rational basis test in Vermont

2021“As a general rule, challenges under the Equal Protection Clause are reviewed by the rational basis test, whereby distinctions will be found unconstitutional only if similar persons are treated differently on wholly arbitrary and capricious grounds.” Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 265 , 692 A.2d 384, 395-96 (1997) (quotation 13 omitted).

2021“As a general rule, challenges under the Equal Protection Clause are reviewed by the rational basis test, whereby distinctions will be found unconstitutional only if similar persons are treated differently on wholly arbitrary and capricious grounds.” Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 265 , 692 A.2d 384, 395-96 (1997) (quotation 13 omitted).

2000Equal protection claims must be reviewed under the rational basis test, where different treatment of different persons or groups will be permitted unless such treatment is based upon “wholly arbitrary and capricious grounds.” Id. at 199 , 485 A.2d at 136 .

2000Equal protection claims must be reviewed under the rational basis test, where different treatment of different persons or groups will be permitted unless such treatment is based upon “wholly arbitrary and capricious grounds.” Id. at 199 , 485 A.2d at 136 .

1999See In re T.I.S., 586 N.E.2d 690 (Ill.

1999See In re T.I.S., 224 Ill.App.3d 475 , 166 Ill.Dec. 732 , 586 N.E.2d 690 (1991).

2005Thus, we have held that “the test of validity of governmental action under the clause is ‘the rational basis test used for federal equal protection analysis.’” Id. (quoting Alexander v. Town of Barton, 152 Vt. 148, 157 , 565 A.2d 1294, 1299 (1989)).

2005Thus, we have held that “the test of validity of governmental action under the clause is ‘the rational basis test used for federal equal protection analysis.’” Id. (quoting Alexander v. Town of Barton, 152 Vt. 148, 157 , 565 A.2d 1294, 1299 (1989)).

2023See, e.g., Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 303 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiff must “negate every conceivable basis which might support the legislation” challenged). 17 ¶ 30.

2016All parties agree that the rational-basis test applies to Stinson’s federal constitutional claim. “[W]here ordinary commercial transactions are at issue, rational basis review requires deference to reasonable underlying legislative judgments.” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 566 U.S. 673, 680 , 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (quotation omitted); see Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that where an economic regulation is challenged “under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,” the rational-basis test is used). ¶ 32.

2016All parties agree that the rational-basis test applies to Stinson’s Federal constitutional claim. “[W]here ordinary commercial transactions are at issue, rational-basis review requires deference to reasonable underlying legislative judgments.” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (quotation omitted); see Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that where an economic regulation is challenged “under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,” the rational-basis test is used). ¶ 32.

2016All parties agree that the rational-basis test applies to Stinson’s federal constitutional claim. “[W]here ordinary commercial transactions are at issue, rational basis review requires deference to reasonable underlying legislative judgments.” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 566 U.S. 673, 680 , 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (quotation omitted); see Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that where an economic regulation is challenged “under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,” the rational-basis test is used). ¶ 32.

2016All parties agree that the rational-basis test applies to Stinson’s federal constitutional claim. “[W]here ordinary commercial transactions are at issue, rational basis review requires deference to reasonable underlying legislative judgments.” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 566 U.S. 673, 680 , 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (quotation omitted); see Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that where an economic regulation is challenged “under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,” the rational-basis test is used). ¶ 32.

2010“Consistent with the core presumption of inclusion,” Baker requires some consideration of the “relative ‘weights’ or dignities of the contending interests.” 170 Vt. at 214 , 744 A.2d at 879 (citation omitted).

2010“Consistent with the core presumption of inclusion,” Baker requires some consideration of the “relative ‘weights’ or dignities of the contending interests.” 170 Vt. at 214 , 744 A.2d at 879 (citation omitted).

2010Relying primarily on a thirty-year-old case that imposed a rational-basis analysis in upholding a 1946 law intended to "`insure the rapid advancement of men of ability to positions of responsibility and the elimination of men who have reached their ceilings of performance,'" Vance, 440 U.S. at 99 , 99 S.Ct. 939 (quoting Congressional Record), the majority's decision is in a time warp unaffected by our Baker decision or contemporary societal values that underlie the ADEA and other federal and state laws. ¶ 82.

2010Relying primarily on a thirty-year-old case that imposed a rational-basis analysis in upholding a 1946 law intended to ‘“insure the rapid advancement of men of ability to positions of responsibility and the elimination of men who have reached their ceilings of performance,”’ Vance, 440 U.S. at 99 (quoting Congressional Record), the majority’s decision is in a time warp unaffected by our Baker decision or contemporary societal values that underlie the ADEA and other federal and state laws. ¶ 82.

2010As Justice Thurgood Marshall stated in his dissent in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 , 96 S.Ct. 2562 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), wherein he called for application of a standard of review similar to our Baker standard and more rigorous than the rational-basis standard applied by the majority: There is simply no reason why a statute that tells able-bodied police officers, ready and willing to work, that they no longer have the right to earn a living in their chosen profession merely because they are 50 years old should be judged by the same

2010As Justice Thurgood Marshall stated in his dissent in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), wherein he called for application of a standard of review similar to our Baker standard and more rigorous than the rational-basis standard applied by the majority: There is simply no reason why a statute that tells able-bodied police officers, ready and willing to work, that they no longer have the right to earn a living in their chosen profession merely because they are 50 years old should be judged by the same minimal standards of rationality

2009Assocs., 2005 VT 112, ¶ 12 (articulating the rational basis test thus: “governmental action is unconstitutional only if it treats similar persons differently for arbitrary and capricious reasons” (quotation omitted)).

2009Conversely, we will uphold the reappraisal “if we can conceive of any reasonable policy or purpose for it,” id., and if it treated similarly situated taxpayers equitably, see id. ¶ 11.

2003See, e.g., Oxx v. Dep't of Taxes, 159 Vt. 371, 376 , 618 A.2d 1321, 1324 (1992) (statute requiring taxpayers to pay Vermont income tax on federal recapture of investment credit held unconstitutional as applied to taxpayers who had not derived a state income tax benefit from the investment credit); State v. Harrington, 68 Vt. 622, 629 , 35 A. 515 , 517 (1896) (Legislature may impose a license tax upon one occupation and not another, so long as there is no discrimination among those engaged in the occupation taxed).

2003See, e.g., Oxx v. Dep't of Taxes, 159 Vt. 371, 376 , 618 A.2d 1321, 1324 (1992) (statute requiring taxpayers to pay Vermont income tax on federal recapture of investment credit held unconstitutional as applied to taxpayers who had not derived a state income tax benefit from the investment credit); State v. Harrington, 68 Vt. 622, 629 , 35 A. 515 , 517 (1896) (Legislature may impose a license tax upon one occupation and not another, so long as there is no discrimination among those engaged in the occupation taxed).

1999Cf. Thornton v. Hunt, 852 F.2d 526, 527 (11th Cir. 1988) (classification denying “good time” credits to prisoners serving sentences greater than ten years is rationally related to legitimate purpose of preventing early release of serious offenders).

1999Cf. Thornton v. Hunt, 852 F.2d 526, 527 (11th Cir.1988) (classification denying "good time" credits to prisoners serving sentences greater than ten years is rationally related to legitimate purpose of preventing early release of serious offenders).

1999I, art. 7, is generally coextensive with the equivalent guarantee in the United States Constitution, and imports similar methods of analysis.” Brigham, 166 Vt. at 265 , 692 A.2d at 395 ; see also Lorrain, 160 Vt. at 212 , 628 A.2d at 550 (test under Common Benefits Clause is same as test under federal Equal Protection Clause).

1999I, art. 7, is generally coextensive with the equivalent guarantee in the United States Constitution, and imports similar methods of analysis." Brigham, 166 Vt. at 265 , 692 A.2d at 395 ; see also Lorrain, 160 Vt. at 212 , 628 A.2d at 550 (test under Common Benefits Clause is same as test under federal Equal Protection Clause).

1999I, art. 7, is generally coextensive with the equivalent guarantee in the United States Constitution, and imports similar methods of analysis." Brigham, 166 Vt. at 265 , 692 A.2d at 395 ; see also Lorrain, 160 Vt. at 212 , 628 A.2d at 550 (test under Common Benefits Clause is same as test under federal Equal Protection Clause).

1999I, art. 7, is generally coextensive with the equivalent guarantee in the United States Constitution, and imports similar methods of analysis.” Brigham, 166 Vt. at 265 , 692 A.2d at 395 ; see also Lorrain, 160 Vt. at 212 , 628 A.2d at 550 (test under Common Benefits Clause is same as test under federal Equal Protection Clause).

1997Johnsbury, 150 Vt. 351, 357 , 554 A.2d 233, 238 (1988) (quoting Colchester Fire Dist.

1997Johnsbury, 150 Vt. 351, 357 , 554 A.2d 233, 238 (1988) (quoting Colchester Fire Dist.

1997State v. Stewart, 140 Vt. 389, 402 , 438 A.2d 671, 677 (1981).

1997State v. Stewart, 140 Vt. 389, 402 , 438 A.2d 671, 677 (1981).

1989See Stoneman v. Vergennes Union High School Dist. #5, 139 Vt. 50, 56 , 421 A.2d 1307, 1310 (1980).

1989See Stoneman v. Vergennes Union High School Dist. #5, 139 Vt. 50, 56 , 421 A.2d 1307, 1310 (1980).

1980Pabst v. Commissioner of Taxes, 136 Vt. 126 , 131 n.2 and 132-33, 388 A.2d 1181 , 1184 n.2 and 1184—85 (1978); In re Estate of Eddy, 135 Vt. 468, 472-73 , 380 A.2d 530, 534 (1977).

1980Pabst v. Commissioner of Taxes, 136 Vt. 126 , 131 n.2 and 132-33, 388 A.2d 1181 , 1184 n.2 and 1184—85 (1978); In re Estate of Eddy, 135 Vt. 468, 472-73 , 380 A.2d 530, 534 (1977).