rational basis test in Utah

2010Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 29 , 116 P.3d 295 (quoting Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 356 (Utah 1989)) (alternation in original).

2008Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 358-59 (Utah 1989).

2014Thus, with regard to substantive due process challenges to economic regulations, "[the almost universal" standard embraced by the courts today is "a rational basis test so tolerant that the substantive content of economic statutes rarely violates due process." Wells 681 P.2d at 205 . 14 {35 That approach has not been broadly extended beyond the realm of economic rights, With respect to noneconomic rights, the court has continued to uphold certain substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.

2014See Wells, 681 P.2d at 205 (citing scholarly literature and cases addressed to the "almost universal opinion that substantive due process was abused in invalidat ing economic regulations in the first third of this century" under Lockner and its progeny, while suggesting that the judicial reaction to this era "has culminated in a rational basis test so tolerant that the substantive content of economic statutes rarely violates due process"); United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.

2005Additionally, we review statutory classifications that implicate rights protected by the open courts clause under “heightened scrutiny.” Judd, 2004 UT 91 at ¶ 19 , 103 P.3d 135 ; see also Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580-82 (Utah 1993) (holding that “a standard of scrutiny stricter than the rational-basis standard governed when a discrimination implicated a right protected by the open courts provision”).

1997See Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 582-83 (Utah 1993).

2014Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 347 , 127 S.Ct. 1786 , 167 LEd.2d 655 (2007) (describing Lochner as "a time when [the] Court presumed to make ... binding judgments for society under the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause," and cau- - tioning that it is [ground] we should not seek to reclaim"); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 130 S.Ct 3020, 3062 , 177 LEd.2d 894 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (étating that the "now-repudiated Lochner line of cases attests to the dangers of judicial overconfidence in using substantive due process to advance a broad theo-. ry of the right or the good

2014Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 347 , 127 S.Ct. 1786 , 167 LEd.2d 655 (2007) (describing Lochner as "a time when [the] Court presumed to make ... binding judgments for society under the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause," and cau- - tioning that it is [ground] we should not seek to reclaim"); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 130 S.Ct 3020, 3062 , 177 LEd.2d 894 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (étating that the "now-repudiated Lochner line of cases attests to the dangers of judicial overconfidence in using substantive due process to advance a broad theo-. ry of the right or the good

2014Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 347 , 127 S.Ct. 1786 , 167 LEd.2d 655 (2007) (describing Lochner as "a time when [the] Court presumed to make ... binding judgments for society under the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause," and cau- - tioning that it is [ground] we should not seek to reclaim"); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 130 S.Ct 3020, 3062 , 177 LEd.2d 894 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (étating that the "now-repudiated Lochner line of cases attests to the dangers of judicial overconfidence in using substantive due process to advance a broad theo-. ry of the right or the good

2014Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 347 , 127 S.Ct. 1786 , 167 LEd.2d 655 (2007) (describing Lochner as "a time when [the] Court presumed to make ... binding judgments for society under the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause," and cau- - tioning that it is [ground] we should not seek to reclaim"); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 130 S.Ct 3020, 3062 , 177 LEd.2d 894 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (étating that the "now-repudiated Lochner line of cases attests to the dangers of judicial overconfidence in using substantive due process to advance a broad theo-. ry of the right or the good

2014The ―mere recitation‖28 that the 21 Id., 458 U.S. at 725 ; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975). 22 Miss.

2014The ―mere recitation‖28 that the 21 Id., 458 U.S. at 725 ; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975). 22 Miss.

2015Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶30 , 103 P.3d 135 (stating that, for nonfundamental rights, "we apply a rational basis test in substantive due process cases").

2015Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶30 , 103 P.3d 135 (stating that, for nonfundamental rights, "we apply a rational basis test in substantive due process cases").

1994Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820-21 (Utah 1991). "`A presumption of constitutionality is extended to statutes ... and that presumption is sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of a classification created by the statute unless the classification creates an invidious discrimination, or bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.'" Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993) (quoting J.J.N.P.

1994Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820-21 (Utah 1991).

1993Id. at 889-90 . .

1993See generally Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 821 (Utah 1991); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887-88 (Utah 1988); J.J.N.P.

2021“Although . . . the 20190614-CA 7 2021 UT App 46 State v. Herrera jury has an inherent mercy-dispensing power as an inevitable consequence of the jury system, . . . the jury does not have the right to find a fact and then refuse to render the verdict which such a finding necessarily requires.” Crick, 675 P.2d at 531 (quotation simplified).

2021See generally State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ¶ 20 , 20 P.3d 888 (“[H]armless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings.

2021See generally State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ¶ 20 , 20 P.3d 888 (“[H]armless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings.

2021Accord Mitchell, 2020 UT 26, ¶ 43 . ¶11 Here, because Rosen did not raise a uniform operation of laws argument below, we do not directly address the constitutionality of the statutory scheme.

2020See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (applying the rational basis test to educators’ editorial control over “school-sponsored expressive activities”).

2017See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 1991), as amended on denial of reh'g (Jan. 9, 1992) (declining to undertake Pike balancing and ruling that a nondiscriminatory "ordinance would violate the commerce clause only if the particular means chosen to achieve its goals were irrational, arbitrary or unrelated to those goals.”); Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 2001) (ruling that the plaintiff "failed to carry its burden of proving that ‘the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative lo

2017See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 1991), as amended on denial of reh'g (Jan. 9, 1992) (declining to undertake Pike balancing and ruling that a nondiscriminatory "ordinance would violate the commerce clause only if the particular means chosen to achieve its goals were irrational, arbitrary or unrelated to those goals.”); Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 2001) (ruling that the plaintiff "failed to carry its burden of proving that ‘the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative lo

2014Under rational basis review, the 52 Supra ¶ 75 (state has interest in ―giving voice to those with a demonstrated commitment‖); supra ¶ 78 (―[a] mother‘s parental rights . . . give[] her a voice in the child‘s upbringing‖); supra ¶ 82 (commitment, which mother shows simply by giving birth, is an ―important prerequisite[] . . . to the voice that accompanies [the parental right] in the context of an adoption‖). 53 As I point out above, the stereotype that women are inhe- rently well-suited and competent parents implicates the mir- ror stereotype that men are inherently less caring, less skilled,

2010Id; see also United States v. Angelos, 345 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1235-36 (D.Utah 2004), aff'd, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir.2006) (applying a rational basis review to petitioner’s claim that sentencing guidelines violated equal protection and due process); United States v. Bredy, 209 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.2000)(“Due process requires only that a sentencing scheme be rational.”); United States v. Eaton, 2000 WL 293789 at *3, 2000 U.S.App.

2010Id; see also United States v. Angelos, 345 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1235-36 (D.Utah 2004), aff'd, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir.2006) (applying a rational basis review to petitioner’s claim that sentencing guidelines violated equal protection and due process); United States v. Bredy, 209 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.2000)(“Due process requires only that a sentencing scheme be rational.”); United States v. Eaton, 2000 WL 293789 at *3, 2000 U.S.App.