rational basis test in New York

2023The deference afforded by the rational basis test makes it “a paradigm of judicial restraint” (see Knox, 12 NY3d at 69 [internal quotation marks omitted]; Affronti, 95 NY2d at 719 ).

2020At bottom, the rational basis standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint.” (Myers, 30 NY3d at 15-16 [internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted]; see Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001]; Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 320 [1993].) Applying this undemanding level of judicial review, the temporary confinement of sex offenders in correctional facilities, while on a waiting list for SARA-compliant NYCDHS housing, is rationally related to a conceivable, legitimate government purpose of keeping level three sex offenders more than 1,000 feet away from schools.

2020At bottom, the rational basis standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint.” (Myers, 30 NY3d at 15-16 [internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted]; see Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001]; Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 320 [1993].) Applying this undemanding level of judicial review, the temporary confinement of sex offenders in correctional facilities, while on a waiting list for SARA-compliant NYCDHS housing, is rationally related to a conceivable, legitimate government purpose of keeping level three sex offenders more than 1,000 feet away from schools.

2017In addressing claims alleging equal protection violations, a court first must determine whether to apply a strict scrutiny analysis or the less stringent rational basis analysis (Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 319 [1993]; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v Bakke, 438 US 265 [1978]; Soberal-Perez v Heckler, 717 F2d 36, 41 [2d Cir 1983]; Alevy v Downstate Med.

2011Co. v State Tax Commn., 45 NY2d 529, 535 [1978]), this rational basis standard “is especially deferential in the context of classifications made by complex tax laws” (Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d at 289 ; Trump v Chu, supra).

2011“The rational basis standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 290 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1276 [2000]; FCC v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 US 307, 314 [1993]) and requires the challenger to negate “ ‘every conceivable basis which might support [the state’s interest] whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d at 719 , quoting Heller v Doe, 509 US 3

2016Otherwise, government action is subject to the rational basis standard of review, which requires that the action be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose (Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v Garrett, 531 US 356, 367 [2001]; see also Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242 [1984]).

2016Otherwise, government action is subject to the rational basis standard of review, which requires that the action be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose (Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v Garrett, 531 US 356, 367 [2001]; see also Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242 [1984]).

2008Here, the court applied the rational basis standard, pursuant to which an ordinance will be sustained provided that it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (see Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432, 439-440 [1985]).

2007Using the rational basis test to review this allegation of sexual orientation discrimination, the “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest” (Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432, 440 [1985]; see Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631-633 [1996]; Matter of Valentine v American Airlines, 17 AD3d at 42 ).

2007Using the rational basis test to review this allegation of sexual orientation discrimination, the “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest” (Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432, 440 [1985]; see Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631-633 [1996]; Matter of Valentine v American Airlines, 17 AD3d at 42 ).

2006As to the level of scrutiny regarding assertions of sexual orientation discrimination, we recently held, in Matter of Valentine v American Airlines ( 17 AD3d 38, 42 [2005]), as follows: “Courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have applied the rational basis standard, rather than strict or heightened scrutiny, when reviewing sexual orientation discrimination allegations (see Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631-633 [1996]; Lofton v Secretary of Dept, of Children & Family Servs., 358 F3d 804, 818 [11th Cir 2004], cert denied [543] US [1081] [2005]; Schroeder v Hamilton School Dist., 282 F3

1998If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” (Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485 [1970]; see also, Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 61 [1975].) Under the rational basis standard, the “general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest * * * When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal P

1992Under the rational basis standard, so long as a classification created by regulatory legislation bears some reasonable relationship to a legitimate State purpose it does not offend the Constitution (Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41 ).

2016Education is not a fundamental right under either the Federal or State Constitutions and, absent any allegation that the challenged legislation discriminates against a suspect class, binding precedent establishes that “the rational basis test [is] the appropriate standard” (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d at 320; see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 40-44 [1973]; Reform Educ.

2016Applying the rational basis standard delineated by the Supreme Court of the United States in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v Rodriguez ( 411 US 1 [1973]), the Court observed in Levittown “that the justification offered by the State — the preservation and promotion of local control of education — is both a legitimate State interest and one to which the present financing system is reasonably related” (Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch.

2025People v. Drayton , 39 NY2d 580, 584 (1976).

1980Since the classification does not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental interest, the rational basis test applies and the classification will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it (People v Drayton, 39 NY2d 580, 584, 585 ).

2024"The rational basis test is not a demanding one" ( Knox , 12 NY3d at 69 ; see Myers v Schneiderman , 30 NY3d 1 , 15 [2017], rearg denied 30 NY3d 1009 [2017]); "rather, it is 'the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny' " ( Myers , 30 NY3d at 15, quoting Dallas v Stanglin , 490 US 19, 26 [1989]).

2024"The rational basis test is not a demanding one" ( Knox , 12 NY3d at 69 ; see Myers v Schneiderman , 30 NY3d 1 , 15 [2017], rearg denied 30 NY3d 1009 [2017]); "rather, it is 'the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny' " ( Myers , 30 NY3d at 15, quoting Dallas v Stanglin , 490 US 19, 26 [1989]).

1993Having concluded that the rational basis standard of review is appropriate, the test to be applied is whether the classification "rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective” (McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 425 ; People v Whidden, 51 NY2d 457, 460 ).

1986In People v Whidden ( 51 NY2d 457, 460 ), Judge Wachtler for the majority set forth as the rational basis test "whether the varied treatment of separate classifications of citizens 'rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective’ (McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 425 )”. .

2011“The rational basis standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 290 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1276 [2000]; FCC v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 US 307, 314 [1993]) and requires the challenger to negate “ ‘every conceivable basis which might support [the state’s interest] whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d at 719 , quoting Heller v Doe, 509 US 3

2007“The rational basis standard is 1 “a paradigm of judicial restraint” ’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001], quoting Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 290 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1276 [2000], quoting FCC v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 US 307, 314 [1993]) and, in order to prevail where the standard is employed, a party must demonstrate that the facts upon which the governmental decision was conceivably based, “ ‘whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record’ ” (see Affronti v Crosson, supra at 719, quoting Heller v

2024"The rational basis test is not a demanding one" ( Knox , 12 NY3d at 69 ; see Myers v Schneiderman , 30 NY3d 1 , 15 [2017], rearg denied 30 NY3d 1009 [2017]); "rather, it is 'the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny' " ( Myers , 30 NY3d at 15, quoting Dallas v Stanglin , 490 US 19, 26 [1989]).

2024"The rational basis test is not a demanding one" ( Knox , 12 NY3d at 69 ; see Myers v Schneiderman , 30 NY3d 1 , 15 [2017], rearg denied 30 NY3d 1009 [2017]); "rather, it is 'the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny' " ( Myers , 30 NY3d at 15, quoting Dallas v Stanglin , 490 US 19, 26 [1989]).

2006As to the level of scrutiny regarding assertions of sexual orientation discrimination, we recently held, in Matter of Valentine v American Airlines ( 17 AD3d 38, 42 [2005]), as follows: “Courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have applied the rational basis standard, rather than strict or heightened scrutiny, when reviewing sexual orientation discrimination allegations (see Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631-633 [1996]; Lofton v Secretary of Dept, of Children & Family Servs., 358 F3d 804, 818 [11th Cir 2004], cert denied [543] US [1081] [2005]; Schroeder v Hamilton School Dist., 282 F3

2005Courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have applied the rational basis standard, rather than strict or heightened scrutiny, when reviewing sexual orientation discrimination allegations (see Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631-633 [1996]; Lofton v Secretary of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F3d 804, 818 [11th Cir 2004], cert denied — US —, 125 S Ct 869 [2005]; Schroeder v Hamilton School Dist., 282 F3d 946, 950-951 [7th Cir 2002], cert denied 537 US 974 [2002]; Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344 , 364 [1985] [noting that courts hav

2014It is undisputed that the disparate judicial salary schedule set forth in Judiciary Law § 221-i does not implicate a suspect class or a fundamental right, and thus it is subject to the rational basis standard of review (see Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 718-719 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001]; D'Amico v Crosson, 93 NY2d 29, 31-32 [1999]).

2014It is undisputed that the disparate judicial salary schedule set forth in Judiciary Law § 221-i does not implicate a suspect class or a fundamental right, and thus it is subject to the rational basis standard of review (see Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 718-719 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001]; D'Amico v Crosson, 93 NY2d 29, 31-32 [1999]).

2007Using the rational basis test to review this allegation of sexual orientation discrimination, the “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest” (Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432, 440 [1985]; see Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631-633 [1996]; Matter of Valentine v American Airlines, 17 AD3d at 42 ).

2006As to the level of scrutiny regarding assertions of sexual orientation discrimination, we recently held, in Matter of Valentine v American Airlines ( 17 AD3d 38, 42 [2005]), as follows: “Courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have applied the rational basis standard, rather than strict or heightened scrutiny, when reviewing sexual orientation discrimination allegations (see Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631-633 [1996]; Lofton v Secretary of Dept, of Children & Family Servs., 358 F3d 804, 818 [11th Cir 2004], cert denied [543] US [1081] [2005]; Schroeder v Hamilton School Dist., 282 F3

2003(Id. at 435.) Pointing out that the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual states to violate the Equal Protection Clause (see Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365, 382 [1971]), and that Congress, in effect, has authorized New York “to determine for itself the extent to which it will discriminate against legal aliens for State Medicaid eligibility” (Aliessa, 96 NY2d at 433 ), the Court of Appeals concluded that the challenged state legislation could not take advantage of the applicability of the rational basis test to federal legislation but, rather

2003In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals recognized that the rational basis test applies to federal legislation which places restrictions on the rights of aliens and that, in some instances, the application of this test may be extended to state legislation which, under the express authority of Congress, implements such federal legislation. ( See Aliessa , 96 NY2d at 432-433 .) However, emphasizing that, under the United {** 2 Misc 3d at 613 }States Constitution, Congress is charged with the exclusive responsibility for establishing uniform rules on immigration and on the conditions im

2014It is undisputed that the disparate judicial salary schedule set forth in Judiciary Law § 221-i does not implicate a suspect class or a fundamental right, and thus it is subject to the rational basis standard of review (see Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 718-719 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001]; D'Amico v Crosson, 93 NY2d 29, 31-32 [1999]).

2014It is undisputed that the disparate judicial salary schedule set forth in Judiciary Law § 221-i does not implicate a suspect class or a fundamental right, and thus it is subject to the rational basis standard of review (see Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 718-719 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001]; D'Amico v Crosson, 93 NY2d 29, 31-32 [1999]).

1990In reviewing plaintiff’s claims it must first be noted that those in plaintiff’s position do not constitute a suspect class, nor do the requirements of CPLR 3012-a interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right; therefore, the statute should not be subjected to strict scrutiny but rather a rational basis standard of judicial review (see, Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250 , appeal dismissed 474 US 802 ; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 59 ; see also, Vance v Bradley, 440 US 93, 96-97 ).

1986The proper standard of review is a rational basis test, under which a statute will be upheld absent a showing that the different treatment of different persons is so unrelated to the achievement of a legitimate purpose that it becomes readily apparent that the Legislature’s actions were irrational (Vance v Bradley, 440 US 93, 97 ).

1978Center of State of N. Y. ( 39 NY2d 326 ) and, therefore, the appropriate standard is the traditional rational basis test (Riley v County of Monroe, supra).

1977Center of State of N. Y. ( 39 NY2d 326 ), the traditional rational basis test is appropriate.

1998If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” (Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485 [1970]; see also, Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 61 [1975].) Under the rational basis standard, the “general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest * * * When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal P

1987When reviewing a statute or constitutional provision under the rational basis test, the law will be upheld if it is found that there exists a rational relationship to a permissible State interest (see, Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471 ).

2011“The rational basis standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 290 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1276 [2000]; FCC v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 US 307, 314 [1993]) and requires the challenger to negate “ ‘every conceivable basis which might support [the state’s interest] whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d at 719 , quoting Heller v Doe, 509 US 3

2007“The rational basis standard is 1 “a paradigm of judicial restraint” ’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001], quoting Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 290 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1276 [2000], quoting FCC v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 US 307, 314 [1993]) and, in order to prevail where the standard is employed, a party must demonstrate that the facts upon which the governmental decision was conceivably based, “ ‘whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record’ ” (see Affronti v Crosson, supra at 719, quoting Heller v

1994The claims were rejected pursuant to the Court’s determination that use of the rational basis standard was proper for examination of the State’s public school financing system (Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v Nyquist, supra, at 41).

1990In Board of Educ. v Nyquist ( 57 NY2d 27 [1982]) the rational basis standard was employed in a case challenging the State formula for aid to education, the court stating (at 43-44): "The circumstance that public education is unquestionably high on the list of priorities of governmental concern and responsibility, involving the expenditures of enormous sums of State and local revenue, enlisting the most active attention of our citizenry and of our Legislature, and manifested by express articulation in our State Constitution, does not automatically entitle it to classification as a 'fundamental

2001The rational basis standard of review is especially deferential in the context of classifications created by complex tax laws (see, Nordlinger v Hahn, supra, at 11; Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 289 , cert denied 530 US 1276 ).

1996Under this rational basis standard, no deprivation of equal protection of the law occurs so long as there is a plausible reason for the nonsuspect classification of the aggrieved complainant (Federal Communications Commn. v Beach Communications, 508 US 307, 313-314 ; Nordlinger v Hahn, 505 US 1, 11 ).