rational basis test in Rhode Island

2013Under the rational basis test, we “merely determine[ ] whether the differential treatment bears a reasonable or rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 91 (R.I.1983); see also Moreau, 15 A.3d at 587 ; Mackie v. State, 936 A.2d 588, 595-96 (R.I.2007).

2005Having answered that question in the affirmative, the Court finds that the statute in question, § 9-19-34.1 , is not violative of state or federal equal protection guaranties. 8 In Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983), the Supreme Court found unconstitutional the provision of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1976 dealing with required preliminary hearings before non-judicial panels to determine the sufficiency of evidence in claims of medical malpractice.

2013Under the rational basis test, we “merely determine[ ] whether the differential treatment bears a reasonable or rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 91 (R.I.1983); see also Moreau, 15 A.3d at 587 ; Mackie v. State, 936 A.2d 588, 595-96 (R.I.2007).

2009See Mackie , 936 A.2d at 596 . *Page 1

2002See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d at 950 -51 and In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d 1356 , 1360 (R.I. 1991).

1995See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d 943, 950-51 (R.I.1991) (upholding constitutionality of DEPCO legislation using rational basis review); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO II), 593 A.2d 1356, 1360 (R.I.1991) (same).

2002See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d at 950 -51 and In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d 1356 , 1360 (R.I. 1991).

1995See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d 943, 950-51 (R.I.1991) (upholding constitutionality of DEPCO legislation using rational basis review); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO II), 593 A.2d 1356, 1360 (R.I.1991) (same).

2008See Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 824, 825 (holding that no fundamental right was implicated by statute and applying a rational-basis test).

2007The Rhode Island Supreme Court has often referred to the rational basis test as a "minimum-scrutiny" test, used to determine "whether a rational relationship exists between [the challenged act or actions] and a legitimate state interest." Cherenzia v. Lynch , 847 A.2d 818 , 825 (R.I. 2004).

2008"Under this analysis, if [this Court] can conceive of any reasonable basis to justify the classification, we will uphold the statute as constitutional." Mackie v. State , No. 2006-63-M.P., slip op. at 13 (R.I., filed Dec. 11, 2007) (quoting Kennedy v. State , 654 A.2d 708 , 712-13 (R.I. 1995)).

2005As such, the regulation of fishing resources need only be reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose under the rational basis test, which presumptively favors the constitutionality of the statute. 9 Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 825 (citing Kennedy v. State, 654 A.2d 708 , 712-13 (R.I. 1995)).

2008The rational basis standard of review has been called a paradigm of judicial restraint, id. at 314, and "[t]he Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." Vance v. Bradley , 440 U.S. 93 , 97 (1979).

2005In fact, "[t]o satisfy the rational basis test, the challenged regulation need not be `the best means of promoting a legitimate government interest.'" Medeiros v. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Comm'n, 327 F. Supp. 2d 145 , 151 (D.R.I. 2004) (quoting New York State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303 , 1309 (2d Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original). "`[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.'" Id. (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 314 (1993)).

2008The rational basis standard of review has been called a paradigm of judicial restraint, id. at 314, and "[t]he Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." Vance v. Bradley , 440 U.S. 93 , 97 (1979).

1990See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 , 99 S.Ct. 939, 943 , 59 L.Ed.2d 171, 176 (1979); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566-67 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 525 (1976).

1996Application in Summary Judgment Context "In regard to the rational basis test, whether the act serves a legitimate objective and whether the act is rationally related to that objective, are questions of law." Power , 582 A.2d at 902 .

1996See Power , 582 A.2d at 902 ; see also Brennan , 529 A.2d at 639-40 (applying test on certified question).

2020The minority in Kirsch highlighted that the majority “seem[ed] to be either subtly altering the rational basis test, or paying lip service to that test but refusing to apply it[.]” Kirsch, 626 A.2d at 381 (Chasanow, J., dissenting, with whom Murphy, C.J., and Rodowsky, J., joined).

2020After explaining that it was the court’s obligation to uphold the ordinance “if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain the classification,” id. at 382 (quoting Creative School v. Board, 219 A.2d 789, 801 (Md. 1966)), the dissenters further explained: “Several states of facts reasonably can be conceived that would justify the student/non-student classification.

2020See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (putting the burden on the state to demonstrate that the legislation was “justified by a compelling government interest and [was] narrowly drawn to serve that interest”). -7- does not impinge on a fundamental right, nor does it create a suspect classification, this Court will employ a rational basis test to determine whether it violates the Rhode Island Constitution.”).7 1 Are College Students a Suspect Class?

2020After explaining that it was the court’s obligation to uphold the ordinance “if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain the classification,” id. at 382 (quoting Creative School v. Board, 219 A.2d 789, 801 (Md. 1966)), the dissenters further explained: “Several states of facts reasonably can be conceived that would justify the student/non-student classification.

2013However, “the proper inquiry is not whether this Court can find a rational basis for the statute, but whether the General Assembly rationally could conclude that the legislation would solve a legitimate problem.” Faria, 947 A.2d at 868 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2013See Riley v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 941 A.2d 198, 211 (R.I.2008) (“It is well settled that under the equal protection clause, legislative classifications that do not affect a fundamental right or a suspect class such as race, alienage, or national origin, are examined under a minimal-scrutiny analysis.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2013Under the rational basis test, we “merely determine[ ] whether the differential treatment bears a reasonable or rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 91 (R.I.1983); see also Moreau, 15 A.3d at 587 ; Mackie v. State, 936 A.2d 588, 595-96 (R.I.2007).

1996See Power , 582 A.2d at 902 ; see also Brennan , 529 A.2d at 639-40 (applying test on certified question).

1994See Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 91-92 (R.I.1983); see also Estate of Coates v. Pacific Engineering, 71 Haw. 358 , 791 P.2d 1257 (1990) (holding exclusivity provision of Hawaii’s workers’ compensation statute not vio-lative of equal-protection or due-process guarantees after applying rational-basis test).

1994See Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 91-92 (R.I.1983); see also Estate of Coates v. Pacific Engineering, 71 Haw. 358 , 791 P.2d 1257 (1990) (holding exclusivity provision of Hawaii’s workers’ compensation statute not vio-lative of equal-protection or due-process guarantees after applying rational-basis test).