106 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richardson v. Stategreen2 sentences2020We cannot agree. [33] In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999), the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that “two or more offenses are the same offense in violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013). 2020Our supreme court has explained that two or more offenses are the same offense in violation of Indiana’s double jeopardy clause “if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999). [14] Hatcher does not contend that his offenses are the same offense under Richardson’s statutory elements test. | 24 | 68 |
Juan M. Garrett v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2020We cannot agree. [33] In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999), the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that “two or more offenses are the same offense in violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013). 2017Appellee’s Br. p. 7. [6] The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 14. “[T]wo or more offenses are the same offense in violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to . . . the actual evidence used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999)). | 13 | 13 |
Guyton v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Our Supreme Court established the following test for deciding double jeopardy claims: [T]wo or more offenses are the same offense in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense. 2 One count of domestic battery and one count of battery were enhanced from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class D felony because of prior convictions for battery. 3 Richards 2012See Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 53 (Ind. 1999) (holding that for two challenged offenses to constitute the same offense in a claim of double jeopardy, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense). 5 In addition to the instances covered by Richardson, our courts have “long adhered to a series of rules of statutory construction and common law that are often described as double jeopardy, | 5 | 5 |
Spivey v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 832 (Ind. 2002). [6] Here, Carle’s only double jeopardy claim is that the child molesting and neglect counts are all based on the same actual evidence.5 In considering this argument, an appellate court will find a double jeopardy violation only where there is a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the factfinder to establish the essential elements of one of the offenses may also have been used to establish all the essential elements of the other challenged offense or offenses. 2016Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 832 (Ind. 2002). | 4 | 4 |
Ronald Rexroat v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2017Rexroat v. State, 966 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. [7] Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits double jeopardy, providing that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” As our supreme court has explained: In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999)[,] this Court concluded that two or more offenses are the same offense in violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one challenged 2015Rexroat v. State, 966 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied. [15] Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits double jeopardy, providing that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” As our supreme court has explained: In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999)[,] this Court concluded that two or more offenses are the same offense in violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one challenged off | 3 | 3 |
Bunch v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Bunch, 937 N.E.2d at 845 (citing Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 49 ). 2015Bunch v. State, 937 N.E.2d 839, 845 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). *22 [46] Under the “statutory elements” test, two or more offenses are the same offense in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution if the essential statutory elements of one of the challenged offenses also establishes the essential statutory elements of another challenged offense. | 3 | 3 |
Cardwell v. Stategreen2 sentences2020The nature of the offense analysis compares the defendant’s actions with the required showing to sustain a conviction under the charged offense, Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008), while the character of the offender analysis permits broader consideration of a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-314 | August 19, 2020 Page 5 of 11 defendant’s character. 2020The nature of the offense analysis compares the defendant’s actions with the required showing to sustain a conviction under the charged offense, Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008), while the character of the offender analysis permits broader consideration of a defendant’s character. | 2 | 3 |
Douglas v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). [9] Ultimately, our determination of appropriateness “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224 . 2020Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). [7] Ultimately, our determination of appropriateness “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224 . | 2 | 2 |
Boesch v. Stategreen1 sentence2020All that is required, as noted above, is that a serious evidentiary dispute regarding the presence of sudden heat is before the jury. [17] The post-conviction court ultimately found that the objection to the voluntary manslaughter instruction lodged by Edmond’s counsel was unlikely to have been sustained because the specific wording of sudden heat as an “element” of the offense was standard at the time.2 Furthermore, the post-conviction court found that Edmond was not prejudiced because, even though the voluntary manslaughter instruction contained errors, it held the State to a higher-than- 2 | 1 | 1 |
Grabarczyk v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Grabarczyk v. State, 772 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). [16] Article 1, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” In Richardson, our supreme court concluded that two or more offenses are the same offense in violation of Article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense. 717 N.E.2d at 49 . | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Johnson v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1103, 1107-08 (Ind. 2001). [T]wo or more offenses are the same offense in violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense. | 1 | 1 |
William T. Calvert v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2015Calvert v. State, 14 N.E.3d 818, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “[T]wo or more offenses are the same offense in violation of Article I, Section 14 11 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). “[I]n order to find a double-jeopardy violation pursuant to the Richardson actual evidence | 1 | 1 |
Jeremy Ellis v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2015Ellis v. State, 29 N.E.3d 792, 797 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), trans. denied. [8] Article 1, Section 14. of the Indiana Constitution prohibits double jeopardy, providing that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained: In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999)[,] this Court concluded that two or more offenses- are the same offense in violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one challeng | 1 | 1 |
Dennis Vermillion v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2014Vermillion v. State, 978 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Lacy v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See id. 2005See id. *1117 I do not think that quote from Lacy is dictum that was unnecessary to the resolution of the case. | 1 | 1 |
Hatchett v. Stategreen1 sentence2001Teer, 738 N.E.2d at 290 ; Hatchett v. State, 740 N.E.2d 920, 924 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Bluck v. Stategreen1 sentence2001Issue Three: Sentence Finally, sentencing determinations rest within the trial court’s discretion *979 and are governed by Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1. 4 Bluck v. State, 716 N.E.2d 507, 511 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Redman v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Redman v. State, 679 N.E.2d 927, 932 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (concluding that vacating the lesser offense which would have “merged” into the greater offense would have been the more appropriate resolution). | 1 | 1 |
| Stone v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Webbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Games v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Teer v. State
green
2 sentences2001Teer, 738 N.E.2d at 290 ; Hatchett v. State, 740 NE.2d 920, 924 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. demied. 2001Teer, 738 N.E.2d at 290 ; Hatchett v. State, 740 N.E.2d 920, 924 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Jarrell v. State
green
1 sentence2018Multiple punishments are for the same offense in violation of double jeopardy, “if, with respect to . . . the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Id. [22] In Count IV, the State charged Kraemer with neglect of a dependent based on the fact that she knowingly placed C.H. in a situation that endangered his life or health as evidenced by the fact that she tested positive for methamphetamine and THC. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
McQueen v. State
green
2 sentences2017Double Jeopardy [15] Tanksley argues that he was “subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy.” Appellant’s Br. at p. 15. “[A] violation of a condition of community corrections does not constitute an offense within the purview of double jeopardy analysis.” McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1244 . 2017“Double jeopardy protection applies only to criminal proceedings, and revocation of community corrections placement proceedings are not criminal proceedings because violations must be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Constance Anderson v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2014Anderson, 989 N.E.2d at 827 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Gabbard v. State
neutral
1 sentence2013Under the actual evidence test, a defendant must demonsterate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish all of the essential elements 3 In our unpublished memorandum opinion, D.T. v. State, 904 N.E.2d 728 , at 4 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), we noted, In construing a statute, our primary goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature, but we presume the legislature intended the language used in the statute “to be applied logically and not to bring about a | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Green v. State
green
2 sentences2008Id. 2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Cox v. State
green
1 sentence2007Specifically, he argues that he had “already been punished for a May 2005 positive drug screen, and for failing to attend GED Classes as well as sanctioned for a positive drug screen on November 20, 2005.” 5 Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2006Whether Whaley's sentences violate Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), reh'g denied. 2006Whether Whaley's sentences violate Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), reh'g denied. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Light v. State
green
2 sentences2005However, the Court held that they were admissible, stating, "Mindful that revolting crimes generate revolting evidence, we conclude that admission of just three photographs depicting the reality of the offense was not error." Id. at 1081 . 2005However, the Court held that they were admissible, stating, “Mindful that revolting crimes generate revolting evidence, we conclude that admission of just three photographs depicting the reality of the offense was not error.” Id. at 1081 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Conrad v. State
green
1 sentence2002We have already held that "the classification of the serious violent felon statute as a Class B felony does not constitute eruel and unusual punishment or punishment disproportionate to the severity of the offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution." Conrad, 747 N.E.2d at 584 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Ray v. Beacon Hudson Mountain Corp.
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Staael v. State
green
2 sentences1999That is to say, the first jury found the [defendant] was not an armed robber, but was unable to agree as to whether he was an unarmed robber."); Staael v. State, 697 P.2d 1050 , 1055 n. 2 (Alaska App.Ct. 1985) ("When a defendant is charged with two offenses in a single proceeding, one of which is a lesser-included offense of the other, and the jury acquits on the greater offense but cannot reach a verdict on the lesser offense, double jeopardy does not bar retrial of the lesser offense except as required by rules of collateral estoppel."), aff'd, 718 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1986); Stone v. Superior C 1999That is to say, the first jury found the [defendant] was not an armed robber, but was unable to agree as to whether he was an unarmed robber.”); Staael v. State, 697 P.2d 1050 , 1055 n. 2 (Alaska App.Ct. 1985) ("When a defendant is charged with two offenses in a single proceeding, one of which is a lesser-included offense of the other, and the jury acquits on the greater offense but cannot reach a verdict on the lesser offense, double jeopardy does not bar retrial of the lesser offense except as required by rules of collateral estoppel.”), aff'd, 718 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1986); Stone v. Superior C | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Matter of JJJ green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Green v. United States green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Benton v. Maryland green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Russell green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Crago green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Bailey v. Indiana Department of State Revenue green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Collins v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Lynch v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Berkley v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Barker v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Jackson v. State neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Stanley v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Foran v. State green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| De Latour v. State neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.