rational basis test in Colorado

2021Claim Appeals Off., 2017 COA 71, ¶ 20 (citations omitted). ¶ 45 “Under the rational basis test, ‘a statutory classification is presumed constitutional and does not violate equal protection unless it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the classification does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.’” Id. at ¶ 21 (quoting Pace Membership Warehouse v. Axelson, 938 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. 1997)).

2016Moreover, “[s]imply because a statutory classification creates a harsh result in one instance does not mean that the statute fails to meet constitutionality requirements under the rational basis standard.” Diaz, ¶ 25, 347 P.3d at 627 (quoting Pace Membership Warehouse v. Axelson, 938 P.2d 504, 507 (Colo. 1997)).

1994Equal protection of the law requires, under a rational basis analysis, that “a governmental classification which singles out a group of persons for disparate treatment be rationally founded on differences that are real and not illusory and that such classification be reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.” Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 675 (Colo.1987); see also Bath v. Department of Revenue, supra. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that their applications were handled differently than those submitted by private investigators who are current or retired law enforcement officer

1992Rational Basis Review Under the rational basis test, section 24-10-114(1) is presumed constitutional and can create a classification that affords disparate treatment to different groups only if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 5 Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 675 (Colo.1987).

1992We decline to follow the jurisprudence of the Trujillo court because we do not recognize a right' to full recovery for damages, nor do we view (as claimants concede) the rational basis inquiry to be ‘largely toothless.’ See, e.g., Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 50 (Colo.1984) (a legislative classification failed under a rational basis test); and Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo.1989) (statute failed to pass rational basis test). .

1992We decline to follow the jurisprudence of the Trujillo court because we do not recognize a right' to full recovery for damages, nor do we view (as claimants concede) the rational basis inquiry to be ‘largely toothless.’ See, e.g., Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 50 (Colo.1984) (a legislative classification failed under a rational basis test); and Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo.1989) (statute failed to pass rational basis test). .

1996Under the rational basis standard, we presume that section 13-21-101 is constitutional, see Duran, 883 P.2d at 482 , and place the burden upon the Rodriguezes to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statutory classification: (1) has no rational basis in fact; or (2) is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.

1996I consider the two prongs of the rational basis test in turn, considering first whether there is “a rational basis in fact for the statutory classification.” Duran, 883 P.2d at 482 .

2016Taxation , 2013 CO 39, ¶22 (quoting Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ. , 649 P.2d 1005, 1014 (Colo. 1982)). ¶20 Both parties agree that the rational basis test applies to an equal protection challenge of economic legislation such as the net worth provision.

2016Taxation, 2013 CO 39, ¶ 22 , 304 P.3d 217 (quoting Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1014 (Colo.1982)). ¶ 20 Both parties agree that the rational basis test applies to an equal protection challenge of economic legislation such as the net worth provision.

2025Notably, the court permitted Pettigrew to assert a traditional self-defense at trial, although the jury rejected it. ¶ 60 “[W]e review substantive due process claims that [do not] implicate a fundamental right under the rational basis test: the state must ‘demonstrate that the legislation bears some reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.’” People v. Maloy, 2020 COA 71, ¶ 52 , 465 P.3d 146, 158 (quoting People v. Young, 859 P.2d 814, 818 (Colo. 1993)). ¶ 61 The detention facility exception readily survives rational basis review.

2020As with equal protection, we review substantive due process claims that don’t implicate a fundamental right under the rational basis test: the state must “demonstrate that the legislation bears some reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.” People v. Young, 859 P.2d 814, 818 (Colo. 1993).

1996Harris v. The Ark, 810 P.2d 226, 230 (Colo. 1991); accord, e.g., Bath v. Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 758 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Colo.1988); Dawson v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n., 664 P.2d 702, 707 (Colo.1983).

1996Dawson v. Public Employees Retirement Ass’n, 664 P.2d 702 (Colo.1983).

2016Moreover, “[s]imply because a statutory classification creates a harsh result in one instance does not mean that the statute fails to meet constitutionality requirements under the rational basis standard.” Diaz, ¶ 25, 347 P.3d at 627 (quoting Pace Membership Warehouse v. Axelson, 938 P.2d 504, 507 (Colo. 1997)).

2016See People v. Diaz , 2015 CO 28, ¶25 (A court applies a rational basis test "where, as here, no traditionally suspect class is present, no fundamental right is at issue, and no other classification warrants review under strict or intermediate scrutiny."). ¶21 Under this test, "a statutory classification is presumed constitutional and does not violate equal protection unless it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the classification does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose." Pace Membership Warehouse, Div. of K-Mart Corp. v. Axelson , 938 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo

2021Our review must be “especially deferential to legislative choice: ‘[S]o long as it is arguable that the other branch of government had [a rational] basis for creating the classification, a court should not invalidate the law.’” Culver v. Ace Elec., 971 P.2d 641, 646 (Colo. 1999) (quoting 2 Ronald D.

2004Under the rational basis test, the party asserting the statute’s unconstitutionality must show that the classification “lacks a legitimate governmental purpose and, without a rational basis, arbitrarily singles out a group of persons for disparate treatment in comparison to other persons who are similarly situated.” Culver, 971 P.2d at 646 .

2021He relies on Brown v. People, 239 P.3d 764, 770 (Colo. 2010), for the proposition that “a criminal defendant who maintains his innocence may receive an inconsistent jury instruction . . . provided there is a rational basis for the instruction in the evidentiary record.” Id.

2021He relies on Brown v. People, 239 P.3d 764, 770 (Colo. 2010), for the proposition that “a criminal defendant who maintains his innocence may receive an inconsistent jury instruction . . . provided there is a rational basis for the instruction in the evidentiary record.” Id.

2020Under the approach we took there, which we described as essentially rational basis review, “it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged [legislation] actually motivated the legislature.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (outlining rational basis review in equal protection context).12 In other words, the rational basis test ensures rational government enactments. ¶54 But the due process limitation we discussed in Town of Dillon is independent from the separate and distinct constraint located in article II, section 13

2010Pace Membership Warehouse, 938 P.2d at 507 ("[a] statute can only be stricken under the rational basis standard if there exists no reasonably conceivable set of facts to establish a rational relationship between the statute and a legitimate governmental purpose"); see also Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 313-14 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 (in equal protection context, rational basis review is a "paradigm of judicial restraint": "Where there are 'plausible reasons' for Congress' action, 'our inquiry is at an end.'" (quoting United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 , 101 S.Ct. 453 , 66

2016However, three divisions of this court have examined this issue. ¶63 In Trinen v. City & County of Denver , 53 P.3d 754, 757 (Colo. App. 2002) (a decision by a division of this court with which the majority disagrees), the division held that the Robertson court "essentially applied the rational basis test" and "implicitly found that the right to bear arms is not a fundamental right." See also Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condos.

2016However, three divisions of this court have examined this issue. ¶63 In Trinen v. City & County of Denver , 53 P.3d 754, 757 (Colo. App. 2002) (a decision by a division of this court with which the majority disagrees), the division held that the Robertson court "essentially applied the rational basis test" and "implicitly found that the right to bear arms is not a fundamental right." See also Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condos.

2016Home Owners Ass'n, 2014 CO 37, ¶ 27 , 325 P.3d 1032 (Where an "ordinance does not implicate a fundamental right" it must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest or a "reasonable relationship between .the ordinance .and a legitimate government objective."). {64 In 2010, in Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, L.L.C. v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 280 P.3d 18, 21 (Colo.App.2010), aff'd, 2012 CO 17 , 271 P.3d 496 , a division 'of this court applied the Robertson reasonable exercise test in evaluating whether the statute requiring a permit to carry a conceale

2016Home Owners Ass’n , 2014 CO 37, ¶27 (Where an "ordinance does not implicate a fundamental right" it must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest or a "reasonable relationship between the ordinance and a legitimate government objective."). ¶64 In 2010, in Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, L.L.C. v. Regents of the University of Colorado , 280 P.3d 18, 21 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d , 2012 CO 17 , a division of this court applied the Robertson reasonable exercise test in evaluating whether the statute requiring a permit to carry a concealed handgun, sections 18-12201 t

1996Harris v. The Ark, 810 P.2d 226, 230 (Colo. 1991); accord, e.g., Bath v. Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 758 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Colo.1988); Dawson v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n., 664 P.2d 702, 707 (Colo.1983).

1994Equal protection of the law requires, under a rational basis analysis, that “a governmental classification which singles out a group of persons for disparate treatment be rationally founded on differences that are real and not illusory and that such classification be reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.” Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 675 (Colo.1987); see also Bath v. Department of Revenue, supra. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that their applications were handled differently than those submitted by private investigators who are current or retired law enforcement officer

2010Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803, 808 (Colo.1992).

1992The rational basis standard does not demand that legislatively created classifications be perfect, nor does it require that legislative action address the “ ‘ “whole field of possible abuses.” ’ ” Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803, 810 (Colo.1992) (quoting In re Interrogatories, 97 Colo. 587, 596 , 52 P.2d 663, 667 (1935) (in turn, quoting Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649, 661 , 43 S.Ct. 651, 656 , 67 L.Ed. 1157, 1164 (1923))); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 , 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162-63 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 502-03 (1970) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clau

1999See id.; Romero, 912 P.2d at 66 .

1998Industrial Claim *555 Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1996).

2016Home Owners Ass'n, 2014 CO 37, ¶ 27 , 325 P.3d 1032 (Where an "ordinance does not implicate a fundamental right" it must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest or a "reasonable relationship between .the ordinance .and a legitimate government objective."). {64 In 2010, in Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, L.L.C. v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 280 P.3d 18, 21 (Colo.App.2010), aff'd, 2012 CO 17 , 271 P.3d 496 , a division 'of this court applied the Robertson reasonable exercise test in evaluating whether the statute requiring a permit to carry a conceale

2016Home Owners Ass’n , 2014 CO 37, ¶27 (Where an "ordinance does not implicate a fundamental right" it must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest or a "reasonable relationship between the ordinance and a legitimate government objective."). ¶64 In 2010, in Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, L.L.C. v. Regents of the University of Colorado , 280 P.3d 18, 21 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d , 2012 CO 17 , a division of this court applied the Robertson reasonable exercise test in evaluating whether the statute requiring a permit to carry a concealed handgun, sections 18-12201 t

1997See Colorado Soc’y of Community and Institutional Psychologists, Inc. v. Lamm, 741 P.2d 707, 711 (Colo.1987).

1996Colorado Society of Community & Institutional Psychologists, Inc. v. Lamm, supra. A statute being analyzed under the rational basis test is presumed to be constitutional and a party challenging it bears the burden of proving that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.

1996The first prong of the rational basis test, see, e.g., Harris, 810 P.2d at 230 — whether there is a reasonable basis in fact to distinguish between those who commit a sex offense by itself or in conjunction with a lesser crime and those who commit a sex offense in addition to a more serious crime — can be disposed of easily.

1996The first prong of the rational basis test, see, e.g., Harris , 810 P.2d at 230—whether there is a reasonable basis in fact to distinguish between those who commit a sex offense by itself or in conjunction with a lesser crime and those who commit a sex offense in addition to a more serious crime—can be disposed of easily.

1992We decline to follow the jurisprudence of the Trujillo court because we do not recognize a right' to full recovery for damages, nor do we view (as claimants concede) the rational basis inquiry to be ‘largely toothless.’ See, e.g., Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 50 (Colo.1984) (a legislative classification failed under a rational basis test); and Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo.1989) (statute failed to pass rational basis test). .

1992We decline to follow the jurisprudence of the Trujillo court because we do not recognize a right' to full recovery for damages, nor do we view (as claimants concede) the rational basis inquiry to be ‘largely toothless.’ See, e.g., Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 50 (Colo.1984) (a legislative classification failed under a rational basis test); and Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo.1989) (statute failed to pass rational basis test). .

1994Under the rational basis standard of review, the classification will be "upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communication, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); see also Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485 , 110 S.Ct. 2499, 2504 , 110 L.Ed.2d 438 (1990); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 , 99 S.Ct. 939, 949-50 , 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 484-85 , 90 S.Ct. at 1161-62 .

1994Under the rational basis standard of review, the classification will be "upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communication, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); see also Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485 , 110 S.Ct. 2499, 2504 , 110 L.Ed.2d 438 (1990); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 , 99 S.Ct. 939, 949-50 , 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 484-85 , 90 S.Ct. at 1161-62 .

1991E.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 , 86 S.Ct. 760, 762 , 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966); Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 675 (Colo.1987); Hurricane v. Kanover, Ltd., 651 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Colo.1982).

1991E.g., Hurricane v. Kanover, Ltd., 651 P.2d 1218 (Colo.1982); Smith v. Charnes, 649 P.2d 1089 (Colo.1982).

2016Home Owners Ass'n, 2014 CO 37, ¶ 27 , 325 P.3d 1032 (Where an "ordinance does not implicate a fundamental right" it must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest or a "reasonable relationship between .the ordinance .and a legitimate government objective."). {64 In 2010, in Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, L.L.C. v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 280 P.3d 18, 21 (Colo.App.2010), aff'd, 2012 CO 17 , 271 P.3d 496 , a division 'of this court applied the Robertson reasonable exercise test in evaluating whether the statute requiring a permit to carry a conceale

2016Home Owners Ass’n , 2014 CO 37, ¶27 (Where an "ordinance does not implicate a fundamental right" it must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest or a "reasonable relationship between the ordinance and a legitimate government objective."). ¶64 In 2010, in Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, L.L.C. v. Regents of the University of Colorado , 280 P.3d 18, 21 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d , 2012 CO 17 , a division of this court applied the Robertson reasonable exercise test in evaluating whether the statute requiring a permit to carry a concealed handgun, sections 18-12201 t

2004Scholz, 851 P.2d at 906 (“The HCAA does not infringe on a fundamental right, nor does it create a classification based on race, religion, national origin, or gender.

2002In Scholz, we held that the HCAA must be reviewed under the rational basis test because it "does not infringe on a fundamental right, nor does it create a classification based on race, religion, national origin, or gender." Scholz, 851 P.2d at 906 .

1996Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270 (Colo.1991).

1996In the absence of a classification that infringes on a fundamental right, creates a suspect class, or creates a classification subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, such as illegitimacy and gender, "persons may be treated differently without violating equal protection guarantees if the statutory classification has some reasonable basis in fact and bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Colo. 1991).

1991E.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 , 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1300 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Branson v. City and County of Denver, 707 P.2d 338, 340 (Colo. 1985).

1991City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Bath v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 758 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Colo.1988); Branson, 707 P.2d at 340 . “[I]n order to subject a law to any form of judicial review under the equal protection guarantee, one must be able to demonstrate that the law classifies persons in some manner.” J.

1989Stevenson v. Industrial Commission, 190 Colo. 234 , 545 P.2d 712 (1976).

1989Stevenson v. Industrial Commission, 190 Colo. 234 , 545 P.2d 712 (1976).

2020Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was 12We note that even under rational basis review, a more searching inquiry is called for where a law exhibits animus, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996), unsubstantiated fear, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985), or a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 32 required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrat

1991City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Bath v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 758 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Colo.1988); Branson, 707 P.2d at 340 . “[I]n order to subject a law to any form of judicial review under the equal protection guarantee, one must be able to demonstrate that the law classifies persons in some manner.” J.