offense violation in Texas

2024It does not “focus[] the jury’s attention on a specific type of evidence that may support an element of an offense or a defense,” nor does it “improperly tell[] the jury how to consider certain evidence before it.” Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 214 (Tex. Crim.

2024It does not “focus[] the jury’s attention on a specific type of evidence that may support an element of an offense or a defense,” nor does it “improperly tell[] the jury how to consider certain evidence before it.” Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 214 (Tex. Crim.

2019In such a case, the non-statutory instruction would constitute a prohibited comment on the weight of the evidence.” In Giesberg v. State, 984 S.W.2d 245, 250-51 (Tex. Crim.

2018App. 2000) (explaining that “terms not legislatively defined are typically to be understood as ordinary usage allows, and jurors may thus give them any meaning which is acceptable in common parlance”). “[N]either the defendant nor the State is entitled to a special jury instruction relating to a statutory offense or defense if that instruction (1) is not grounded in the Penal Code, (2) is covered by the general charge to the jury, and (3) focuses the jury’s attention on a specific type of evidence that may support an element of an offense or a defense.” Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 212 (citing gener

2011“In determining whether there is ‘other evidence’ tending to connect [the defendant] with the offense in an analysis under article 38.14, a court must ‘eliminate all accomplice evidence and determine whether the other inculpatory facts and circumstances in evidence tend to connect the appellant to the offense.’ ” Young v. State, 95 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (quoting McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)).

2011"In determining whether there is `other evidence' tending to connect [the defendant] with the offense in an analysis under article 38.14, a court must `eliminate all accomplice evidence and determine whether the other inculpatory facts and circumstances in evidence tend to connect the appellant to the offense.'" Young v. State, 95 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (quoting McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)).

2021The court, in determining whether the evidence was reliable, should consider: “(a) the length of time between the offense and the test(s) administered; (b) the number of tests given and the length of time between each test; and (c) whether, and if so, to what extent, any individual characteristics of the defendant were known to the expert in providing his extrapolation.” Id.

2017In determining the reliability of retrograde-extrapolation evidence, courts are to consider and balance: “(a) the length of time between the offense and the test(s) administered; (b) the number of tests given and the length of time between each test; and (c) whether, and if so, to what extent, any individual characteristics of the defendant were known to the expert in providing his extrapolation.” Mata, 46 S.W.3d at 916–17.

2017See Harvey, 78 S.W.3d at 368-69 (“A person commits the offense of violation of protective order if, in violation of an order issued under [one of the certain provisions of the Family Code or Code of Criminal Procedure], the person knowingly or intentionally commits family violence or performs another prohibited act.” (internal quotations omitted)); Avilez v. State, 333 S.W.3d 661, 670 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (“A conviction for violation of a protective order requires proof of a protective order issued under Chapter 85 of the Family Code and proof that the defendant (1)

2015Appellant’s reliance upon Harvey v. State, 78 S.W.3d 368 (Tex.Crim.App.2002), is misplaced as that case concerned the offense of violation of a protective order, not a bond condition.

2017To determine whether an offense is a lesser-included offense of another offense, we use the "cognate-pleading" approach, which we begin by "comparing the elements of the greater offense, as the State pled it in the indictment, with the elements in the statute that defines the lesser offense." Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 525 (Tex. Crim.

2012Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim.

2011See North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (holding that double jeopardy principles protect against second prosecution for same offense following conviction or acquittal and against multiple punishments for same offense).

2011See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (holding that double jeopardy principles protect against second prosecution for same offense following conviction or acquittal and against multiple punishments for same offense).

2004In Duron v. State, 956 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997), the Court held that an indictment that contains all the essential elements of the offense charged is sufficient to meet the requirements of article V, section 12 and that a party is required to object to preserve error for appellate review.

2001In Duron v. State, 956 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997), the Court held that an indictment that contains all the essential elements of the offense charged is sufficient to meet the requirements of article V, section 12 and that a party is required to object to preserve error for appellate review.

2004In determining whether there is “other evidence” tending to connect an accused with the offense in an analysis under article 38.14, a court must “eliminate all accomplice evidence and determine whether the other inculpatory facts and circumstances in evidence tend to connect appellant to the offense.” McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (“[t]he test ... is to eliminate from consideration the evidence of the accomplice witness and then examine the testimony of other witnesses to ascertain if there is inculpatory evide

2003In determining whether there is “other evidence” tending to connect an accused with the offense in an analysis under article 38.14, a court must “eliminate all accomplice evidence and determine whether the other inculpatory facts and circumstances in evidence tend to connect appellant to the offense.” McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (“[t]he test ... is to eliminate from consideration the evidence of the accomplice witness and then examine the testimony of other witnesses to ascertain if there is inculpatory evide

2023App. 2007); see also Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Tex. Crim.

2023Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 651 (citing Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 212 (Tex. Crim.

2025Id. (citing Chacon, 558 S.W.2d at 876 ).

2025Id. at 436 (citing Chacon, 558 S.W.2d at 876 ).

2017See Harvey, 78 S.W.3d at 368-69 (“A person commits the offense of violation of protective order if, in violation of an order issued under [one of the certain provisions of the Family Code or Code of Criminal Procedure], the person knowingly or intentionally commits family violence or performs another prohibited act.” (internal quotations omitted)); Avilez v. State, 333 S.W.3d 661, 670 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (“A conviction for violation of a protective order requires proof of a protective order issued under Chapter 85 of the Family Code and proof that the defendant (1)

2012See Avilez v. State, 333 S.W.3d 661, 670 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)(“A conviction for violation of a protective order requires proof of a protective order issued under Chapter 85 of the Family Code and proof that the defendant (1) one time, (2) intentionally or knowingly violated that order, (3) by committing family violence or another specified action, by communicating with or threatening a protected person, or by going to or near the home or workplace of a protected person.”); Harvey v. State, 78 S.W.3d 368, 368-69 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002)(“A person commits the offense of v

2009Cf. Woods v. State, 801 S.W.2d 932, 943 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990, pet. ref’d) (explaining that the purpose of prohibiting conspiracies is to prevent “socially dangerous combinations”).

2009Cf. Woods v. State , 801 S.W.2d 932, 943 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990, pet. ref'd) (explaining that the purpose of prohibiting conspiracies is to prevent "socially dangerous combinations").

2009DOUBLE JEOPARDY We now turn to Appellant’s first two issues in his original brief, which contend that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the double-jeopardy clause when many of the counts either contained the same elements or same descriptive language.2 See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 , 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977); Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim.

2009DOUBLE JEOPARDY We now turn to Appellant's first two issues in his original brief, which contend that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the double-jeopardy clause when many of the counts either contained the same elements or same descriptive language. (2) See Brown v. Ohio , 432 U.S. 161, 165 , 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977); Langs v. State , 183 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim.

2008This Court has noted the use of such a practice with approval.”); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 , 1209-10 & n. 4 (Utah 1993) (“Numerous state and federal courts have concluded that when a defendant is convicted of an offense but an error occurred at trial, a court has the power to enter judgment for a lesser included offense rather than ordering a retrial if (i) the trier of fact necessarily found facts sufficient to constitute the lesser offense, and (ii) the error did not affect these findings"; listing states and federal jurisdictions that follow this rule); State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 48

2008This Court has noted the use of such a practice with approval.”); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 , 1209-10 & n. 4 (Utah 1993) (“Numerous state and federal courts have concluded that when a defendant is convicted of an offense but an error occurred at trial, a court has the power to enter judgment for a lesser included offense rather than ordering a retrial if (i) the trier of fact necessarily found facts sufficient to constitute the lesser offense, and (ii) the error did not affect these findings"; listing states and federal jurisdictions that follow this rule); State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 48

2008This Court has noted the use of such a practice with approval."); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 , 1209-10 & n. 4 (Utah 1993) ("Numerous state and federal courts have concluded that when a defendant is convicted of an offense but an error occurred at trial, a court has the power to enter judgment for a lesser included offense rather than ordering a retrial if (i) the trier of fact necessarily found facts sufficient to constitute the lesser offense, and (ii) the error did not affect these findings"; listing states and federal jurisdictions that follow this rule); State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 48

2008This Court has noted the use of such a practice with approval.”); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 , 1209-10 & n. 4 (Utah 1993) (“Numerous state and federal courts have concluded that when a defendant is convicted of an offense but an error occurred at trial, a court has the power to enter judgment for a lesser included offense rather than ordering a retrial if (i) the trier of fact necessarily found facts sufficient to constitute the lesser offense, and (ii) the error did not affect these findings"; listing states and federal jurisdictions that follow this rule); State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 48

2023To determine whether a defendant has been subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, we determine whether the defendant was “convicted of more offenses than the legislature intended.” Ex parte Milner, 394 S.W.3d at 507 (quoting Ex parte Ervin, 991 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim.

2015But in double jeopardy/mCiitiple punishment claims, Blockburger is not the solo focus- Ervin v. State$? 991 S.W.2d 804,814 (Tex.Ceim.App.1999)- .IfIthe Court has actual legislative intent of the two statutes, that intent is the critical factor- If not then look at Girdy V.

2008When a defendant has been prosecuted and convicted in a single criminal action of two or more offenses that constitute the same offense, in violation of double jeopardy, the remedy is to apply “the most serious offense test.” See Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim.

2008When a defendant has been prosecuted and convicted in a single criminal action of two or more offenses that constitute the same offense, in violation of double jeopardy, the remedy is to apply “the most serious offense test.” See Ex parte Cavazos , 203 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim.

2005Patterson , 152 S.W.3d at 92 ; Patterson , 96 S.W.3d at 432-33 ; Hutchins , 992 S.W.2d at 632 .

2005Patterson, 152 S.W.3d at 92 ; Patterson, 96 S.W.3d at 432-33 ; Hutchins, 992 S.W.2d at 632 . *89 We sustain point of error nine.

2005Patterson , 152 S.W.3d at 92 ; Patterson , 96 S.W.3d at 432-33 ; Hutchins , 992 S.W.2d at 632 .

2005Patterson, 152 S.W.3d at 92 ; Patterson, 96 S.W.3d at 432-33 ; Hutchins, 992 S.W.2d at 632 . *89 We sustain point of error nine.

2025Id. at 436 (citing Chacon, 558 S.W.2d at 876 ).

2015See Pierce, 113 S.W.3d at 436 -37 (citing Chacon v. State, 558 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim.