” which is "a claim that his sentence was illegal.”). 11 . 2002Brown v. United States, 795 A.2d 56, 60 (D.C.2002).	2	2
Whalen v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1980 · cited in 3 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1985–1988 2 sentences 1988To hold to the contrary, Whalen argued, would be to interpret the District of Columbia statutes so as to impose multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [12] The Supreme Court, as the majority here correctly points out, noted in Whalen that deference is due to the District of Columbia courts "on matters of purely local concern." Whalen, supra, 445 U.S. at 687 , 100 S.Ct. at 1435 (citing Pernell v. Southall Realty, supra, 416 U.S. at 366 , 94 S.Ct. at 1725 ). 1988To hold to the contrary, Whalen argued, would be to interpret the District of Columbia statutes so as to impose multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [12] The Supreme Court, as the majority here correctly points out, noted in Whalen that deference is due to the District of Columbia courts "on matters of purely local concern." Whalen, supra, 445 U.S. at 687 , 100 S.Ct. at 1435 (citing Pernell v. Southall Realty, supra, 416 U.S. at 366 , 94 S.Ct. at 1725 ).	1	3
Owens v. United Statesgreen dc · 1985 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1986–1987 2 sentences 1987This rule of statutory construction is embodied in D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981). 8 As we noted in Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 861 , 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986), the intent of the D.C. legislation is clear: [B]y enacting D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981), Congress intended that consecutive sentences be imposed for all offenses which are not the same offense under the test established in Blockburger v. United 880 States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), unless the sentencing court expressly states otherwise. 1986*In Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 861 , 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986), upon which appellant chiefly relies, we recognized that “by enacting D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981), Congress intended that consecutive sentences be imposed for all offenses which are not the same offense under the test established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 [ 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 ] ... (1932), unless the sentencing court expressly states otherwise.” 1 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981) in the same manner.	1	2
v. Riegergreen coloctapp · 2019 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 1 sentence 2024Council, Extension of Comments on Bill No. 4-133, at 104-05 (July 20, 1982); see also Rieger, 436 P.3d at 615 (“[a]s recognized by the drafters of a provision in the Model Penal Code similar to ours, the ‘limiting factor’ of the offense is the requirement of specific intent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 241.7 cmt. 3 (Am.	1	1
Berg v. United Statesgreen dc · 1993 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 1 sentence 2013Because we have “a duty to construe statutes in a way which avoids declaring them unconstitutional,” Berg v. United States, 631 A.2d 394, 398 (D.C.1993), that is the construc tion we should apply. 8 With it, there is no reason why we should rest on the example of the uninformed visitor to conclude that § 22-2511 is unconstitutional. 9 Continuing with my discussion of why the circumstances here are unlike those in Lambert , I reject my colleagues’ suggestion that the PMVCF statute punishes conduct that would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community.	1	1
United States v. Hosep Krikor Bajakajian, Aka: Joe Bajakajiangreen ca9 · 1996 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 2 sentences 1998The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which examined the constitutional excessiveness of the full $357,144 forfeiture using a two-factor test: “The property forfeited must be an ‘instrumentality’ of the crime committed, and the value of the property must be proportional to the culpability of the owner.” Bajakajian, supra, — U.S. at —, 118 S.Ct. at 2032 (citing 84 F.3d 334, 336 (1996)). 1998The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which examined the constitutional excessiveness of the full $357,144 forfeiture using a two-factor test: "The property forfeited must be an `instrumentality' of the crime committed, and the value of the property must be proportional to the culpability of the owner." Bajakajian, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2032 (citing 84 F.3d 334, 336 (1996)).	1	1
In Re THBgreen dc · 1996 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 1 sentence 1997Appellants’ theory that the prosecutor “opened the door” to such evidence does not make this one of those “most unusual cases,” when the prosecutor merely responded in reasonable fashion to the defense suggestion that Ms. Smith had sex with a stranger in an alley to spite her boy friend. 27 *1002 IV Finally, Thomas contends that his two rape convictions punished him twice for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 28 Citing Gray v. United States, 544 A.2d 1255 (D.C.1988), and In re T.H.B., 670 A.2d 895, 900 (D.C.1996), cases in which we held that tw	1	1
Reale v. United Statesgreen dc · 1990 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 1 sentence 1993Appellants’ contention that the trial judge erred by not applying the tourist standard 13 is meritless in view of the instruction that was given, requiring a finding of more than minimal interference and the fact that appellants’ conduct resulted in *59 the complete blockage of vehicular traffic at the South Barricade. 14 Cf. Reale v. United States, 573 A.2d 13, 15 (D.C.1990) (under § 9-112(b)(4), forbidding disorderly conduct in Capitol building, tourist standard not an element of the offense but only a test of whether the statute is constitutional as applied).	1	1
Taylor v. United Statesgreen dc · 1986 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 1 sentence 1987Id. at 1095 (footnote omitted); accord Taylor v. United States, 508 A.2d 99 (D.C.1986).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Blockburger v. United States green scotus · 1931 2 sentences 1987This rule of statutory construction is embodied in D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981). 8 As we noted in Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 861 , 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986), the intent of the D.C. legislation is clear: [B]y enacting D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981), Congress intended that consecutive sentences be imposed for all offenses which are not the same offense under the test established in Blockburger v. United 880 States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), unless the sentencing court expressly states otherwise. 1987This rule of statutory construction is embodied in D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981). 8 As we noted in Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 861 , 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986), the intent of the D.C. legislation is clear: [B]y enacting D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981), Congress intended that consecutive sentences be imposed for all offenses which are not the same offense under the test established in Blockburger v. United 880 States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), unless the sentencing court expressly states otherwise.	3	1985–1987
Tucker v. United States green scotus · 1986 2 sentences 1987This rule of statutory construction is embodied in D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981). 8 As we noted in Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 861 , 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986), the intent of the D.C. legislation is clear: [B]y enacting D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981), Congress intended that consecutive sentences be imposed for all offenses which are not the same offense under the test established in Blockburger v. United 880 States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), unless the sentencing court expressly states otherwise. 1986*In Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 861 , 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986), upon which appellant chiefly relies, we recognized that “by enacting D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981), Congress intended that consecutive sentences be imposed for all offenses which are not the same offense under the test established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 [ 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 ] ... (1932), unless the sentencing court expressly states otherwise.” 1 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981) in the same manner.	2	1986–1987
Wharton v. Abbeville School District No. 60 green scotus · 1986 2 sentences 1987This rule of statutory construction is embodied in D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981). 8 As we noted in Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 861 , 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986), the intent of the D.C. legislation is clear: [B]y enacting D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981), Congress intended that consecutive sentences be imposed for all offenses which are not the same offense under the test established in Blockburger v. United 880 States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), unless the sentencing court expressly states otherwise. 1986*In Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 861 , 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986), upon which appellant chiefly relies, we recognized that “by enacting D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981), Congress intended that consecutive sentences be imposed for all offenses which are not the same offense under the test established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 [ 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 ] ... (1932), unless the sentencing court expressly states otherwise.” 1 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted D.C.Code § 23-112 (1981) in the same manner.	2	1986–1987
United States v. Benz green scotus · 1931 2 sentences 1998Benz, supra, 282 U.S. at 307 , 51 S.Ct. 113 . 13 A. The trial court’s resentencing decision did not implicate Francis’s double jeopardy rights, as she secured a stay of execution of the sentence and therefore had not begun serving it at the time of resentencing. 1998Benz, supra, 282 U.S. at 307 , 51 S.Ct. 113 . 13 A. The trial court’s resentencing decision did not implicate Francis’s double jeopardy rights, as she secured a stay of execution of the sentence and therefore had not begun serving it at the time of resentencing.	1	1998–1998
United States v. Bajakajian green scotus · 1998 2 sentences 1998The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which examined the constitutional excessiveness of the full $357,144 forfeiture using a two-factor test: “The property forfeited must be an ‘instrumentality’ of the crime committed, and the value of the property must be proportional to the culpability of the owner.” Bajakajian, supra, — U.S. at —, 118 S.Ct. at 2032 (citing 84 F.3d 334, 336 (1996)). 1998The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which examined the constitutional excessiveness of the full $357,144 forfeiture using a two-factor test: "The property forfeited must be an `instrumentality' of the crime committed, and the value of the property must be proportional to the culpability of the owner." Bajakajian, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2032 (citing 84 F.3d 334, 336 (1996)).	1	1998–1998
Gray v. United States green dc · 1988 1 sentence 1997Appellants’ theory that the prosecutor “opened the door” to such evidence does not make this one of those “most unusual cases,” when the prosecutor merely responded in reasonable fashion to the defense suggestion that Ms. Smith had sex with a stranger in an alley to spite her boy friend. 27 *1002 IV Finally, Thomas contends that his two rape convictions punished him twice for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 28 Citing Gray v. United States, 544 A.2d 1255 (D.C.1988), and In re T.H.B., 670 A.2d 895, 900 (D.C.1996), cases in which we held that tw	1	1997–1997
Pernell v. Southall Realty green scotus · 1974 2 sentences 1988To hold to the contrary, Whalen argued, would be to interpret the District of Columbia statutes so as to impose multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [12] The Supreme Court, as the majority here correctly points out, noted in Whalen that deference is due to the District of Columbia courts "on matters of purely local concern." Whalen, supra, 445 U.S. at 687 , 100 S.Ct. at 1435 (citing Pernell v. Southall Realty, supra, 416 U.S. at 366 , 94 S.Ct. at 1725 ). 1988To hold to the contrary, Whalen argued, would be to interpret the District of Columbia statutes so as to impose multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [12] The Supreme Court, as the majority here correctly points out, noted in Whalen that deference is due to the District of Columbia courts "on matters of purely local concern." Whalen, supra, 445 U.S. at 687 , 100 S.Ct. at 1435 (citing Pernell v. Southall Realty, supra, 416 U.S. at 366 , 94 S.Ct. at 1725 ).	1	1988–1988
North Carolina v. Pearce red scotus · 1969 2 sentences 1982The appeal concerns only the commitment and release orders; it seeks neither to reopen the determination on the merits, i.e., the acquittal by reason of insanity, see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-98 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2197-2198 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); United States v. Tyler, D.C.App., 392 A.2d 511 (1978) (en banc), nor to increase a criminal penalty, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). [3] On May 29, 1980, the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination of appellee to determine whether, at the time of the offense, appellee suffered fro 1982The appeal concerns only the commitment and release orders; it seeks neither to reopen the determination on the merits, i.e., the acquittal by reason of insanity, see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-98 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2197-2198 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); United States v. Tyler, D.C.App., 392 A.2d 511 (1978) (en banc), nor to increase a criminal penalty, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). [3] On May 29, 1980, the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination of appellee to determine whether, at the time of the offense, appellee suffered fro	1	1982–1982
United States v. Scott green scotus · 1978 2 sentences 1982The appeal concerns only the commitment and release orders; it seeks neither to reopen the determination on the merits, i.e., the acquittal by reason of insanity, see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-98 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2197-2198 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); United States v. Tyler, D.C.App., 392 A.2d 511 (1978) (en banc), nor to increase a criminal penalty, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). [3] On May 29, 1980, the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination of appellee to determine whether, at the time of the offense, appellee suffered fro 1982The appeal concerns only the commitment and release orders; it seeks neither to reopen the determination on the merits, i.e., the acquittal by reason of insanity, see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-98 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2197-2198 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); United States v. Tyler, D.C.App., 392 A.2d 511 (1978) (en banc), nor to increase a criminal penalty, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). [3] On May 29, 1980, the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination of appellee to determine whether, at the time of the offense, appellee suffered fro	1	1982–1982
United States v. Tyler green dc · 1978 2 sentences 1982The appeal concerns only the commitment and release orders; it seeks neither to reopen the determination on the merits, i.e., the acquittal by reason of insanity, see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-98 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2197-2198 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); United States v. Tyler, D.C.App., 392 A.2d 511 (1978) (en banc), nor to increase a criminal penalty, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). . 1982The appeal concerns only the commitment and release orders; it seeks neither to reopen the determination on the merits, i.e., the acquittal by reason of insanity, see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-98 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2197-2198 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); United States v. Tyler, D.C.App., 392 A.2d 511 (1978) (en banc), nor to increase a criminal penalty, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). [3] On May 29, 1980, the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination of appellee to determine whether, at the time of the offense, appellee suffered fro	1	1982–1982
Miranda v. Arizona green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 1979NOTES [1] W. stated that on prior occasions the trio had set fires in other apartments in the building. [2] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [3] T. answered "yes" to the question: "Are you willing to answer questions without having an attorney present?" [4] The detectives attempted to contact appellants' parents by telephone, but were unsuccessful. [5] The latter offense is a violation of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-403. 1979NOTES [1] W. stated that on prior occasions the trio had set fires in other apartments in the building. [2] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [3] T. answered "yes" to the question: "Are you willing to answer questions without having an attorney present?" [4] The detectives attempted to contact appellants' parents by telephone, but were unsuccessful. [5] The latter offense is a violation of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-403.	1	1979–1979

Statutes the citing opinions construe

DC § D.C. Code § 23-112 (4) DC § D.C. Code § 22-501 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 265 (1896–2026) CA 126 (1894–2025) IL 121 (1947–2025) OH 120 (1966–2026) IN 106 (1931–2020) MO 88 (1902–2024) FL 56 (1931–2025) KS 53 (1909–2026) WA 49 (1971–2026) TN 47 (1916–2026) VA 42 (1922–2025) MI 35 (1971–2026) OR 31 (1964–2026) PA 30 (1924–2025) NY 29 (1952–2024) GA 26 (1901–2025) NC 25 (1973–2024) NJ 23 (1949–2024) AZ 22 (1923–2025) AL 21 (1915–2025) LA 20 (1951–2023) CO 18 (1982–2026) NM 18 (1975–2025) MN 17 (1945–2016) CT 16 (1957–2020) MA 16 (1977–2023) HI 15 (1952–2013) DC 14 (1979–2024) AR 14 (1877–2021) ID 13 (1952–2026) MD 12 (1977–2022) WI 11 (1908–2025) ND 9 (1912–2023) WV 9 (1961–2023) VT 8 (1994–2018) NE 8 (1977–2025) OK 8 (1911–2019) IA 8 (1871–2018) MT 8 (1951–2025) KY 7 (1917–2016) WY 7 (1977–2000) NH 6 (1971–2017) AK 6 (1982–1996) MS 5 (2001–2025) UT 5 (1993–2015) NV 4 (1994–2011) RI 4 (1970–2017) VI 3 (2012–2014) SD 3 (1987–2018) ME 2 (1998–2000)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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