rational basis test in Kentucky

2023“Under the rational basis test, a classification must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Howard, 969 S.W.2d at 703 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 113 S. Ct. 2637 , 125 L.

2020Howard, 969 S.W.2d at 703 (“Under the rational basis test, a classification must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”).7 Under the rational basis test, the “person 7 If the classification at issue involved a suspect class, such as race, or interfered with a fundamental right we would use a more rigorous examination standard.

2023Therefore, the rational basis test rather than strict scrutiny is the appropriate constitutional standard to analyze KRS 118.176. -14- “A person challenging a law upon equal protection grounds under the rational basis test has a very difficult task because a law must be upheld if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Crutchfield, 157 S.W.3d at 624 .

2011Therefore, a rational basis test is the appropriate constitutional standard. 157 S.W.3d at 623-24 (citations omitted).

2026The Supreme Court of Kentucky described the rational-basis analysis, albeit in an equal protection context, in Steven Lee Enterprises v. Varney, 36 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Ky. 2000), relying upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heller v. Doe by Doe, -16- 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 , 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642-43 , 125 L.

2026The Supreme Court of Kentucky described the rational-basis analysis, albeit in an equal protection context, in Steven Lee Enterprises v. Varney, 36 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Ky. 2000), relying upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heller v. Doe by Doe, -16- 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 , 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642-43 , 125 L.

2026Mobley v. Armstrong, 978 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Ky. 1998). “[T]he burden is on the party claiming a violation of equal protection to establish that the statutory distinction is without a rational basis.” Id.

2026Mobley v. Armstrong, 978 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Ky. 1998). “[T]he burden is on the party claiming a violation of equal protection to establish that the statutory distinction is without a rational basis.” Id.

2024Parker [v. Webster Co. Coal, LLC, 529 S.W.3d 759, 465 (Ky. 2017)]. [KRS] 431.076 explicitly permits defendants who were acquitted to file for expungement: “A person who has been charged with a criminal offense and who has been acquitted of the charges . . . may petition the court in which the disposition of the charges was made to expunge all charges.” [KRS] 431.076(l)(b).

2024Parker [v. Webster Co. Coal, LLC, 529 S.W.3d 759, 465 (Ky. 2017)]. [KRS] 431.076 explicitly permits defendants who were acquitted to file for expungement: “A person who has been charged with a criminal offense and who has been acquitted of the charges . . . may petition the court in -11- which the disposition of the charges was made to expunge all charges.” [KRS] 431.076(l)(b).

2019While strict and 5 intermediate scrutiny apply when a “statute makes a classification on the basis of a ‘suspect’ or ‘quasi-suspect’ class,” the rational basis test is used when “the statute merely affects social or economic policy[.]” Id. at 466 (quoting D.F. v. Codell, 127 S.W.3d 571, 575-76 (Ky. 2003)).

2019While strict and 5 intermediate scrutiny apply when a “statute makes a classification on the basis of a ‘suspect’ or ‘quasi-suspect’ class,” the rational basis test is used when “the statute merely affects social or economic policy[.]” Id. at 466 (quoting D.F. v. Codell, 127 S.W.3d 571, 575-76 (Ky. 2003)).

2026The Supreme Court of Kentucky described the rational-basis analysis, albeit in an equal protection context, in Steven Lee Enterprises v. Varney, 36 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Ky. 2000), relying upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heller v. Doe by Doe, -16- 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 , 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642-43 , 125 L.

2026The Supreme Court of Kentucky described the rational-basis analysis, albeit in an equal protection context, in Steven Lee Enterprises v. Varney, 36 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Ky. 2000), relying upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heller v. Doe by Doe, -16- 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 , 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642-43 , 125 L.

2017See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 ; 364 (1973) (emphasis added) .. 18 The rational-basis test imposes an admittedly enormously high bar for challengers seeking to invalidate perceived unconstitutional statutes.

2017See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 ; 364 (1973) (emphasis added) .. 18 The rational-basis test imposes an admittedly enormously high bar for challengers seeking to invalidate perceived unconstitutional statutes.

2026See -17- Zuckerman v. Bevin, 565 S.W.3d 580, 595 (Ky. 2018) (“[A] statute that merely affects social or economic policy . . . is subject to a less searching form of judicial scrutiny, i.e. the rational basis test.” (internal quotation marks omitted).) First, ARKK contends that there are two factual issues to be decided: 1) whether the current conditions and demands of society make the Legislature’s decision to ban select skill games by labeling them as gambling is beyond police power; and 2) whether the Legislature’s decision to ban skill-based games like the Game was motivated by economic pro

2026See -17- Zuckerman v. Bevin, 565 S.W.3d 580, 595 (Ky. 2018) (“[A] statute that merely affects social or economic policy . . . is subject to a less searching form of judicial scrutiny, i.e. the rational basis test.” (internal quotation marks omitted).) First, ARKK contends that there are two factual issues to be decided: 1) whether the current conditions and demands of society make the Legislature’s decision to ban select skill games by labeling them as gambling is beyond police power; and 2) whether the Legislature’s decision to ban skill-based games like the Game was motivated by economic pro

2018In Elk Hom Coal, we declined to address this “heightened” standard because of our view that the legislation in question failed even the rational basis test as “arbitrary and irrational.” 163 S.W.3d at 421 . 23 Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d 456, 466-67 (Ky. 2004) (upholding sales and use tax exemption for gasoline sales for industrial- type commercial vessels); Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Ky. 1998) (upholding juvenile DUI statute which imposes lower blood alcohol level for drivers under 21 years of age).

2018In Elk Hom Coal, we declined to address this “heightened” standard because of our view that the legislation in question failed even the rational basis test as “arbitrary and irrational.” 163 S.W.3d at 421 . 23 Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d 456, 466-67 (Ky. 2004) (upholding sales and use tax exemption for gasoline sales for industrial- type commercial vessels); Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Ky. 1998) (upholding juvenile DUI statute which imposes lower blood alcohol level for drivers under 21 years of age).

2011Following in the footsteps of the United States Supreme Court, this Court has also found equal protection violations based upon the rational basis standard. 30 For instance, in Commonwealth Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Kentec Coal Co., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Ky.2005), the procedure of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet required prepayment before mining permittees could obtain a formal hearing to challenge an assessment.

2011Such a notion flies in the face of the belief of “equal justice under the law.” Id. at 725 . 31 Thus, our precedent, along with that of the United States Supreme Court, demonstrates that the rational basis standard, while deferential, is certainly not demure.

2018In Elk Hom Coal, we declined to address this “heightened” standard because of our view that the legislation in question failed even the rational basis test as “arbitrary and irrational.” 163 S.W.3d at 421 . 23 Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d 456, 466-67 (Ky. 2004) (upholding sales and use tax exemption for gasoline sales for industrial- type commercial vessels); Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Ky. 1998) (upholding juvenile DUI statute which imposes lower blood alcohol level for drivers under 21 years of age).

2018In Elk Hom Coal, we declined to address this “heightened” standard because of our view that the legislation in question failed even the rational basis test as “arbitrary and irrational.” 163 S.W.3d at 421 . 23 Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d 456, 466-67 (Ky. 2004) (upholding sales and use tax exemption for gasoline sales for industrial- type commercial vessels); Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Ky. 1998) (upholding juvenile DUI statute which imposes lower blood alcohol level for drivers under 21 years of age).

2012See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 , 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996); Michigan Dept. of State Police, 490 F.3d at 501 (“We evaluate statutes that do not implicate a [person’s] fundamental rights by utilizing a rational-basis standard of review.”).

2012See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 , 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996); Michigan Dept. of State Police, 490 F.3d at 501 (“We evaluate statutes that do not implicate a [person’s] fundamental rights by utilizing a rational-basis standard of review.”).

2012It is important to emphasize that, in applying the rational-basis test, we must presume Kentucky’s SORA is constitutional; in other words, “an act should be held valid unless it clearly offends the limitations and prohibitions of the Constitution.” Stephens, 894 S.W.2d at 626 ; Brooks v. Island Creek Coal Co., 678 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Ky.App.1984).

1997What these standards mean is that appellate review of this issue will involve the use of the rational basis test. 3 Although the issue of whether KRS 342.730(4) amounts to age discrimination in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Kentucky Constitution is one of first impression in Kentucky, a similar issue was raised in Brooks, supra. In Brooks , the argument concerned the constitutionality of a provision in KRS 342.730(l)(b) (since repealed) which discontinued workers’ compensation benefits “after the employee becomes eligible for normal old age benefits under the

2012Co., 894 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Ky.1995); Edwards v. Louisville Ladder, 957 S.W.2d 290, 295-96 (Ky.App.1997) (substantive due process is violated under the rational-basis test if the “deprivation[ ] of liberty rest[s] on grounds wholly irrelevant to a reasonable state objective”).

2012It is important to emphasize that, in applying the rational-basis test, we must presume Kentucky’s SORA is constitutional; in other words, “an act should be held valid unless it clearly offends the limitations and prohibitions of the Constitution.” Stephens, 894 S.W.2d at 626 ; Brooks v. Island Creek Coal Co., 678 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Ky.App.1984).

2006Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 , 96 S.Ct. 2562 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976); Earthgrains v. Cranz, 999 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. App.1999), overruled on other grounds, City of Louisville v. Slack, 39 S.W.3d 809 (Ky.2001).

2001Stephens, supra at 627 ; see also Earthgrains v. Cranz, Ky.App., 999 S.W.2d 218, 223 (1999).

2025Sys., 25 S.W.3d 88, 93 (Ky. 2000) (“Under the rational basis test, a classification must be upheld 12 against an equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).

2025To meet the rational basis standard, a “legislative act must be rationally connected to the purpose of the -21- power for which the legislative body’s power exists.” City of Lebanon v. Goodin, 436 S.W.3d 505, 510 (Ky. 2014).

2023The Sims Court ultimately applied the rational basis test that was rejected by Woodall to approve the legislation, stating “[w]e have long . . . held that a legislative enactment is not necessarily local nor repugnant to Section 59 of -21- our Kentucky Constitution because such enactment applies to only one class or group of subjects, provided that the classification thus made is not unreasonable nor arbitrary.” Id. at 495 (citation omitted).

2012See Michigan Dept, of State Police, 490 F.3d at 501 ; State v. Smith, 323 Wis.2d 377 , 780 N.W.2d 90, 96 (2010); State v. Robinson, 873 So.2d 1205,1217 (Fla.2004).

2012See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 , 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996); Michigan Dept. of State Police, 490 F.3d at 501 (“We evaluate statutes that do not implicate a [person’s] fundamental rights by utilizing a rational-basis standard of review.”).

2012See Michigan Dept, of State Police, 490 F.3d at 501 ; State v. Smith, 323 Wis.2d 377 , 780 N.W.2d 90, 96 (2010); State v. Robinson, 873 So.2d 1205,1217 (Fla.2004).

2012Such a deferential view of government action cannot adequately protect members of non-mainstream faiths from governmental encroachment upon their religious liberty and should be rejected because “construction [of a constitutional provision that is] so loose as to virtually nullify the section, which is mandatory in its terms, should not be adopted.” Bd. of Penitentiary Comm’rs v. Spencer, 159 Ky. 255 , 166 S.W. 1017, 1018 (1914).

2012Such a deferential view of government action cannot adequately protect members of non-mainstream faiths from governmental encroachment upon their religious liberty and should be rejected because “construction [of a constitutional provision that is] so loose as to virtually nullify the section, which is mandatory in its terms, should not be adopted.” Bd. of Penitentiary Comm’rs v. Spencer, 159 Ky. 255 , 166 S.W. 1017, 1018 (1914).